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INTERFIRM COOPERATION EFFECTS AND A VENTURE CAPITAL PERSPECTIVE
Improving medicine and health is the ultimate purpose of biotechnological innovation,
where basic science is used to develop new innovative diagnostics and therapeutics to
significantly improve the lives of patients worldwide. Concurrently, for three stakeholder
groups, the primary goal is to generate profitable business from biotechnological innova -
tion. These stakeholders are ‘entrepreneurial’ biotech companies, venture capitalists and
established pharmaceutical firms.
This dissertation evaluates interfirm cooperation and venture capital investments, aiming
to better understand how more biotechnological innovation can reach the market and
which biotechnologies will revolutionize R&D productivity and global healthcare. The first
studies show that alliances between established pharmaceutical firms and biotech compa -
nies outperform acquisitions of biotech companies by such firms, as these acquisi tion negati -
vely affect innovation performance. Furthermore, alliances involve a risk-return trade-off in
new product development, for biotech companies as technology suppliers. Moreover, for
big pharma, alliances with- and acquisitions of biotech companies are both complementary
innovation activities at higher levels of firms’ absorptive capacity.
Regarding venture capital, the final studies show that venture capitalists fulfil a crucial
role in the biopharmaceutical value chain. By investing in the right technologies and
therapeutic areas, venture capitalists build for big pharma as they foresee big pharma’s
future innovation demand. Simultaneously, venture capitalists create a technology push as
visionary technological gatekeepers. 
Finally, the dissertation concludes that big pharma’s dominant logic and blockbuster
paradigm have been the root cause of underutilized biotechnological innovation. It further
proposes transformation towards a new organizational form for sustainable science-based
business and effective exploitation of biotechnological innovation.
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              Chapter  1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This dissertation evaluates interfirm cooperation and venture capital investments in the 
context of biotechnological innovation and science-based business. After the rise of 
biotechnological innovation, several promising waves of technological development have 
emerged but as yet, the potential and initial expectations of biotechnology have not been 
realized. The studies in this dissertation aim to better understand how more 
biotechnological innovation can reach the market and which biotechnologies will 
revolutionize R&D productivity and global healthcare. Related processes are evaluated 
from different business perspectives (i.e. entrepreneurial biotech companies, established 
pharmaceutical firms and venture capitalists). The focus lies on the following themes: 
Technological development of initial biotechnological innovation (chapter 2); the 
dynamics of interfirm cooperation and how biotech companies can increase the likelihood 
of eventual product introduction (chapter 3); how pharmaceutical firms can adapt interfirm 
cooperation dynamics to increase R&D productivity and innovation performance (chapter 
4); and which new fields of biotechnological innovation may shape the future of the 
science-business model from a venture capital perspective (chapters 5 and 6). The current 
chapter introduces the context as well as the central concepts of this dissertation. Section 
1.2 provides an outline of the dissertation, including a schematic overview and brief 
summaries of the individual chapters. It also presents an overview of the various chapters 
(table 1.1), including their publication status. The central concepts are introduced in 
section 1.3, namely: biotechnology, the value chain, interfirm cooperation, and venture 
capital. Each subsequent chapter of this dissertation can be read independently. 
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1.1 Science-based business 
Improving medicine and health is the ultimate purpose of medical biotechnological 
innovation, where basic science is used to develop new innovative diagnostics and 
therapeutics to improve the lives of patients worldwide. Concurrently, for three out of four 
stakeholder groups, the primary goal is to generate profitable business. These stakeholders 
are ‘entrepreneurial’ biotech companies, venture capitalists (VCs) and established 
pharmaceutical firms. A fourth group of stakeholders are the academic research institutions 
or universities, which provide much of the fundamental science and intellectual property 
(IP) that fuels biotechnological innovation.  
 
Traditionally, business and science were two separate constructs. On the one hand, 
established chemical and pharmaceutical firms were in the business of developing new 
drugs based on chemistry and pharmacology 1. On the other hand, universities and other 
research institutions were primarily focused on advancing basic science 2. Scientific 
breakthroughs in understanding the fundamentals of DNA and genetic engineering opened 
the realm of possibilities of modern biotechnological innovation (see glossary 1.3.1).  
 
New possibilities for developing innovative diagnostics and therapeutics led to a strong 
convergence of science and business, which in turn led to the evolution of a new 
organizational form, with science-based businesses at the centre of it 2, 3. Advances in 
biosciences combined with three fundamental driving forces in the general innovation 
system co-shaped this evolution. Pisano 2 describes these driving forces as changes taking 
place in the convergence of science and business with the emergence of biotechnology in 
the latter decades of the 20th century.  
 
The first significant change concerned the demise of central corporate research laboratories 
as fundamental research was increasingly viewed as a cost rather than an investment. 
Although this was a general trend, large pharmaceutical corporations have always been 
highly dependent on their internal research and development (R&D) efforts and operate 
corporate research laboratories to this day. However, these large incumbents started to 
realize that internal efforts alone were not sufficient to fuel pipelines with innovations 4, 5. 
Therefore they started to look outside the boundaries of the firm for innovation, adopting 
the open innovation model 6, 7. This is a trend that coincides with the rise of biotechnology 
and science-based business, and is further explored in chapter 4. 
 
The second change was the universities’ increasing focus on appropriating monetary 
returns on their intellectual property. Where academic knowledge institutions used to 
primarily focus on basic scientific research as opposed to applied science, the extent of 
their patenting, licensing and spin-off activities expanded dramatically in the latter decades 
of the 20th century 2, 8, 9. 
 
Finally, there was the emergence of new science-based entrepreneurial businesses, mainly 
in life sciences, due to significant scientific advances in biosciences and biotechnology. 
Science-based businesses are defined as “entities that both participate in the creation and 
advancement of science and attempt to capture financial returns from this participation”, 
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 3 
emphasizing that “they are not simply ‘users’ of science, but contributors to it as well” 2. 
Noteworthy, the science underlying these new companies is not as well developed as the 
science underlying start-ups in other high-technology industries. Moreover, science-based 
entrepreneurial businesses in biotechnology face significantly higher risk profiles and 
longer R&D trajectories than start-ups in other industries such as electronics or software 2. 
Biopharmaceutical products in development follow a very specific and highly regulated 
value chain, which is elaborated on in glossary 1.3.2. The path of the recent history of 
biotechnology and waves of innovation spurring from the scientific advancement of 
genetic engineering are specified in glossary 1.3.1. 
 
These driving forces shaped the current ‘science-business model’, and Genentech, 
incorporated in 1976, laid its foundation. As the first biotech company, Genentech formed 
the first cooperative R&D agreement with Eli Lilly to further develop and market the first 
biologic (Humulin®, launched in 1982). In 1980 Genentech was the first biotech company 
to go public, while having no marketed products or revenue. This, however, successful 
initial public offering (IPO), and subsequent others 10, made the biotech sector increasingly 
attractive for VCs 2.  
 
The success of this ‘science-business model’ inspired high expectations of biotechnological 
innovation, especially in light of the productivity gap and innovation deficits of large 
incumbent pharmaceutical firms 5, 11, 12. Imminent patent expirations on blockbuster drugs 
and deficits of new potential ones led to enormous increases of R&D expenditures as well 
as an increasing trend of mergers & acquisitions (M&A) and alliances with biotech 
companies 13-15. Biotechnology as a new source of external innovation was expected to be 
the answer to the challenges of the pharmaceutical industry 3, 16. 
 
However, despite several success stories of biotech companies, optimistic expectations of 
biotechnology remain unsupported by empirical evidence and the “biotech revolution” has 
been disappointing in terms of new productivity and financial performance 2, 5, 16, 17. Some 
insinuate that biotechnology would never deliver on its promising expectations of 
revolutionizing drug R&D 16, 17. Others, however, believe that it can, provided that industry 
organization and anatomy are adapted 2, 18 or through new technological innovation such as 
personalized medicine 19, 20. 
 
Different levels of uncertainty21, 22 pertaining to science and waves of innovation require 
different management tools and strategic approaches to extract the technological potential. 
Regarding the organization of science and business, there is much to learn before we may 
reap the true benefits of biotechnology in medicine. The studies in this dissertation focus 
on the future of biotechnological innovation by, on the one hand, exploring the increasing 
trend of interfirm cooperation and its effects on innovation performance and productivity in 
the current industry setting; and, on the other hand, by exploring which type of 
innovation(s) will co-shape the future organization of science-based business. The aim is to 
better understand processes that take place from different business perspectives (i.e. 
entrepreneurial biotech companies, established pharmaceutical firms and VCs) with 
regards to how more biotechnological innovation can reach the market and which 
biotechnologies will revolutionize R&D productivity and eventually global healthcare. The 
focus lies on the following main themes: Technological development of initial 
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biotechnological innovation (chapter 2); the dynamics of interfirm cooperation and how 
biotech companies can increase the likelihood of eventual product introduction (chapter 3); 
how pharmaceutical firms can adapt interfirm cooperation dynamics to increase R&D 
productivity and innovation performance (chapter 4); and which new fields of 
biotechnological innovation may shape the future of the science-business model from a 
venture capital (VC) perspective (chapters 5 and 6).  
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1.2 Outline 
This dissertation presents several studies from the perspective of three key stakeholders 
involved in the ‘science-business model’ regarding biotechnological innovation in 
medicine. It is important to note that the scope of the dissertation is limited to business 
interests of commercial stakeholders. For this reason, none of the studies presented in this 
dissertation pertain to the perspective of academic knowledge institutions or universities. 
Thus, the dissertation follows a triangular structure of distinct vantage points and business 
interests, with biotechnological innovation at the centre (figure 1.1). 
 
Figure 1.1 Outline of the dissertation in a schematic view !
!!
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Chapter 2 introduces technological forecasting of biotechnologies using technology S-
curve theory 23, 24. We assess the development stage of the first wave of biotechnological 
innovation, by analysing patents related to the recombinant DNA (rDNA) and monoclonal 
antibody (mAb) technologies. This chapter shows that, in terms of innovation entering the 
R&D pipeline, this first wave has reached a stage of saturation. Due to the average time-
span of R&D between patent application and product approval, this saturation has not yet 
been reflected in biotechnological products on the market, but will affect future 
productivity. 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 explore effects of interfirm cooperation on company-level productivity 
and innovation performance from two different perspectives. Chapter 3 investigates 
innovation clusters, strategic alliances and acquisitions as three different dimensions of 
inter-firm cooperation, and their relationship with biotech companies’ future product 
introductions and financial returns. The study focuses on the perspective of the technology 
supplier, in this case biotech companies, and their strategic options with regards to 
interfirm cooperation. A trade-off between risk and return is revealed for biotech 
companies looking to further develop and commercialize their innovative products. 
 
Chapter 4 examines the effects of strategic alliances and M&A on the innovation 
performance of the technology recipient, in this case established pharmaceutical firms. In 
this context, the chapter further explores the role of technology relatedness and firms’ 
absorptive capacity. M&A and consequential consolidation of the pharmaceutical industry 
have been an increasing trend that coincided with the evolution of science-based business 
and the rise of biotechnology. The study shows that pharmaceutical firms have increasingly 
preferred (unrelated) biotechnology companies as their alliance and acquisition targets as 
opposed to other (related) traditional pharmaceutical companies. However, it also shows 
that effects of such interfirm cooperation on established firms’ innovation performance are 
moderated by their absorptive capacity. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the next waves of biotechnological innovation from a VC 
perspective. Chapter 5 includes an analysis of the distribution of VC funding over various 
biotechnology fields and therapeutic areas, which are defined through interviews and 
literature research. In addition, it includes the transaction values and multiples realized in 
trade sale deals of VC-backed companies. The chapter is divided into two parts. First, it 
demonstrates the role of VCs as technology gatekeepers, based on an analysis of 
investments in- and trade sales of portfolio companies backed between 1999 and 2013, 
only including trade sale data from these respective companies. The second part shows 
which therapeutic areas and broad technology fields have benefitted VCs most by 
presenting an analysis of trade sales of VC-backed companies that occurred between 2010 
and 2014. 
  
Chapter 6 combines qualitative and quantitative research to conduct a systematic 
prioritization analysis of VCs’ investment priorities in terms of biotechnologies and 
therapeutic areas, as well as associated investment barriers. The study reveals several 
niches of technology – therapeutic area combinations with high VC attractiveness. 
Furthermore, it exposes high-prioritized barriers specific to these niches, that when 
overcome at an early stage could significantly increase VC attractiveness of new ventures. 
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Finally, chapter 7 summarizes the key findings and recapitulates how each chapter 
contributes to existing literature and the overall aim of the dissertation. Furthermore, the 
main conclusions are further discussed in the organizational context of science-based 
business and the dominant pharmaceutical business model. In conclusion, several 
management implications of organizational innovation are discussed, recommendations for 
transforming science-based business are made, and avenues for further research are 
suggested. Table 1.1 presents a tabular overview of the individual dissertation chapters. 
8_Erim Fernald BW stand.job
 
 8 
 
 
Table 1.1 In-depth overview of the individual dissertation chapters 
 Chapter Title Central Research Question Sub-questions 
Theoretical 
perspective Methodology 
1 Introduction         
2 Limits of 
biotechnological 
innovation 
What is the current stage of 
the two first biotechnologies 
that are associated with 
marketed products? 
- What is the relation with the 
innovation paradox? 
- How have radicalness and value of 
inventions progressed over time? 
- Technology 
forecasting (S-
curve). 
- Technology trend 
analysis and 
forecasting.  
- Patent citation 
analysis 
3 Biotechnology 
commercializatio
n strategies; risk 
and return in 
interfirm 
cooperation 
How do alliances with a 
technology recipient affect 
risks and returns in 
biotechnological product 
development? 
- Effects of alliances (source vs. 
non-source) on product 
development and on product 
revenue? 
- Effects of being acquired on 
product development and on 
product revenue? 
 
- Exploration and 
Exploitation  
- Inter-
organisational 
cooperation and 
learning 
- Business clusters 
- Database-research.  
- OLS regression 
analyses.  
- Tobit regression 
analyses 
4 The moderating 
role of absorptive 
capacity and the 
differential 
effects of 
acquisitions and 
alliances on big 
pharma firms’ 
innovation 
performance 
How do acquisitions of- and 
alliances with biotech 
companies affect pharma 
firms’ innovation 
performance? 
- Main effects of alliances and 
acquisitions on innovation 
performance? 
- Interaction effects of alliances and 
acquisitions with R&D intensity 
(absorptive capacity) on innovation 
performance? 
- Open innovation  
- Exploration and 
Exploitation 
- Absorptive 
capacity 
- Resource-Based 
View 
- Database-research.  
- Poisson regression 
analyses 
- Negative binomial 
regression analyses. 
5-I Venture 
capitalists as 
gatekeepers for 
biotechnological 
innovation 
 
In which therapeutic areas 
and technology fields have 
VCs invested and in which 
are they realizing highest 
returns? 
- Which therapeutic areas? 
- Which technology fields? 
- Role of diagnostics and 
personalised medicine? 
- How do investments relate to trade 
sales? in terms of technology fields 
and therapeutic areas 
- Can we observe a general strategy 
of VCs from their investment 
behaviour? 
 
- Portfolio theory 
- Asset pricing 
- Strategic venture 
investing 
- Qualitative interviews 
- Database research 
- Analysis of 
investments 
 
5-II Biotech trade sale 
returns on 
venture capital – 
2010-2014 
Which type of companies 
and which therapeutic areas 
have benefitted VCs most 
between 2010-2014. 
 
Overview of trade sales and their 
initial VC investments (gross 
returns/multiples) per therapeutic 
area and broad technology field? 
- Portfolio theory 
- Asset pricing 
- Strategic venture 
investing 
- Database research 
- Analysis of trade sales 
6 A quantitative 
prioritization and 
barrier analysis 
of biotechnology 
fields and 
therapeutic 
areas; A venture 
capital 
Perspective 
How do life sciences venture 
capitalists prioritise 
biotechnology fields and 
therapeutic areas and 
associated innovation 
barriers? 
- Ranking of therapeutic areas and 
technologies (from VC perspective) 
- What are the investment barriers 
per top 3 therapeutic areas and top 3 
technology fields? 
- Portfolio theory 
- Investment 
behaviour 
- Investment 
selection 
- Qualitative interviews 
- Quantitative 
Questionnaires 
- Prioritization analysis 
7 Conclusions and discussion; summary of main conclusions and contributions, 
management implications, recommendations, and suggestion for further research 
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Data Main conclusions Status Outlet 
        
Patent and product data related to 
rDNA and mAb technologies over 
the period 1980-2011 (Source: 
AcclaimIP; Espacenet) 
Early biotechnologies have reached their technological limit and 
there is a lack of newer radically innovative technologies that are 
currently generating product innovations. These outcomes may be 
determinants for an innovation cliff in biotechnology. 
Published 
(2013)14 
 
Technology & 
Investment 
Company data of biotech firms that 
own(ed) rDNA and mAb patents 
over the period 1980-2011. 
(Source: AcclaimIP; Espacenet; 
ThomsonReuter’ SDC Platinum 
Database; Datastream; Compustat) 
Strategic alliances involve a risk-return trade-off. Increased biotech 
company involvement in alliances, as technology suppliers, 
decreases risk by increasing the likelihood of future product 
introductions. However, biotech companies earn lower returns when 
their products are developed through such alliances.  
A similar trade-off exists for biotech clusters, as they positively 
affect product introductions, but have a negative effect on returns. 
Acquisitions, however, negatively affect the likelihood of 
introducing biotechnological products, but have no effect on 
revenues gained from these products. 
Published 
(2015)25 
Journal of Product 
Innovation 
Management 
Pharma company data; NCEs; 
acquisitions and alliances; R&D 
intensity; over the period 1990-
2013. (Source: ThomsonReuter’ 
SDC Platinum Database; FDA 
(CDER and CBER); Datastream; 
Compustat) 
Increases in the number of acquisitions of biotech companies have 
negatively affected big pharma firms’ innovation performance. 
However, acquisitions of both pharma and biotech companies are 
complementary innovation activities at higher levels of absorptive 
capacity, whereas the general effects of these acquisitions appear to 
be negative. Noteworthy, pharma acquisitions outperform biotech 
acquisitions in this regard, illustrating the known influence of 
technology- and market-relatedness. The same complementarity 
exists between biotech alliances and absorptive capacity, while 
pharma alliances’ main effect is positive but these alliances turn out 
to be substitutive strategic options at higher levels of absorptive 
capacity.  
Submitted/ 
Under 
Review15 
R&D Management 
- Qualitative data from interviews 
with VCs 
- Data on 1,217 biotech/pharma 
VC-backed companies between 
1999-2013. (Source: 
ThomsonReuter’ SDC Platinum 
VentureXpert Database) 
- Relating technology fields, 
therapeutic areas of lead 
product(s). 
 
In terms of therapeutic areas, VCs can balance their average 
investments valuations more in correspondence with what big 
pharma is willing to pay. But, VCs have formidable insight in the 
types of technologies that do well. VCs seem to employ a strategy 
focused on both short-term and long-term success: On the one hand 
they play it safe, minimizing risk by investing most in small 
molecules and proteins. On the other hand, they are investing 
heavily in DNA/RNA technologies, which up until now have not yet 
proven to be very profitable. The blockbuster business model 
directly affects new venture financing by VCs. However, VCs are 
also rebelliously investing in the biotechnologies that underlie 
personalized medicine. 
Published 
(2015)26 
 
Journal of Commercial 
Biotechnology 
 
- Data on 115 VC-backed 
biotech/pharma ventures acquired 
between 2010-2014. (Source: 
ThomsonReuter’ SDC Platinum 
VentureXpert Database). 
- Relating technology fields, 
therapeutic areas of lead 
product(s). 
 
VCs have benefited most in the area of oncology; other beneficial 
therapeutic areas are infectious -, auto-immune - and central nervous 
system diseases. Furthermore, big pharma’s predominant 
blockbuster paradigm guides their acquisition preference and 
therewith their innovation demand. VCs predict the corresponding 
innovation supply and act as visionary technological gatekeepers27, 
building for big pharma. 
Accepted28 Nature Biotechnology 
- Qualitative data from interviews 
with VCs  
- Quantitative questionnaire data: 
prioritization of therapeutic areas, 
technology fields, and barriers to 
innovation. 
 
VCs seem to be considering cell- and gene therapy technologies as 
future disrupters in terms of innovation and economic development. 
VCs might be jumping the S-curve of technological development 
from proteins to gene and cell therapy 
Solving high-prioritized barriers for specific niches with high VC 
attractiveness could significantly increase competitive advantages 
for entrepreneurs. 
 
Submitted/ 
Under 
Review29 
Int. Journal of 
Biotechnology 
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1.3 Glossary of central concepts 
1.3.1 Biotechnology 
Biotechnology is in fact an all-encompassing term for various fields of biosciences. This 
dissertation solely focuses on biotechnology for medicine, excluding applications of 
biotechnology in other sectors. The invention of genetic engineering greatly influenced 
medical biotechnological innovation. The possibility of this became apparent after the 
discovery of the structure of DNA by Watson and Crick 30 in 1953 and was realized in 
1973 with the discovery of a recombinant DNA technique by Cohen et al. 31, using E.coli 
bacteria. Recombinant DNA (rDNA) technology was further developed and used to 
produce recombinant proteins as biotechnological products (i.e. biologics), with 
Genentech’s Humulin® being the first 32. These biologics were a totally new kind of 
therapeutics compared to the smaller chemical compounds traditionally developed and 
marketed by pharmaceutical companies. The technology has been used for the 
development of various kinds of recombinant proteins including cytokines, hormones, 
interferons, coagulation factors, fusion proteins, antibodies, and subunit vaccines. Many of 
these biologics became blockbuster products (i.e. selling over $1 billion/year). Table 1.2 
shows the top-selling biologics of 201333. 
 
Table 1.2 Top-selling biologics of 2013 (adapted from Lawrence and Lahteenmaki 33) 
 
 
Noticeably, most of the top-selling recombinant products are monoclonal antibodies 
(mAbs), which turned out to be the most profitable subsegment of recombinant proteins. 
Antibody technology, gradually improved from using murine mAbs, to chimeric, 
humanized and, finally, fully human mAbs 34. In 1986, Orthoclone OKT3® became the 
first approved murine mAb 35. Humira®, approved in 2002, was the first human mAb33, 
and by 2013 there were 31 approved therapeutic mAbs on the U.S. market (chapter 2) 14. 
The rise of these biologics as the first products of biotechnology can be considered the first 
wave of biotechnological innovation, which is further explored in chapter 2. 
Name Type Indication Lead company Approval date 
2013 
worldwide 
sales ($B) 
Humira® (adalimumab) mAb Inflammation, auto-
immune 
AbbVie Dec 31, 2002 10.66 
Enbrel® (etanercept) Protein Inflammation, auto-
immune 
Amgen Nov 2, 1998 8.74 
Lantus® (insulin glargine) Peptide Diabetes Sanofi Apr 20, 2000 7.59 
Rituxan® (rituximab) mAb Lymphoma, Leukemia Roche (Genentech) Nov 26, 1997 7.50 
Remicade® (infliximab) mAb Inflammation, auto-
immune 
Johnson & Johnson 
(Centocor) 
Aug 24, 1998 6.96 
Avastin® (bevacizumab) mAb Angiogenesis Roche (Genentech) Feb 26, 2004 6.75 
Herceptin® (trastuzumab) mAb Breast cancer Roche (Genentech) Sep 25, 1998 6.56 
Neulasta® (pegfilgrastim) Protein Chemotherapy induced 
infection 
Amgen Jan 31, 2002 4.39 
Copaxone® (glatiramer 
acetate) 
Peptide Multiple Sclerosis Teva Pharmaceutical Dec 20, 1996 4.36 
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Recombinant DNA techniques provided the tools needed for the further development of 
human gene therapy 36. It now became possible to modify viruses to incorporate and 
express foreign genes, including potentially therapeutic sequences. Recombinant SV40 
became the first vector to transfer foreign DNA into mammalian cells, and the viral vector 
model for gene therapy was adopted as a promising approach in 1976 37. In 1980, an 
attempt of primal gene therapy was conducted in a study with human patients, but failed 36. 
After much ethical contemplation, the first approved clinical trials were initiated around 
1990, using retroviral vectors 36. Two decades later, the first gene therapy product is 
approved for the European market, using an adeno-associated viral (AAV) vector 
(UniQure’s Glybera®) 38, 39.  
 
Similarly, with rDNA technologies, modification of whole cells (i.e. cellular engineering) 
became another possibility. Historically, cells were transferred since blood transfusions and 
the first bone marrow transplantation 40. However, modern cell therapies are more 
complex, involving the manipulation and engineering of cells based on genes that program 
their development and functions, and can be divided into two types. First, there are stem 
cell therapies, where modified stem cells are used for regenerative medicine and tissue 
engineering 41. Although ‘embryonic stem cells’ were discovered in 198142, the first 
clinical trial involving such stem cells was approved as late as 2009 43, due to several 
ethical concerns and regulatory issues. The second type of cell therapies concerns those 
using modified mature cells to perform specific functions in fighting diseases. Many cell 
therapies that are currently in clinical development concern treatments of autologous 
immune cells (e.g. dendritic cells, T-cell) for oncology  (i.e. immunotherapy or therapeutic 
cancer vaccines) 44.  
 
Although oncology is a common target, cell therapy is widely applicable, for example for 
cardiovascular diseases 45, 46 or neurodegenerative diseases 47. However, apart from 
Dendreon’s Provenge® and several tissue repair, transplantation, and cord blood products, 
there are no cell therapies that have reached market approval 48, 49. Although gene therapy 
and cell therapy are separate developments in biotechnology, advances in terms of clinical 
research and product development have been relatively closely consecutive. Therefore, 
together, gene- and cell therapies can be considered the second wave of biotechnological 
innovation (figure 1.2). 
 
Considering a third wave, it would primarily concern technologies that have vastly 
increased our understanding of human biology, and have mainly led to advances in 
molecular diagnostics. DNA sequencing followed by genome sequencing and genomics, 
initiated this wave, aiming at studying the genome to find disease related genes. The first 
full genome was sequenced in 1977, namely that of bacteriophage ΦX174 50. In 1990, ‘the 
human genome project’ commenced, aiming to sequence the entire human genome 51. It 
was completed in 2003, costing a total of $3 billion 52, and ‘the ENCODE project’ was 
initiated, aiming to identify and characterize all 20,000 – 25,000 genes found in ‘the human 
genome project’ 53. In 2007, next-generation sequencing technologies, such as Applied 
Biosystems’ SOLiD System, transformed biology research by causing a dramatic drop in 
sequencing costs 54. Subsequently, in 2010, ‘the 1,000 genomes project’ consortium 
publishes a map of human genome variation, including the whole-genome analysis of 
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1,000 people. Genome analysis and our consequential understanding of various diseases on 
a molecular level, will provide increasing ways of applying personalized medicine 55. 
Developing accompanying molecular diagnostics for existing or new therapeutics and 
therapies may revolutionize medicine and healthcare in the near future.  
 
At its completion in 2012, the ENCODE study confirms that the human genome contains 
20,687 protein-coding genes 56. With data from ‘the human genome project’ and ‘the 
ENCODE project’, the possibility to systematically study the human proteome, the vast 
scala of human proteins, became apparent. The aim of proteomics is to provide detailed 
descriptions of structure, function and control of biological systems in health and disease57, 
which will also play an increasingly important role in personalized medicine 19, 20. 
Moreover, cross-disciplinary developments with bioinformatics or systems biology will 
increase the possibilities19, 20. Developments of other biotechnologies such as drug delivery 
technologies and nanobiotechnologies coincided with these waves of innovation. An 
overview of biotechnology fields is included in chapter 5. 
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1.3.2 Biopharmaceutical value chain 
The value chain essentially describes the full R&D trajectory from basic research to 
eventual registration and marketing of a new therapeutic biopharmaceutical product. This 
trajectory has proven to be extremely risky with an average duration of 11.9 years 58, and 
costs of $0.8–$1.3 billion 59. Moreover there is an overall success rate of approximately 
10% for product candidates that enter clinical development 25, 60, 61. The current value chain 
has evolved along with high quality and ethical standards for clinical research, enforced by 
regulatory authorities 58. 
 
The links of the chains represent the phases in the R&D process, each concluded with 
milestones. With successful completion of each phase, value is created because risk of 
failure to reach the market is reduced. Evidently, some phases are riskier than others and, 
correspondingly, upon successful completion of those phases, more value is created (see 
glossary 1.3.4). As such, different kinds of products are associated with different risk 
profiles in their development, yet clinical phase II is usually most risky 62. 
 
The first moment of value creation occurs when the intellectual property underlying a 
product candidate is properly protected, which in this industry mainly concerns protection 
by one or multiple patents. This is in fact the first milestone, which is preceded by the 
discovery phase 63. In this phase various techniques and technologies can be used either to 
identify new lead compounds or engineer them. A potential product candidate is usually 
focused on a specific disease, often to validate a biotechnology platform that could also be 
used for other target diseases. The discovery phase mainly encompasses laboratory 
research resulting in a patent application. Although granting of patents can take up to 
several years, the invention is protected from the moment of application, provided that it is 
eventually granted. Therefore, early application forms a basis for further R&D.  
 
Onward, the product candidate is subjected to further study in the pre-clinical phase, using 
animal models. In addition to its focus on chemistry, manufacturing and control (CMC), 
this phase is primarily focused on assessing the potential of human treatment, by collecting 
data on efficacy and toxicity 63. After approval of a dossier of data from this phase by the 
respective regulatory authority, the product candidate may be further studied in clinical 
trials as an Investigational New Drug (IND) in the U.S. or under a Clinical Trial 
Agreement (CTA) in Europe. Reaching this milestone is the second moment of value 
creation, and is often referred to as pre-clinical ‘proof of concept’ (PoC). 
 
In the clinical phases of R&D, human participants are used as research subjects to prove a 
product candidate’s safety and efficacy. Any participant enters the research with informed 
consent and clinical research pertains to any medication, diagnostic product, medical 
device or treatment regimen. Clinical R&D consists of four sub-phases of controlled trials, 
with milestones of their own. 
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Figure 1.3 Schematic view of the (bio)pharmaceutical value chain  
(PoC, proof of concept; IND, investigational new drug; CTD, common technical document.  
Adapted from Pronker et al.63) 
 
 
 
The first sub-phase (i.e. Phase I trials) is an exploratory study to assess first in-human 
safety for multiple dosages of the product candidate in approximately 20-80 healthy 
participants64. It studies the administration, delivery, metabolism and excretion pathways, 
and toxicology (ADMET) of the product candidate as well as pharmacokinetic/ 
pharmacodynamics properties (PK/PD), taking around 0.5-1 year 64, 65.  
 
The second sub-phase (i.e. Phase II trials) often consist of a phase IIa and phase IIb trial. 
Phase IIa trials are still exploratory studies, but now aiming to assess safety and dose 
tolerability in 100-300 patients. Phase IIb trials aim to confirm effectiveness of the right 
dosage, studying delivery and biological activity, again with 100-300 patients. Phase II 
trials usually take between 1.5 and 2 years 63, 64. Successful completion of phase I and 
phase II trials mitigates a substantial portion of the risk and paves the way to confirmatory 
phase III trials. 
 
The third sub-phase (i.e. Phase III trials) concerns highly expensive, often multi-centre 
studies that aim to confirm safety, dosage and effectiveness in 1,000 to 5,000 patients, and 
taking between 3 and 4 years 64, 65. This phase is relatively less risky and due to the high 
amount of required resources, these trials are usually conducted by large established 
(bio)pharmaceutical firms that are often more risk-averse (see chapters 3 and 4). Upon 
successful completion, a Common Technical Document (CTD) containing all data from 
these studies according to specific safety and efficacy parameters, is submitted to the 
respective regulatory authority and reviewed for approval, which may take another 1 to 2 
years 64.  
 
Finally, after market entry, the product is subjected to additional post-marketing 
surveillance clinical trials (i.e. Phase IV trials). This fourth sub-phase of clinical research is 
aimed at monitoring short- and long-term (side) effects of the product in question, or at 
evaluating efficacy and safety in specific patient groups that are not included in the CTD 
(e.g. children). Such studies may continue for as long as the product is used in patients 63. 
 
From the perspective of science-based entrepreneurial businesses, value created with each 
consecutive milestone in the chain can be captured through upfront- and milestone 
payments based on collaborative R&D agreements with established firms. In exchange, 
these firms capture the majority of value after the product is introduced on the market. 
Finally, VCs capture a portion of the created value as described in glossary 1.3.4. 
12_Erim Fernald BW stand.job
 
 16 
1.3.3 Interfirm cooperation 
Several important developments in the evolution of science-based business are related to 
interfirm cooperation and its various dimensions. Undoubtedly, there are numerous ways in 
which firms can cooperate to create and capture value that are mutually beneficial (e.g. 
joint-ventures, cooperative R&D, equity-investments). The difference between such forms 
most often lies in associated governance structures. For the purposes of the studies 
included in this dissertation, we have primarily focused on three dimensions of interfirm 
cooperation and their role in biotechnological innovation. These are: informal cooperation 
within biotech clusters; strategic alliances for R&D; and M&A (see chapters 3 and 4).  
 
As shown in chapter 3, clusters stimulate and positively affect success in product 
innovation 25. In biotechnology clusters, knowledge is mostly transmitted through informal 
relations and cognitive networks, making it fit most with the “new social network” type of 
cluster 66. Such networks are fostered when science-based businesses are collocated and 
consequent interaction and transaction occurs among entrepreneurs, scientists, VCs, 
managers and other stakeholders, creating knowledge spillovers that facilitate and 
accelerate innovation 66-68. By clustering, the infrastructure for knowledge transfer and 
valorisation is created, resulting in regional innovation systems 67, 69, 70. The largest biotech 
clusters are situated in the U.S. (e.g. Greater Boston/Cambridge, MA; San Francisco Bay 
Area, CA; San Diego/ La Jolla, CA), although there are also a few large clusters in Europe 
(e.g. Cambridge, UK; BioValley, Switzerland/Germany/France; Medicon Valley, 
Denmark/Sweden) 25. 
 
Although strategic alliances often occur within clusters, these are far more formal 
agreements that often last several years. Alliances can involve a range of different deal 
types (e.g. licensing, collaborative R&D, out-sourcing, joint ventures, technology transfer). 
In the context of the value chain, alliances are an important way for biotech companies to 
generate income while their products are in development. The ‘science-business model’ is 
largely based on this premise, first illustrated by the alliance between Genentech and Eli 
Lilly for Genentech’s recombinant insulin, in which Lilly funded further development and 
would pay royalties on sales of the product that was later marketed as Humulin® (1982) 2. 
Such deals often include upfront R&D funding, royalty payments and (minority) equity 
investments 15, 25. As shown in chapters 3 and 4, strategic alliances for R&D can be 
beneficial and positively affect innovation performance for both technology suppliers and 
technology recipients. 
Strategic alliances between biotech companies and established pharmaceutical firms often 
precede acquisitions 71. In addition, larger scale M&A amongst established firms have 
marked significant consolidation of the pharmaceutical industry over the past decades (see 
figure 4.1) 15. Increases in both large mergers and small-scale acquisitions 13, have been 
mostly motivated by innovation deficits in pharmaceutical R&D pipelines  72, 73. Although 
increased M&A activity has been a response to significant challenges confronted by 
established firms, many doubt whether it has been an adequate solution 72, 74, 75. Existing 
empirical evidence largely suggests that acquisitions of technology companies destroy 
value and negatively affect innovation performance 25, 76-79. In the following chapters the 
relationship between acquisitions and innovation is further examined, both for biotech 
companies (chapter 3) and for established firms (chapter 4). 
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1.3.4 Venture capital 
In the context of regional infrastructures and innovation clusters, VC plays a key role in the 
development of new firms in new markets 80, 81. For a large part VCs are drivers of 
technological innovation and stimulate the formation of high technology innovation 
clusters 27. Stimulating innovation, economic growth and regional competitiveness, is for 
some sectors even highly dependent on active VC industries 82. 
 
VC is a kind of private equity risk capital that is an important intermediary in financial 
markets, mainly because it provides funding to typically young ventures that would 
normally have difficulty attracting capital due to high levels of uncertainty 83. VCs usually 
take a very active role in monitoring and managing their portfolio companies with the 
primary goal of maximizing financial returns by exiting through a trade sale or initial 
public offering (IPO) 84. Many VC firms prefer pre-seed, seed and early stage investments, 
and most are involved with high-technology investments 85, 86. Moreover, most high-tech 
investments concern research-driven university spin-off companies87, illustrating the fact 
that science-based business is highly dependent on this form of capital. 
 
In addition to biotech companies’ need for VC, the possibilities for biotech IPOs and the 
increasing M&A interest of pharmaceutical companies made clinical stage biotech 
companies increasingly attractive for VC firms. Due to the lengthy and costly R&D 
trajectories of biotechnological and pharmaceutical products and the fact that VCs are 
aiming to realize financial returns within three to five years after their initial investment, 
they invest during very specific stages of the value chain. In this context, VCs focus on ‘the 
value step’ that is realized when the most uncertain clinical phases are successfully 
completed (figure 1.4). Thus, from a VC perspective, a delicate balance must be found 
between money, time and risk. 
 
The initial stages are often funded by R&D subsidies as well as informal investors and 
business angels and the later stages of clinical R&D are mostly funded by established 
(bio)pharmaceutical firms through alliances and acquisitions 15, 88, 89. These incumbents will 
typically get involved after successful phase II clinical trials, as they are far more risk-
averse 15. Thus, VCs are essentially facilitating and profiting from the supply of 
biotechnological innovation originated from science while meeting the demand of the 
market, which mostly concerns established pharmaceutical acquirers. 
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LIMITS OF BIOTECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
 
 
Abstract 
During the past two decades the biopharmaceutical industry has been facing an innovation 
deficit, characterized by in- creasing research & development costs and stagnant 
productivity. From its inception, biotechnology has been expected to counter this deficit by 
its revolutionary science-based approach to drug discovery. For this study we gathered 
patent and product data related to the technological development of the first two 
biotechnologies: recombinant DNA technology and monoclonal antibody technology. We 
studied the technological lifecycles of these technologies in terms of scientific discoveries 
and inventions as well as product innovations. Results indicate that over the years 
inventions related to these technologies have simultaneously become less radical and less 
valuable. Furthermore, our analysis shows that these biotechnologies have reached a stage 
of technological limit or saturation, which may be followed by an innovation cliff. Now, 
more than ever, it is crucial to examine new strategies and opportunities for value creation, 
capturing, and delivery, within the biopharmaceutical industry. 
 
Fernald, K.D.S., Weenen, T.C., Sibley, K.J. and Claassen. E.  
Technology and Investment (2013) 4: 168-181; doi: 10.4236/ti.2013.43020 
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2.1 Introduction 
The revolutionary characteristic of biotechnology is the fact that it is derived from 
advances in fundamental science, and can be used for discovery and development of new 
products to fulfil unmet medical needs. The rise of biotechnology transformed drug 
discovery and development from traditional pharmaceutical target screening to a science-
deductive process 90, 91. Consequently, it became possible to target new leads based on the 
understanding of complex biological systems. 
 
From the first technological breakthroughs in the 1970s, high expectations arose that 
biotechnology would radically improve drug development and generate new classes of 
biological products. Moreover, specific biotechnological products were expected to counter 
declining pharmaceutical productivity 11, 92, 93. Contrary to those initial expectations, several 
researchers have since suggested that those optimistic expectations of biotechnology are 
unsupported by empirical evidence16 and that the ‘biotech revolution’ has been 
disappointing in terms of new products and financial performance 94, 95. Based on their 
study of preclinical product development data covering 1992 and 1993, Drews & Ryser5 
already predicted that the output of biotechnology would be insufficient to counter the 
pharmaceutical innovation deficit. 
 
Even with a dramatic five fold increase in research & development (R&D) spending there 
appears to be no effect on New Chemical Entity (NCE i.e. New Molecular Entity) 
production, resulting in a pharmaceutical ‘productivity gap’ (figure 2.1) 4, 12, 63. In addition, 
patent expirations of blockbuster drugs might cause incumbent pharmaceutical firms to 
lose billions of US dollars in combined annual sales 96. 
 
Figure 2.1 The pharmaceutical ‘productivity gap’; The considerable rise of R&D expenditures versus 
a stagnant pattern of New Chemical Entity (NCE) introductions.  
(Data obtained from fda.gov, Medtrack and literature94, 97) 
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Evidently, pharmaceutical firms are in need of innovation to increase productivity. 
Therefore, it is important to study the innovation patterns and lifecycles of individual 
biotechnologies. Such specific patterns can be examined using technology forecasting, a 
useful tool for identifying phases of a given technology’s lifecycle 98, 99. 
 
In this chapter, we examine the patterns of innovation regarding the first two major 
medical applications of biotechnology: recombinant DNA (rDNA) technology and 
monoclonal Antibody (mAb) technology. These biotechnologies have generated a 
sufficient number of marketable biological products that are currently available as 
prescription drugs. We propose that identifying and analysing patterns in biotechnological 
innovation and product development is an important prerequisite for defining optimal 
innovation strategies needed to improve new product development and value creation in 
the biopharmaceutical industry. 
 
2.2 Literature review 
2.2.1 Biotechnology 
The application of biotechnologies in medical product development has a relatively short 
history. The first publications on successful intracellular production of rDNA appeared in 
1972 and 1973 31, 100, 101. In 1974, Stephan Cohen and Herbert Boyer from Stanford 
University applied for the first patent on rDNA 102. Most practitioners of molecular biology 
and rDNA technology worked in universities and research institutions rather than within 
the industry 93.  
 
In the late 1970s/early 1980s, private companies such as Genentech began to focus on 
rDNA technology 35. This sparked a biotechnology revolution that led to multiple usages 
for rDNA technology (e.g. treating hemophilia, hepatitis, cystic fibrosis), as well as paving 
the way for new biotechnological platforms leading to monoclonal antibodies, ‘the human 
genome project’, genomics, and gene therapy 103. Recombinant DNA technology was in 
fact the first revolutionizing biotechnology that was implemented in corporate R&D of 
biopharmaceutical companies and produced the first biotechnological product called 
“Humulin” (i.e. recombinant human insulin) introduced by Genentech and Eli Lilly in 1982 
(glossary 1.3.1)2, 103.  
 
The potential for life-saving cancer treatments due to rDNA technology caused a 
subsequent wave of innovation in biotechnology involving mAb technology 104. Advances 
in genetic engineering in the late 1980s provided the technology to humanize mAbs 105. 
These advances spurred further R&D of many mAb applications for treatment of various 
medical needs (e.g. cancer, autoimmune diseases) 106, 107.  
The two closely related technologies (rDNA and mAb) quickly became efficient methods 
of producing commercially important substances. Wright93 described this process as a 
transformation of an area of basic scientific research that occurred in an intense pace of 
development. However, R&D durations of marketed biopharmaceutical products have 
increased from approximately 4 years in 1982 (e.g. Humulin) to approximately 12 years in 
the late 1990s (e.g. interferon- β1b), with an estimated average of 8 years 59. 
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2.2.2 Innovation 
According to Garcia & Calantone (p.112)108, the essence of innovation can best be 
described as: “an iterative process initiated by the perception of a new market opportunity 
for a technology-based invention which leads to development, manufacturing, and 
marketing tasks aspiring commercial success of the invention”. As these authors indicate, 
this definition addresses two important aspects 108. First, the innovation process comprises 
the combination of technological development of an invention and the market introduction 
of that invention to end-users. Application of this combination in the context of the 
industry as examined in this study is difficult because invention and market introduction 
are two activities separated by 10-14 years of R&D and hundreds of millions of R&D-
spent US dollars 58, 109. In addition, conducting these separate activities requires very 
different knowledge, expertise, resources and capabilities, typically illustrated by the need 
for nimble biotech companies and incumbent pharmaceutical firms to work in 
collaborations and alliances 110-112. This is one of the reasons why biotechnological 
inventions that might lead to a product are often described as innovations and patents are 
often used as a measure for biotechnological innovation 113, 114.  
The second important aspect of the above described definition is that innovation is an 
iterative process and therefore includes the introduction of new innovations on the one 
hand, and the reintroduction of improved innovations on the other. This brings us to the 
need to classify innovation according to various degrees of innovativeness, distinguishing, 
in particular, between radical and incremental innovation 108, 115 116. 
 
2.2.3 Technological lifecycles 
It is generally presumed that a technology follows a certain pattern throughout its lifecycle. 
The technology saturation-curve (S-curve) method of analysis has been described and 
employed to retrieve information on the lifecycle phase of a given technology (figure 2.2) 
23, 24. The technology S-curve can be illustrated by means of a certain technology’s 
cumulative patent count against time or R&D expenditures.  
According to Ernst23, the lifecycle of a technology consists of four fundamental phases, 
namely emerging, growth, maturity, and saturation. Emerging is characterized by low 
technological growth performance compared to R&D input. Growth is identified by a 
positive growth progress compared to cumulative R&D input. Maturity is the opposite: 
negative growth progress occurs compared to R&D input. The final stage, saturation, is 
characterized by relatively few technological innovations despite a very large cumulative 
R&D input. 
 
Technologies can further be classified according to two dimensions, namely the integration 
of the technology in products or processes and the competitive impact of the technology 23. 
When a technology emerges, both the integration in products or processes, and the 
competitive advantage are low. As inventions related to the technology accumulate over 
time the competitive advantage increases and the technology becomes a pacing technology 
in the growth phase. When the pacing technology is increasingly integrated in products or 
processes it becomes a key technology. Subsequently, over time, the technology starts to 
lose its degree of competitive advantage and it becomes a base technology. At this point 
saturation or technological limit is reached. 
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Figure 2.2 The technology S-curve (adapted from Ernst23) with cumulative patent data related to 
medical nutrition (adapted from Weenen et al.24) 
 
 
        
 
The technology-forecasting tool is useful because it indicates the current life cycle phase of 
a technology, allowing companies to strategize for the future 98, 99. For example, when 
Chen et al.98 assessed technologies for generating and storing hydrogen; they showed that it 
had not yet reached the maturity phase. Therefore, they were able to recommend increased 
R&D funding for the technology to accelerate development 98. Similarly, Weenen et al.24 
examined medical nutrition patent data and showed that the medical nutrition industry is 
currently in the growth stage (figure 2.2), indicating ample future innovation opportunities. 
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2.3 Methodology 
2.3.1 Data collection 
Patent applications are perceived as an important indicator, since patent analysis reveals 
information on historical developments of the technologies investigated in this study. The 
patent data for this study was gathered from several patent databases using AcclaimIP 
patent analysis softwarei. The acquired data was compared with data directly gathered from 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)ii, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO)iii, and Thomson Reuters’s Derwent Innovation Indexiv. Over 
the period of 1980 until 2011, we gathered a total of 7,350 patents regarding mAb 
innovations and 9,111 patents regarding other rDNA innovations. Patent data is readily 
available and categorized according to a system of international patent classification (IPC). 
The IPC is a complex hierarchical classification system encompassing all areas of 
technology and is currently used by industrial property offices in more than 90 countries 
117. Each patent is given an IPC code that lists its section, class, subclass, group, and 
usually subgroup 117. We used these codes to identify relevant patents in the databases.  
 
Recombinant proteins can be divided into various sub-types, with monoclonal antibodies 
being the largest sub-type. Therefore, we decided to divide the sub-types of recombinant 
proteins so that two different biotech trends could be plotted separately. Falciola118 states 
that patents involving antibodies commonly contained at least one of the following IPC 
codes: C07K16/* (Immunoglobulins, as a class of proteins), A61K39/395 (medicinal 
preparations containing antibodies), or G01N33/53 (assays involving the use of antibodies). 
Therefore, we decided to only look at patents involving monoclonal antibodies containing 
at least one of these IPC codes (C07K16/*, A61K39/*, or G01N33/53). For patents 
regarding rDNA technology we included all sub-types of recombinant protein products 
other than antibodies. These include recombinant blood factors, insulin, hormones, 
interferons, growth factors, interleukins, and thrombolytic proteins. For the gathering of 
this data we included the following IPC codes: C07K14/*, C12N15/* or A61K38/*. In the 
generative syntax we excluded IPC codes: A01H5/*, C12N5/*, C12N15/29, and 
C12N15/82, as these codes relate to inventions with no relevance to rDNA technology. 
Although data from both US and non-US companies are included in the study, only US 
patents were included in the analysis. This decision is justified by the fact that almost all 
companies, both US and non-US, choose to file their patents in the US, amongst other 
countries, in order to take advantage of the vast US market 119. 
 
In addition, data on biopharmaceutical products was gathered by means of literature 
research and database development using the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
databasev, the FDA Orange Book and the Medtrack databasevi. 
                                                            
i www.acclaimip.com 
ii www.wipo.int 
iii www.uspto.gov 
iv www.thomsonreuters.com 
v www.fda.gov 
vi www.medtrack.com 
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2.3.2 Patent citation analysis 
When analysing patent data, citations form an important source of information. There are 
two types of citations: backward and forward citations. The former refers to patents that 
have been cited by the patent in consideration 120. This is an indicator of preceding 
knowledge and the average number of backward citations has proven to be invertly related 
to the radicalness of the respective invention; lower numbers of backward citations are 
associated with more radical inventions 24. Forward citations refer to the frequency with 
which a particular patent is cited by newer patent applications. Annual average forward 
citations of a patent serve as an indicator of technological importance and economic value 
of that invention 24, 116, 121. In other words, patent citations describe the quality of a patent 
and the effects that a patent has had on later technological advances (i.e. other patents) 119. 
Applicants of patents generally include citations in the patent application but the patent 
office examiners ultimately determine which citations are included 122. Therefore, citation 
analysis is considered to be a valid and unbiased method of studying technological 
developments. We define the annual Average Backward Citations (ABCk) and the annual 
Average Relative Forward Citationsvii (ARFCk), as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where nk is the number of patents in year k and xik are the number of backward citations for 
patent i in year k. yik are the number of forward citation for patent i in year k and ai is the 
age of patent i. 
 
                                                            
vii The forward citations are corrected for age because more recent patents would normally have less forward 
citations. 
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(Results shown in figure 2.3a) (Results shown in figure 2.3b) 
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2.3.3 Lifecycle analysis 
The annual accumulation of patents in a specific area of technological innovation yields 
valuable information regarding technological lifecycle patterns and development phases of 
the respective technology 23, 98. The technology S-curve was constructed by plotting the 
cumulative number of patents against time according to the file dates of those patents. 
Similarly to an S-curve based on patents, product introductions related to a specific 
technology can be plotted cumulatively against time, following a patent S-curve with a 
time lag of several years due to R&D. Furthermore, cumulative revenues generated by 
these products help gain insights into current returns on investments in these technologies 
as well as the future potential earnings from the respective technology related products. 
Analysis of these three independent parameters resulted in the curves as shown in figure 
2.4. 
 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Citation analysis 
Figure 2.3a shows the annual backward citations for recombinant protein and mAb patents. 
The graph clearly indicates that patents from the early 1980’s had a relatively low number 
of backward citations compared to more recent patents. This rising trend of backward 
citations indicates that innovation in these technologies has become less radical and thus 
more incremental because newer patents appear to be more reliant on prior knowledge and 
IP. 
 
Conversely, the average annual trend of forward citations is decreasing in Figure 2.3b. 
This indicates that the economic value of patented inventions related to both technologies 
has been decreasing over time. There appears to be a direct correlation between the 
radicalness and the value of an innovationviii . Figure 2.3 clearly shows that radical 
inventions are more valuable than incremental inventions, and over time inventions have 
become more incremental, and therefore, less valuable. 
                                                            
viii p < 0.01 
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Figure 2.3 a) The average backward citations of rDNA and mAb patent applications indicating the 
degree of incrementalness of patents over time. b) The average relative forward citations of rDNA 
and mAb patent applications indicating the economic value of patents over time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4.2 Technology lifecycle 
In figure 2.4a the lifecycles of both technologies clearly match an S-curve. Around 2007, it 
looks as though the lifecycles have reached the final phase of saturation, indicating that it 
is not likely that these technologies will instigate many subsequent innovative advances. 
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Figure 2.4 a) The cumulative number of rDNA and mAb patent applications illustrating the 
technology S-curves of these biotechnologies. b) The cumulative number of rDNA and mAb product 
introductions. c) Cumulative revenues generated by marketed rDNA and mAb products ($billions) 
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By comparing this technology S-curve to the patent citation trends (figure 2.3), we show 
that the patents that are being approved more recently could be considered less innovative 
since they rely so heavily on previous patents. The fact that the technologies have reached 
a point of saturation supports the idea that radical innovation is far more apparent at the 
emergence of a technology and innovation becomes more incremental during the course of 
technological development. These results fully correspond to the hypotheses of Haupt et 
al.123, who predict patent citation indices during technology life cycle stage transitions. 
 
2.4.3 Biopharmaceutical products 
Overall, 81 recombinant protein products have reached the US market. 31 of these 
concerned monoclonal antibody products. Figure 2.4b shows that the majority of the 
products associated with the studied technologies were approved during the last decade. 
Considering average R&D timelines for pharmaceutical products of 8 years 59, it can be 
assumed that most products approved between 2000 and 2010 were products from the 
technological growth phase that took place between 1993 and 2000 as illustrated in figure 
2.4a. Following this rationale, one can expect several more rDNA and mAb products of 
which the origin lies in patents filed during the subsequent maturity phase. However, these 
results do indicate that the peak in terms of inventions and products related to these 
technologies has past.  
 
Similarly, revenues generated by the products included in our analysis have been plotted 
cumulatively against time (figure 2.4c). With these biopharmaceutical products the 
industry realized a combined sales volume of 582 billion USD, up until 2012. Monoclonal 
antibody products accounted for 217 billion USD of this total sales volume and other 
recombinant protein products generated the remaining 365 billion USD. In the context of 
the law of diffusion of innovation 124, it is safe to presume that product revenues peak 
several years after the introduction of the respective product. Similarly, our results indicate 
that revenues are still growing and companies can still expect growth in returns through 
sales of the products currently on the market. However, to put things in perspective, the 
global pharmaceutical industry has generated approximately 750 billion USD per year on 
average during the period 2003-2011ix. This means that products associated with the 
studied technologies have only accounted for approximately 5% of global pharma sales 
between 1995 and 2012. Evidently, these figures are insufficient to counter or at least 
compensate for part of the innovation deficit that pharma has been struggling with for 
years. 
 
                                                            
ix www.imshealth.com 
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2.5 Conclusions and discussion 
At a relatively low level of 5% of global pharma sales over the past 17 years, we show that 
the first biotechnologies have reached a stage of technological limit. New patents related to 
these technologies are becoming less radical and less valuable and the technology S-curve 
analysis shows that the technological development currently finds itself in a saturation 
phase. In addition, the product curve appears to be reaching a plateau as well, making it 
difficult to expect future growth in product introductions generated by these technologies. 
On a positive note, our results indicate that revenues generated by biopharmaceutical 
products are still growing. However, given these results we conclude that these individual 
technologies will not live up to the expectation of biotechnology at its inception. 
 
This conclusion gives a quantitative basis for earlier assumptions, which projected that the 
biotech output during the first years of the 21st century would not be sufficient to make up 
for NCE deficits 5, 94. According to our results, even less recombinant proteins and 
monoclonal antibodies eventually reached the market than was projected in these studies 5, 
94. In the late 1990s and early 2000s other authors argue that it was too early to tell whether 
the structural industry change triggered by biotechnology, would measurably affect 
industry productivity 94, 125. In hindsight, we can now conclude that so far, biotechnologies 
exerted little impact on overall pharmaceutical productivity. Moreover, the first 
biotechnologies that generated marketable products are already reaching their technological 
limits. Subsequent biotechnologies (i.e. combinatorial chemistry, cell-based assays, 
bioinformatics, genomics, pharmacogenetics and gene therapy) have not yet led to an 
increase in industry productivity either. In addition, the costs of developing a single 
innovative compound have risen from 750 million USD between 1995 and 2000 to 1.3 
billion USD between 2005 and 2010 59, 94. The R&D costs for a single marketable product 
are expected to grow well beyond 2 billion USD, considering current R&D expenditures 97, 
126. 
 
It seems that the currently employed traditional pharmaceutical blockbuster business model 
may not be fully applicable to science-based technology and innovation, and the changes it 
caused in drug discovery 95, 127. Our results imply several scenarios and developments 
within the industry that may involve different strategies and new opportunities. 
 
2.5.1 Implications 
The main conclusion of this study implies a rather pessimistic scenario for early 
biotechnologies as the saturation or the maturity phase might be followed by an 
‘innovation cliff’ 112. Early biotechnologies have reached their technological limit and there 
is a lack of newer radically innovative technologies that are currently generating product 
innovations. These outcomes may be determinants for an innovation cliff in biotechnology. 
This would be disastrous for the pharmaceutical industry at large as incumbent firms relied 
heavily on biotech to come forth with product innovations that would reverse the decline in 
productivity. In addition, patent expirations of current cash cow blockbuster drugs pose an 
even larger threat if a biotechnological innovation cliff would become imminent. 
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Subsequent losses in annual sales affect future R&D investments, which are needed for 
new product development and attracting new knowledge and innovation. 
 
Another scenario might involve further development and innovation with respect to initial 
biotechnologies. During the growth/maturity phases of technological development it is 
useful to suggest a shift in focus regarding innovation towards the development of new 
technologies. In reference of the theory regarding technological development and 
innovation S-curves, rDNA and mAb technologies may have functioned as base 
technologies23  for subsequent innovative technologies such as genomics and gene therapy 
that may spur a new S-curve of their own. In literature, this concept is described as 
‘jumping the S-curve’ 112, 128. Up to date, these subsequent technologies appear to have 
little to no impact on pharmaceutical productivity, as there are no examples of approved 
drugs that directly resulted from these technologies. Nonetheless, newer technologies 
might still have a significant impact on future biopharmaceutical productivity although 
counteracting the innovation deficit might require more than implementing these 
biotechnologies into new product development.  
 
However, in discussion of the S-curve concept, which is broadly embraced in strategic 
literature, Sood & Gerard129 dispute the notion of a single S-curve and state that 
‘technological evolution seems to follow a step function with sharp improvements in 
performance following long periods of no improvement’. A technological S-curve might 
simply represent such a sharp step of radical improvement. Within the context of this 
study, this would imply that following the S-curve of the rDNA and mAb technologies, we 
can expect a longer period of incremental innovation which might be followed by a future 
burst of radical innovation, of which the effects on productivity are unknown. If this 
process were real, it would imply that the possibility of ‘jumping the S-curve’ entirely 
depends on subsequent radical technological innovation. Regardless, it is fairly urgent and 
important to consider new strategies and opportunities for increased value creation, 
capturing, and delivery. Extensive exploration of such strategies is beyond the scope of this 
study. However, we will briefly discuss the implications of two suggested strategies that 
might yield significant opportunity for value creation. 
 
According to some, an opportunity resides in reinventing the traditional pharmaceutical 
business model with respect to diagnostic-drug linked products (i.e. theranostics) and 
“personalized medicine” 127, 130, 131. Newer technologies such as genomics and 
pharmacogenetics can enrich clinical research by defining patient groups with the most 
favourable risk-benefit ratio, making it easier to statistically determine efficacy, safety and 
appropriate dosage of a so-called theranostic in development 130-132. Thereby, such 
technologies can function as a ‘key resource’ for a reinvented pharma business model. 
However, there are two simple but important determinants that form the basis for the 
current ‘blockbuster model’; (1) very high and increasing new product development costs, 
as discussed earlier, and (2) very high attrition rates and thus high risks in new product 
development. Regardless of the technological possibilities of theranostics and personalized 
medicine, these determinants remain, and have to be met in any ‘new’ business model. 
 
Perhaps a more realistic opportunity for short-term exploitation comprises industry 
convergence with the conventional and functional foods sector. Upcoming markets such as 
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the functional food market133, 134 and medical nutrition market24 may yield opportunities for 
biopharmaceutical companies. As Kickbusch & Payne134 rightfully state, the line between 
foods, dietary supplements, and pharmaceutical products is becoming more difficult to 
draw. Weenen et al.112 explain the differences and overlap between these product 
categories as well as convergence opportunities towards pharmanutrition. Another 
undeniable trend is the awareness and demand amongst end-users for increased 
functionality of foods in the context of healthy lifestyles including ‘healthy-ageing’. In 
addition, wellness, health, and disease prevention, as opposed to curing, is increasingly 
stimulated by employers, as healthier employees reduce health insurance costs 133. 
Innovation and technological development regarding pharmanutrition create an opportunity 
for incumbent pharmaceutical firms. According to Weenen et al.24, the medical nutrition 
industry currently finds itself in the growth phase (figure 2.2) and pharmanutrition is an 
area filled with opportunities for enhancing discovery, technological, and development 
competencies 112, 135. Further in-depth research is required to examine options and methods 
of capitalizing on these opportunities.   
 
In conclusion, we show that biotechnological innovation with respect to the first two 
biotechnologies has saturated. By three independent parameters we have identified the 
growth, maturity and saturation stages, internally validating the S-curve for these 
biotechnologies (figure 2.4). A biotechnological limit might imply several, somewhat 
pessimistic, scenarios for future biopharmaceutical productivity. However, whether it 
involves the generation of a new business model to fully capture the value of following 
biotechnologies, or converging with other markets to serve health-oriented consumers, 
there seem to be several opportunities for biopharmaceutical companies to explore. 
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                Chapter  3  
BIOTECHNOLOGY COMMERCIALIZATION STRATEGIES: 
RISK AND RETURN IN INTERFIRM COOPERATION 
 
 
Abstract 
The management and exploitation of biotechnological product innovation have proven to 
be more difficult than initially expected because the number of currently marketed 
biotechnological products is far from sufficient to counter deficits in pharmaceutical 
innovation. This study provides insight into the role of governance structures in interfirm 
cooperation and their effects on biotechnological product innovation and company success. 
Most of the existing literature regarding alliances and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
examines their effects on technology recipients’ innovation performance. Here, the effects 
of alliances and M&A on both the innovation success and financial performance of 
technology suppliers (i.e., sources) are examined. Drawing from a sample of 220 human 
therapeutic biotechnology and biopharmaceutical firms over a period of 32 years (1980–
2011), an analysis of the effects of biotechnology clusters, strategic alliances, and 
acquisitions is provided. This study reveals the existence of a risk-return trade-off for 
strategic alliances between biotech companies and larger, more established firms. Increased 
biotech company involvement in product development alliances decreases risk by 
increasing the likelihood of future product introductions. The trade-off, however, is that 
biotech companies earn lower returns when their products are developed through such 
alliances. A similar risk-return trade-off effect is found for clusters. However, acquisitions 
generally affect both product introductions and product returns in a negative way. These 
findings have strategic implications not only for managing the development of 
biotechnological product innovations and technology platforms but also for 
commercialization strategies with respect to interfirm cooperation and risk reduction.  
 
Fernald, K.D.S., Pennings, H.P.G. and Claassen, E.    
Journal of Product Innovation Management (2015) 32(6): 971-996; doi: 10.1111/jpim.12218 
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3.1 Introduction 
Biotechnology represents a major change in the technology base of a mature 
pharmaceutical industry. From its inception, biotechnology has appeared to be the solution 
to a deficit in pharmaceutical innovation 5, 14. Consequently, its rise has spurred a transition 
from traditional drug discovery to a scientifically deductive process of innovation, and as a 
consequence biotech and pharma have become knowledge-driven sectors 67, 90. Although 
many researchers have shown that biotechnological innovation does not appear to be 
sufficient to counter the widely acknowledged deficits in pharmaceutical innovation 5, 14, 16, 
94, it has revolutionized the current trajectories of drug discovery. Using biomedical science 
as the basis for discovering and developing new drugs, actors other than larger 
pharmaceutical firms now play a pivotal role in biopharmaceutical innovation. 
Universities; research and knowledge institutions; and usually spin-off, biotech small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have begun to facilitate and organize innovation 
processes in the biopharmaceutical industry. This reorganization of research and 
development (R&D) has resulted in the rise of biotechnology clusters 136.  
For entrepreneurs, founders, and investors of biotech SMEs, product development is 
extremely risky in light of the fact that the average R&D duration is 11.9 years 58, R&D 
costs are $0.8–$1.3 billion for each new product 59, 94, and there is an overall success rate of 
approximately 10% for drugs that enter clinical development 60, 61. In such a high-risk 
environment, to survive during the R&D of their innovations, new ventures require both 
large investments and multiple possibilities for cash flow generation. Sources of income 
for early stage SMEs include entering into licensing deals based on their intellectual 
property (IP), providing high-tech services, and receiving upfront or milestone payments 
through R&D partnerships with incumbent firms 137-139. However, the eventual introduction 
of a product remains a crucial focus of any product-oriented biotech SME seeking long-
term survival. In the current climate, early stage biotech SMEs must cooperate with 
external firms to gain the necessary knowledge, experience, and expertise to commercialize 
their innovations. Thus, interfirm cooperation has become a competitive advantage for 
high-technology firms 140, 141.  
 
In this chapter, the effects of interfirm cooperation on the likelihood of product 
introductions and on revenues from product sales are examined, viewed from the 
perspective of biotech SMEs. Based on differences in governance structure, the construct 
of interfirm cooperation is disaggregated into three distinct dimensions: biotech clusters, 
strategic alliances, and acquisitions. First, the most informal mode of interfirm cooperation 
is cooperation within a biotech cluster. Such cooperation is not necessarily based on formal 
agreements, but instead exists by virtue of interactive knowledge exchanges through social 
networks and information infrastructure within a region 67, 70, 142. Several studies have 
provided empirical evidence of the beneficial effects of biotech clusters 114, 143-145. 
However, none of these studies have examined the effects of clusters on biotechnological 
product introductions and their corresponding sales, but they have instead used other 
performance measures (e.g., patents, initial public offerings, private equity placements, 
attracting alliance partners, dissolution of alliances, and products in development).  
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In contrast, the second dimension concerns more formal modes of cooperation, such as in- 
and out- licensing, collaborative R&D agreements, outsourcing, and other types of strategic 
alliances. Strategic alliances for new product development often involve a formal 
technology supply chain that comprised a technology supplier firm (i.e., “source”) and a 
technology recipient firm 146, 147. From a firm-level perspective, one can distinguish 
between alliances in which the firm acted as the technology source and alliances in which 
it did not. A few other articles have made similar distinctions and have studied the effects 
of various types of alliances on productivity and firm performance (e.g., horizontal and 
vertical alliances148; exploration and exploitation alliances149; upstream, horizontal, and 
downstream alliances150). The existing distinctions, however, do not focus on biotech firms 
as alliances’ technology sources, and therefore do not reveal the effects of alliances that 
involve these types of knowledge flows.  
 
The third dimension concerns acquisition, that is, when a smaller firm is “acquired” by a 
larger firm in exchange for a majority stake of the smaller firm’s equity. This dimension 
often involves a partial or complete integration of innovative knowledge and activities into 
the larger firm. Although there are convincing theoretical arguments that suggest negative 
effects of acquisitions on product development 151-153, empirical findings on the effects of 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) on performance appear to be mixed. Some researchers 
have reported negative effects 76-78, 154, whereas others have claimed to find no relationship 
between M&As and performance 74, 155. Other researchers have reported that technology 
M&A have positive effects, given the relatedness between a target and its acquirer 77, 154, 
156. It is noteworthy that all of these studies have measured the effects of an M&A on the 
performance of the acquiring firm, whereas no existing articles have examined the effects 
of “being acquired” on product introductions originally developed by the target company.  
 
Modes of interfirm cooperation and the management of externally acquired innovation can 
play an important factor in increasing firms’ chances of success and performance. 
Therefore, the effective management of the innovation process through a proper mode of 
interfirm cooperation is of key concern to entrepreneurs, company leaders, and managers. 
Moreover, studying the effects of different dimensions of cooperation helps provide insight 
into better ways of managing biotechnological product innovations. This study provides an 
analysis of the different dimensions of cooperation in relation to the probability of a new 
product introduction (as an inverse measure of risk) and new product sales (as a measure of 
return), providing relevant insights with direct implications for strategic options to 
commercialize biotechnological innovations.  
 
The present study addresses shortcomings in the existing literature, some of which have 
already been mentioned; more importantly, however, it links potential risk-return trade-offs 
with different modes of interfirm cooperation. It does so by empirically examining product 
introductions and sales for the three dimensions of interfirm cooperation using longitudinal 
data from 220 biotechnology and biopharmaceutical firms over a period of 32 years. Our 
data cover the entire technological life cycle, from emergence to saturation, of the first 
biotechnologies 14. Accordingly, the data provided us with a unique opportunity to study 
the role of interfirm cooperation in development success and product sales resulting from 
the first two biotechnologies (i.e., recombinant DNA technology and monoclonal antibody 
technology). 
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3.2 Theory and hypotheses 
3.2.1 Interfirm cooperation for new products and revenues  
Given the various types of interfirm relationships, three distinct dimensions of interfirm 
cooperation are defined— that is, clusters, alliances, and M&As—and analysed in the 
context of the exploration and exploitation framework 157. These two concepts of 
innovation not only require different structures, processes, strategies, capabilities, and 
cultures but also appear to have different impacts on firm performance 158. These 
differences may be especially applicable in the context of the biotech and pharma 
industries 159, 160. The value chain in drug development encompasses the complete R&D 
process from the discovery phase to market approval 63. Figure 3.1 shows this value chain, 
along with investment phases and dimensions of interorganizational cooperation. 
 
Figure 3.1 Dimensions of cooperation and exploratory and exploitative activities in the context of the 
biopharmaceutical Value Chain. (PoC, proof of concept; IND, investigational new drug; CTD, 
common technical document. Adapted from Pronker 63) 
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In this line of thought, it is plausible that cooperation within biotechnology clusters, that is, 
networks and relationships among similar companies, is mostly related to the earlier stages 
of the value chain and therefore of a more exploratory nature. The second dimension is 
more difficult to ascertain because there are various types of alliances occurring at different 
stages of the value chain. For example, upstream alliances (i.e., university–industry 
alliances) are related to earlier stages of the value chain. Therefore, in accordance with 
Rothaermel and Deeds149, alliances can be both exploratory and exploitative, depending on 
the nature of the deal, the type of partner (e.g., upstream, horizontal, downstream), and the 
role of the company (i.e., technology supplier versus technology recipient). Acquisitions of 
biotech companies, however, are generally exploitative in nature because such take-overs 
are usually considered investments in R&D replenishment 72, 161, 162. Appendix A provides 
an overview of insights gained from empirical analyses of independent variables related to 
our dimensions of interfirm cooperation. As shown in appendix A, the different dimensions 
of cooperation have been thoroughly analysed separately, but to the best of our knowledge 
never all together in relation to both the likelihood of product introductions and revenue 
from new products. In the following subsections, the three dimensions of cooperation are 
further elaborated, and several hypotheses are developed. 
 
3.2.2 Dimension 1: Biotechnology clusters  
In biopharmaceuticals, much innovation occurs in large firms whose locational criteria 
mainly reflect those of a cluster as an industrial complex, as described by Iammarino and 
McCann66. However, simultaneously, large firms within such clusters also rely heavily on 
science-driven biotechnology SMEs for innovation, which are mostly also geographically 
concentrated but correspond more closely to the “new social network” type of cluster, 
where knowledge is transmitted within cognitive networks 66. In this study, the data cover 
both biotechnology SMEs and larger biopharmaceutical firms. Therefore, in this context, 
the definition of clusters in this study is primarily based on the geographic colocation of 
companies within an industrial complex, where knowledge spillovers are also created 
through social networks of the SMEs. 
 
The colocation of biotechnology firms mainly occurs in close proximity to knowledge 
sources, such as universities and other research institutions 67, 136. However, other actors 
also play important roles, together providing the infrastructure necessary for innovation 
and growth. Creating value by transferring technology and knowledge to the marketplace 
involves complex chains of interaction and transactions among venture capitalists, 
entrepreneurs, scientists, managers, and other actors. Establishing a biotech SME within 
such a cluster setting leads to interfirm cooperation as technical knowledge is transmitted 
through social networks creating knowledge spillovers that facilitate innovation and growth 
66-68, 163. Accordingly, Zeller164 also states that acquiring and transferring tacit knowledge 
within biotech clusters occur through concrete practice and direct social contacts. 
Interactive learning and innovation processes occur in the context of relations among 
different actors—not only other biotech companies or pharmaceutical companies but also 
service suppliers, R&D institutes, universities, and often hospitals in the vicinity 68, 164. In 
this sense, “innovation activities are undertaken in complex social networks, characterized 
by heterogeneous actors, multidimensional interactions, and multiple knowledge flows” 
165(p. 232). Biotech clusters create regional infrastructures that support and promote 
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knowledge transfer, help solve problems, reduce the costs of innovation, and create 
capabilities for commercializing innovative technologies 166, ultimately resulting in 
regional innovation systems 67, 69, 70. Consequently, one important benefit of establishing a 
start-up company within a “business community,” such as a biotech cluster, is that the 
political and institutional support for building such a community reduces barriers to 
launching risky commercialization processes 164.  
Apparently, both innovation and new product development as competitive variables are 
positively affected within a “cluster setting” 67. Empirical studies have usually found such 
positive effects 114, 143-145. Both Phene et al.114 and Folta et al.144 have demonstrated that 
clusters are positively associated with innovation, as measured by patents. Deeds et al.143 
have found that clusters positively affect new biotechnological product development, as 
measured by a combination of introduced products and products in development.  
 
Although these arguments and results support predictions that the “cluster setting” has a 
positive effect on success in terms of the likelihood of a product introduction, there is a 
lack of empirical evidence suggesting that biotechnology companies in a cluster setting 
perform better in terms of product revenues. For instance, George, Zahra, and Wood167 
have found that links between firms and universities can enhance product development but 
have not found statistically significant differences in financial performance among firms 
with and without university linkages. Arguably, the relationship between cluster settings 
and firms’ financial performance in terms of revenues from product sales is more complex 
than the relationship between cluster settings and innovation and new product development 
because a company’s financial performance depends on more factors than innovative 
capability alone. While a cluster location may be beneficial for innovation, the location is 
probably not optimal from a sales perspective where logistic conditions are most important. 
Therefore, learning within clusters is mostly limited to R&D and does not extend to 
marketing and sales, for which biotechnology SMEs mostly rely on larger 
(bio)pharmaceutical partner firms. 
Consistent with the arguments and empirical findings discussed above, the following 
hypothesis posits a positive relationship between the biotech “cluster setting” and the 
likelihood of product introductions (i.e., negative impact on risk). However, it has been 
recognized that this relationship may not be reflected in the revenues from product sales 
(i.e., there is no impact on return). 
H1a: The biotechnology “cluster setting” is positively related to a biotechnology 
company’s likelihood of ultimately introducing a biotechnological product.  
H1b: The biotechnology “cluster setting” does not affect the revenues biotechnological 
companies earn from product sales. 
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3.2.3 Dimension 2: Strategic alliances  
Biotechnology companies enter into strategic alliances for various reasons. An SME is 
predominantly motivated to enter into an R&D alliance to access the complementary assets 
and knowledge needed to commercialize its technology or product 168. Alliances can 
involve a range of different types of deals and agreements (e.g., licensing, collaborative 
R&D, out- sourcing, joint ventures, technology transfer). As companies in this industry 
frequently involve themselves in alliances with other firms, this analysis is embedded in 
the context of “alliance portfolio theory.” The existing literature contains different views of 
the definition of alliance portfolios 169. In this study, the view of social network theorists170, 
171 is adopted because their view is most compatible with the first dimension of 
cooperation, discussing social and interorganization networks within biotech clusters. In 
this view, alliance portfolios can be defined as a focal firm’s egocentric network (i.e., all of 
its direct ties with partner firms169, 170, 172). Undoubtedly, there is a direct relation between a 
firm’s portfolio and its accumulated alliance experience 169, 173, which considering the 
complexity of alliance portfolios varies by partnership type 174. According to Duysters and 
Lokshin 174, and Faems, Van Looy, and Debackere175, alliance portfolios’ impact on the 
innovative performance of firms tends to differ depending on the partnership type and the 
nature of the partner(s) involved. Accordingly, and also prevalent in other literature 146-150, 
an important distinction is applied, relating to alliance experience from the strategic 
perspective of biotech firms. Arguably, biotech firms have two alliance portfolios, one in 
which such firms partake as the technology source (i.e., technology source alliances) and 
another in which they do not (i.e., non-source alliances). Moreover, it is arguable that non-
source alliances will mostly concern upstream alliances, wherein the company concerned 
sources the innovation central to the alliance from its upstream or horizontal partner, 
whereas technology source alliances will mostly concern exploitative downstream or 
horizontal alliances with similar or larger partners, in which the company concerned is the 
source of the innovation central to the alliance. Logically, these different types of 
portfolios will affect success measures, related to new product development, differently. 
 
In our analysis, the focus lies on the effect of “technology source alliances” because those 
alliances may provide insights that are relevant to the commercialization strategies of 
companies aiming both to introduce product innovations and to profit from product sales. 
Although many alliances fail to produce their desired outcomes176, they are mostly 
positively associated with product innovation177, 178 and firm performance 76. In particular, 
these effects have been found in the biopharmaceutical industry 79, 111, 149, 179. According to 
Collins and Hitt180, drugs produced by alliances are 30% more likely to succeed in 
obtaining a Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval, and nearly one third of newly 
marketed biopharmaceutical products seem to be developed through alliances. Moreover, 
Oliver181 has shown that alliances are essential for biotech companies to survive. The 
expertise and resources of pharmaceutical firms are often needed to reduce the risk of 
failure during downstream R&D phases 149, 150. Following this rationale, it is arguable that a 
firm’s decision to engage in a technology source alliance will positively affect its chances 
of successfully introducing a product several years later (i.e., it will negatively impact 
risk).  
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Fewer studies have examined the effects of strategic alliances on companies’ financial 
performance. George et al.148 have found that vertical alliances have a positive effect on net 
sales, but that other types of alliances (e.g., horizontal, knowledge generative, knowledge 
attractive) have no such effect. In their study, vertical links included outsourcing and 
distribution links, whereas horizontal linkages included joint R&D, technology transfer, 
patent swaps, and joint ventures that supplemented firms’ technology bases. As these 
submeasures moderately resemble ours, one can expect a nonsignificant relationship 
between “technology source alliances” and revenues from product sales, but a positive 
effect of “non-source alliances” on returns. For the total number of alliances, a 
nonsignificant effect on returns is expected, consistent with a subsequent study by George 
et al.167. According to the arguments and empirical findings described above, our second 
hypothesis is as follows:  
 
H2a: Engaging in a “technology source alliance” for product development positively 
affects the likelihood of a product introduction several years later.  
H2b: Engaging in a “technology source alliance” does not affect revenues from 
biotechnological product sales.  
3.2.4 Dimension 3: Acquisitions  
The existing empirical evidence suggests that M&A of technological companies reduce the 
innovative performance of acquiring firms 77-79. To the best of our knowledge, however, 
there is no previous literature that has studied the effects of acquisitions on the eventual 
success of individual R&D projects that originated within the target firm.  
 
There are various arguments explaining why acquisition and post-acquisition integration 
processes are detrimental to target firms’ innovation projects. As discussed above, drug 
discovery and development has become a science-based process in which much of the 
important work and relevant technologies now come from universities and biotech SMEs. 
This transformation has presented major challenges to the organization of the drug 
innovation process, which hitherto had been relatively internalized within large 
pharmaceutical companies 182. In the context of the “capability theory of the firm,” Coombs 
and Metcalfe182 have explained that new, innovation-relevant capabilities have been 
created by the rise of new, innovative biotech SMEs, and that such firms’ external 
capabilities must be coordinated with the traditional internal capabilities of large 
pharmaceutical firms. Moreover, as a result of M&A in general, and acquisitions of biotech 
SMEs in particular, large firms have been forced to combine these previously separated 
capabilities while simultaneously maintaining their effectiveness. James151 has argued, 
based on several case studies, that combining these capabilities can sometimes prove to be 
extremely difficult. Inevitably, managers fail to detach themselves from the dominant logic 
of their own organizations, which structures the way in which they view integration 
opportunities 151, 183. These effective, dominant logic practices are often ineffective and 
detrimental when applied to projects involving radical innovations 184. Arguably, 
established firms’ inability to detach from their dominant logic can cause incompatibility 
issues with the entrepreneurial spirit of nimble biotech SMEs. Therefore, it is probable that 
acquiring firms often fail to successfully coordinate and combine the necessary 
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capabilities, as discussed by Coombs and Metcalfe182 and others 151, 185, 186. In many cases, 
this might result in a failure to commercialize biotechnological innovation. 
In addition, the motive for an acquisition can be an important determinant for successful 
commercialization. Many articles have mentioned the fact that larger pharmaceutical firms 
commonly adopt an M&A strategy toward biotech companies in an attempt to counter the 
still-growing pharmaceutical innovation deficit 5, 72, 74, 75, 94, 161, 162. Most such articles have 
argued that this strategy has defeated its purpose. Pisano187 explained that the rapid 
internalization of biotechnological R&D through acquisition is likely to be an undesirable 
model for organizational change. He argued that acquiring biotech SMEs is a particularly 
dangerous strategy when used to overcome weak internal capabilities. The acquisition of a 
biotech SME is only recommended after the established firm has accumulated significant 
in-house R&D experience 185, 187, 188. In reality, target companies are often acquired for just 
one product, or a few products, from their pipelines 189, which often leads to patent 
shelving and the termination of other in-process R&D projects 190, 191. These competitive or 
defensive motives for acquisitions have generally failed to support the retention and further 
development of acquired knowledge and innovation. In addition, managerial motives, such 
as personal gain, risk, and hubris, as opposed to economic motives of the firm, can play an 
important role in M&A and are negatively associated with M&A performance 192, 193. 
 
It is also important to consider acquisition motives from the biotech company’s 
perspective. Often, biotech firms benefit from being acquired by gaining access to 
downstream expertise, resources, and marketing and distribution channels for potential 
future product introductions 74, 161, 162. Importantly, investors and venture capitalists are 
strongly focused on their return on investment, which can be provided by an exit such as 
being acquired by a larger firm 194, 195. 
 
Arguably, it is likely that this complex web of combining firm capabilities and underlying 
motives negatively affects the commercialization process, and therefore its outcome in the 
form of biotechnological product introductions. However, acquisition effects on product 
sales are unclear. Arguably, by being acquired, a target firm’s product innovation might 
have a wider reach through the acquirer’s sales and distribution channels, which would 
otherwise have been unavailable. This would suggest that acquisitions have a positive 
effect on revenues from product sales. Conversely, because acquirers control sales and 
distribution channels, they might also gain a larger share of the sales of certain products at 
the expense of the target firms. Although this result might depend on the nature of an 
acquisition deal, it might negatively affect returns for the target firm. Therefore, it is 
expected that being acquired has a nonsignificant effect on revenues from biotechnological 
product sales for the target firm. 
 
H3a: M&A have a negative effect on the likelihood of future biotechnological product 
introductions.  
H3b: M&A have a nonsignificant effect on future revenues from biotechnological product 
sales.  
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3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Sample 
This study examines the effects of multiple variables related to interfirm cooperation on the 
success and performance of a panel of biotech and biopharmaceutical firms. The sample of 
firms was established by collecting data on patents related to the first two biotechnologies 
(rDNA and mAb). As thoroughly described in previous work (chapter 2)14, the data were 
gathered from several patent databases using the AcclaimIP patent analysis softwarex. The 
acquired data were then checked for consistency with data from the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) xi , the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO)xii, and Thomson Reuters’s Derwent Innovation Indexxiii. Searching for patents 
with specific international patent classification (IPC) codes, namely C07K16/*, A61K39/* 
and G01N33/53 for mAb patents and C07K14/*, C12N15/* and A61K38/* (but excluding 
A01H5/*, C12N5/*, C12N15/29, and C12N15/82) for rDNA patents, resulted in a total of 
7,350 mAb patents and 9,111 rDNA patents 14. Our search only included US patents to 
prevent overlap with patents filed in multiple countries. Nonetheless, our sample included 
both US- and non-US-based firms because companies often choose to file their patents in 
the US, among other countries, to take advantage of the vast US market 14, 119. 
 
The panel data sample was limited to all companies that acted as the original assignees of 
at least five of the aforementioned collected patents for each technology (i.e., five mAb 
patents and five rDNA patents). Subsequently, large, multinational pharmaceutical and 
chemical corporations were excluded, primarily because this study focuses on the success 
and performance of biotech companies. This process resulted in a panel of 220 firms for 32 
one-year periods (1980-2011), resulting in a total of 7040 firm-years. Of these firms, 106 
were acquired during the studied period, and the companies in the sample engaged in a 
total of 3,729 ‘technology source alliances’. For our dependent variables (DV), we 
included 81 marketed biotechnological products, of which 50 were rDNA products and 31 
were mAb products 14. The panel dataset for the second DV was limited to 25 companies 
(i.e. 800 firm-years) that earned revenues from product sales and royalties. By introducing 
a time window of 5 years for certain variables the total number of firm-years was reduced 
to 5697 firm-years and 675 firm-years for the first and second DV respectively. 
 
3.3.2 Measures 
Dependent Variables. A firm’s success is subject to broad interpretation; therefore, we 
defined two dependent variables. For the first set of regression models, we used ‘product 
introductions’ as the dependent variable. This binary variable is defined by whether a 
company, was involved in the development of a product that was introduced within a five-
year period (t to t +5)xiv . Given the limited amount of introduced biotechnological 
products14, measuring this variable for a one-year period alone renders a product 
introduction a rare event. By introducing a window of 5 years, we created an opportunity to 
                                                            
x www.acclaimip.com (by FreePatentsOnline) 
xi www.wipo.int 
xii www.uspto.gov 
xiii www.thomsonreuters.com 
xiv The models tested for (t to t+3), (t to t+4) and (t to t+6) produced similar results (results not shown).  
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assess the effects of independent variables on future product introductions. Furthermore, 
this window allowed time for the independent variables to affect product introductions. For 
the second set of regressions, we used ‘revenues from product sales’. This variable is 
defined as a log transformation of the amount of revenues that firm i earned in year t from 
biotechnological product sales. Product data were collected by researching the literature 
and databases, including the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) database xv, the FDA 
Orange Book, and the Medtrack database xvi. Noteworthy, the raw revenue data do not 
include royalty payments to the product originator, which in essence are a measure for 
returns as well. Considering, most royalty payments vary between 5% and 15% 64, 196, 197, 
we have added a 10% royalty over sales to product originator companies. 
  
Inter-firm Cooperation. This concept is constructed using several variables that represent 
the aforementioned dimensions of cooperation. To generate the cluster variable, company 
location details were retrieved from several databases and websites (e.g., 
Businessweek.com, Bloomberg.com), and it was determined whether companies were 
established within renowned biotech clusters. The cluster variable is a dummy variable for 
whether a company was founded within a cluster (industrial complex) or not.xvii Table 3.1 
provides a list of biotech clusters, based on geographic location, that are included in our 
analysis. The data were collected from reports on biotech clusters 198, 199. We choose to 
include the top 10 US clusters as ranked by the Jones Lang Lasalle Institute 199 as well as 
the largest European and Asian biotech clusters mentioned in this report 199. The definition 
of major European clusters was verified using the Milkens Institute report 198. Table 3.1 
provides the complete selection.xviii  
The second dimension of cooperation is defined by means of three variables related to 
alliances. Models 1 and 3 (tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5) include a firm’s total number of 
alliances as a variable. In models 2 and 4, we applied the distinction between types of 
alliances, as discussed above.  All of the alliances of the 220 firms in the sample were 
categorized into two submeasures: (a) ‘technology source alliances’, representing the 
number of alliances, in which firm i was the technology source (i.e. supplier) of the 
alliance; and (b) ‘non-source alliances’, in which firm i did not act as the source of the 
alliancexix. Furthermore, for these variables, a time lag was introduced to assess the effect 
of previous alliances on future product introductions by creating stock variables over a 
five-year period (t-5 to t).   
Similarly, for the third dimension of cooperation, a dummy variable was created, indicating 
whether the majority of the equity of firm i had been acquired by another company within 
the previous five years (t-5 to t). Furthermore, acquirers’ location data were collected to 
create an additional interaction variable defined by whether an acquisition (between t-5 to 
t) occurred within one cluster. 
                                                            
xv www.fda.gov 
xvi www.medtrack.com 
xvii   This definition avoids the problem of endogeneity that arises when firms that are close to a product 
introduction move to a successful biotech cluster.  
xviii The analysis is also conducted using a smaller selection (i.e. the top 5 US clusters as ranked by Jones Lang 
Lasalle as well as 3 major European clusters and 2 large Asian clusters) as a robustness check. This provided 
similar results, although the positive cluster effect on product introduction likelihood loses its significance at the 
1% level in all models. 
xix For each alliance the deals & alliances database (medtrack.com) discloses which company was the product or 
technology ‘source’ and which company engaged as the partner. 
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Table 3.1 Biotechnology Clusters as Included in the Analysis, Organized by Countrya 
Country Clusters 
Canada Quebec Cluster (Saint-Hyacinthe Technopole) 
United States Greater Boston/Cambridge 
 San Francisco Bay Area/ Silicon Valley 
 San Diego Biocluster 
 Raleigh-Durham (Research Triangle Region) 
 Philadelphia 
 Suburban Maryland/ Washington DC 
 New York/ New Jersey 
 Los Angeles/ Orange County 
 Minneapolis- St Paul 
 Seattle 
United Kingdom Cambridge Cluster 
Switzerland /Germany /France BioValley Cluster 
Germany Munich Cluster (Biotech Region Munich) 
France Paris Biocluster (Genopole) 
Spain Barcelona Cluster (Biocat) 
Denmark/Sweden Medicon Valley 
Sweden Umea cluster (Biotech Umea) 
Norway Oslo Cluster (Teknopol) 
Netherlands Wageningen, Eindhoven (HTCE) 
Belgium Brussels, Ghent 
Japan Hokkaido Biotechnology Industrial Cluster Forum 
  
Source: Milken Institute198, Jones Lang Lasalle199 
a The analysis was also conducted using a smaller selection (i.e. the top 5 US clusters as ranked by Jones Lang Lasalle199 as 
well as 3 major European clusters and 2 large Asian clusters) as a robustness check. This provided similar results, although 
the positive cluster effect on product introduction likelihood loses its significance in all models. 
 
Control Variables. Patent activity is included as a control because it represents innovative 
activity, which is expected to positively affect future product introductions 77, 200-202. Again, 
a time lag of 5 years is introduced by creating a stock variable for patent activity. We 
consider a company’s number of patents associated to a specific type of technology as a 
proxy for R&D investments aimed at products associated with this same type of 
technology, and thus assume that there is a linear relationship between patent activity 
within a certain technological domain and the likelihood of successfully introducing a 
product associated with that same technological domain.xx Age represents the second 
control variable and controls for overall firm experience. Although it is possible for 
younger firms to be governed by experienced management teams, we assume that more 
mature firms are more likely to introduce products202 and generate more revenue. Third, we 
introduce a dummy variable for ‘category big biotech’, which is a control variable because 
larger biotech companies are on average more likely to introduce products and earn more 
revenue. 
                                                            
xx This is supported by the non-significant effects of the quadratic term for patent activity (appendix C) 
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3.3.3 Data analysis 
The analysis proceeds in two steps. To analyse the effects of inter-firm cooperation on the 
successful development of newly introduced products, we estimate a set of logit regression 
models, including year dummy variables, on the full panel. Subsequently, the effects of 
interfirm cooperation on revenues from product sales are examined using a set of pooled 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression models on a limited panel set of companies that 
earned such revenues. Again, year dummies are included in all models; in addition, the 
second set of models are tested both with and without firm dummies (tables 3.4 and 3.5). 
As set forth below, we specified two main models for both dependent variables: 
 
Product Introduction = β0 + β1(Cluster dummy) + β2(Technology source alliances) + 
β3(Non-source alliances) + β4(Acquired) + β5(Patent activity) + β6(Age) + β7(Category 
big biotech) + Year Dummies + ε1, ε1 ∼  N(0, σ12) 
 
Revenue = γ0 + γ1(Cluster dummy) + γ2(Technology source alliances)+ γ3(Non-source 
alliances) + γ4(Acquired) + γ5(Patent activity) + γ6(Age) + γ7(Category Big Biotech 
dummy) + Year Dummies + ε2, ε2 ∼  N(0, σ22) 
 
As shown in the results (tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5), multiple variations of these models are 
tested. Note that the use of a (t to t +5) variable for ‘product introductions’ and several 
independent (t –5 to t) stock variables (e.g., Alliances, Acquired, Patent Activity) created a 
time window of 10 years. As shown in figure 3.1, independent variables such as alliances 
and acquisitions mostly occur during the clinical phases, which have a total duration of 6-8 
years 59, 109, 203. The use of these time windows gave us the opportunity to measure effects 
of independent variables within the past five years on the likelihood of a product 
introduction in the next five years. 
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3.4 Results 
The results are derived from the analysis of a panel data set of companies that owned a 
minimum of five patents related to both rDNA technology and mAb technology over a 
period of 32 years (1980–2011). This period covers the life cycles of the respective 
biotechnologies (rDNA and mAb)14. With respect to the products examined in this study14, 
a distinction between product originators and introducers is made. Figure 3.2 shows this 
difference between categories of companies based on firm size and type. This difference 
clearly illustrates the relevance of technology/R&D transfer through alliances and 
acquisitions. Moreover, the figure shows big pharma’s investments in biotechnology, as 
these firms have marketed twice the amount of drugs they have discovered.  
 
Table 3.2 shows the descriptive statistics. The control variables are mutually correlated and 
correlated with most independent and dependent variables. This is not surprising because 
most of the variables can be indicators of a firm’s innovative activities and/or performance. 
Being acquired seems to correlate with most of the variables except for patent activity, 
which is surprising because a firm’s patents should logically make it a better candidate for 
acquisition. However, this difference might relate to the quality, rather than the quantity, of 
a firm’s patents. Technology source alliances also seem to be positively correlated with 
most variables except for being acquired; however, one would expect a positive correlation 
because most acquisitions are preceded by such alliances 71. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Originators versus introducers of market-approved biotechnological products, illustrating 
technology/R&D transfer through alliances and acquisitions.  
(Big Biotech: Genentech, Amgen, Biogen Idec, Novo Nordisk, Medimmune, Centocor;  
Big Pharma: J&J, Pfizer, Roche, GSK, Novartis, Sanofi-Aventis, AstraZeneca, Merck, Abbott, 
Bayer, Schering, Eli Lilly, BMS; Other mostly concern small biotech companies) 
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Table 3.2 Descriptive Statisticsa 
 
3.4.1 Main effects 
Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 contain the results of the regression analyses. First, the logit 
regression models (table 3.3) show the effects of interfirm cooperation on product 
introductions. The subsequent pooled OLS regression analyses (tables 3.4 and 3.5) 
examine revenues from product sales as the DV, without (table 3.4) and with (table 3.5) 
firm dummies. 
 
The results show support for H1a, as new product introductions are positively associated 
with the biotechnology cluster setting. However, the results show a negative relationship 
between the cluster setting and returns in the analysis of product revenues (table 3.4, H1b). 
H2a is also supported: technology source alliances with larger companies predict a higher 
probability of a successful product introduction several years later. However, “technology 
source alliances” also appears to have a negative effect on revenues gained from product 
sales (tables 3.4 and 3.5, H2b). Conversely, it seems that engaging in “non-source 
alliances” has the opposite effect; such alliances increase the likelihood of failure during 
product development but positively influence revenues from product sales. Finally, H3a, 
which predicts that being acquired negatively affects future product introductions, is 
supported in the first analysis (model 1; table 3.3). However, in model 2, the acquisition 
effect is negative, but not significant. Tables 3.4 and 3.5 show that being acquired has a 
nonsignificant, negative effect on returns, consistent with H3b.  
Considering the control variables, patents seem to be positively associated with both 
product introductions and revenue. Both firm age and the category dummy for big biotech 
companies are positively related to product introductions but are not related to revenue 
from biotech product sales. 
 
Variable Mean S.D. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
1. Product b 0.01 0.09 1          
2. Revenue c 0.19 1.08     0.25** 1         
3. Cluster b 0.55 0.50     0.05**     0.09** 1        
4. Alliances c 0.35 0.68     0.14**     0.25**     0.28** 1       
5. Technology source alliances 
c 
0.22 0.51     0.12**     0.15**     0.26**     0.90** 1      
6. Non-source alliances c 0.21 0.50     0.16**     0.31**     0.21**     0.88**     0.61** 1     
7. Acquired b 0.01 0.10     0.04**     0.06**     0.05**     0.03** 0,02     0.04** 1    
8. Patent activity c 0.25 0.50     0.13**     0.18**     0.19**     0.34**     0.29**     0.30** 0,01 1   
9. Age c 1.82 1.44     0.07**     0.17**     0.49**     0.33**     0.27**     0.30**     0.57**     0.26** 1  
10. Category big biotech b 0.03 0.16     0.27**     0.47**     0.08**     0.25**     0.17**     0.29** 0,02     0.25**     0.12** 1 
a n=7040          
b These are binary variables          
c These variables are log transformations          
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.          
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Table 3.3 Logit Regression Models for Product Introductiona 
 
 
 
Table 3.4 Second stage Ordinary Least Squares Regression Models (without Firm Dummies)a 
Variable                                    Model 1            Model 2 Expected Sign 
DV: Revenue from Biotech Products    
Category big biotech 2.38** [.906] 1.91** [.726]   
Age -.232 [.303] -.135 [.248]  
Patent activity (t-5 to t) .484 [.253] .522* [.246]  
Cluster -1.14* [.506] -.858 [.477] H1b (□) 
Number of alliances (t-5 to t) -.151 [.192]              ---  
Technology source alliances (t-5 to t)                                    --- -.831** [.305] H2b (□) 
Non-source alliances (t-5 to t)                                    --- .680* [.286]  
Acquired (t-5 to t) -.106 [.516] -.255 [.522] H3b (-) 
Constant 5.66*** [1.05] 4.87*** [.968]  
R2 .5441 .5912  
n = 675    
a  Year dummies are includååed in all models. Standard errors in brackets.  
*Statistically significant at the 5% level.  
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
*** Statistically significant at the .1% level.  
Variable              Model 1        Model 2 Expected Sign 
DV: Biotech Product Introduction (t to t+5)    
Category big biotech 9.33*** [2.19] 10.08*** [2.22]  
Age 1.02*** [.308] .923** [.320]  
Patent activity (t-5 to t) .733*** [.187] .618*** [.190]  
Cluster 1.83** [.700] 1.53* [.719] H1a (+) 
Number of alliances (t-5 to t) .390* [.170]              ---  
Technology source alliances (t-5 to t)                 --- 1.08*** [.270] H2a (+) 
Non-source alliances (t-5 to t)                 --- -.571* [.241]  
Acquired (t-5 to t) -.902* [.439] -.718 [.439] H3a (-) 
Constant -18.14*** [1.72] -17.44*** [1.78]  
Chi2 113.96*** 113.52***  
McKelvey & Zavoina's R2 .274 .269  
n = 5697    
a  Year dummies are included in all models. Standard errors in brackets.  
*Statistically significant at the 5% level.  
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
*** Statistically significant at the .1% level.  
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Table 3.5 Second stage Ordinary Least Squares Regression Models (with Firm Dummies)a 
 
3.4.2 Additional analyses 
In addition to the main effects shown in tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5, the regression analyses, 
including interaction terms, are conducted to assess interaction effects between the 
different dimensions of cooperation on our DVs (appendix b). These results include a few 
interesting findings. First, it seems that the interaction effect of the cluster dummy and 
technology source alliances, in addition to the interaction effect of the dummy for acquired 
firms and technology source alliances, are positive (negative) in the binary product 
introduction regression (revenue regression), suggesting that the risk-return trade-off 
especially holds for firms in a cluster that are acquired and engaged in technology source 
alliance agreements with other firms. Second, the interaction effect of acquired and non-
source alliances remains negative for both DVs, whereas the main effect of non-source 
alliances is positive in the revenue regression. This might indicate that when firms acquire 
companies from which they sourced technologies, it reduces the returns that the firms 
receive from the eventually marketed products. Third, the “acquired within cluster” 
variable is significantly positive for the second DV (appendix b; table a2), suggesting that 
the normally nonsignificant effect of being acquired on returns becomes positive once the 
acquiring firm resides in the same biotech cluster.  
 
Furthermore, regression analyses with quadratic terms are included to assess whether or 
not certain main effects are nonlinear (appendix c). In the product introduction regressions 
(appendix c; table a5), no nonlinear effects are found. In the revenue regressions, however, 
a U-shaped effect for the number of alliances is found, which appears to be caused by a U-
shaped effect of non-source alliances. The minimum of this U-shape is reached around one 
alliance, suggesting that returns grow nonlinearly when the number of (non-source) 
alliances is two or more. 
Variable                           Model 3        Model 4 Expected Sign 
DV: Revenue from Biotech Products    
Age -.572 [.376] -.381 [.324]  
Patent activity (t-5 to t) .430 [.283] .484* [.282]  
Number of alliances (t-5 to t) -.074 [.202]             ---  
Technology source alliances (t-5 to t)                            --- -.799** [.330] H2b (□) 
Non-source alliances (t-5 to t)                            --- .706** [.281]  
Acquired (t-5 to t) -.170 [.532] -.093 [.504] H3b (-) 
Constant 4.97** [1.83] 4.28** [1.55]  
R2 .6812 .6982  
n = 675    
a  Firm dummies and year dummies are included in all models. Standard errors in brackets  
*Statistically significant at the 5% level.  
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
*** Statistically significant at the .1% level.  
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3.5 Conclusions and discussion 
This study shows that strategic alliances involve a risk-return trade-off. Increased biotech 
company involvement in alliances, in which they supply the technology involved, 
decreases risk by increasing the likelihood of future product introductions. However, 
biotech companies earn lower returns when their products are developed through such 
alliances. In addition, we show that a similar trade-off exists for biotech clusters, as they 
positively affect product introductions, but have a negative effect on returns. Acquisitions, 
however, negatively affect the likelihood of introducing biotechnological products, but 
have no effect on revenues gained from such products.  
 
The results show that, in general, alliances are positively associated with product 
introductions, which seems to be caused by the strong positive effect of technology source 
alliances, indicating that biotech companies’ collaborations related to their technologies or 
products reduce the risk of failure during development. The consequential risk reduction is 
a common motivator for biotech companies to engage in such alliances 110. The second set 
of analyses show that technology source alliances negatively and significantly affect 
revenues from product sales. This can be explained as products derived from such alliances 
are usually marketed by the technology recipient firm, which consequently earns a larger 
share of revenues from product sales. Moreover, it seems that of those companies that 
managed to successfully introduce products, the ones that did not develop their products 
through a technology source alliance earned more revenue from sales. Thus, a 
biotechnological product developed in-house generates greater returns for the respective 
company, but as shown, that company faces significantly higher risks and failure rates.  
 
In contrast to technology source alliances, “non-source alliances” of biotech companies 
negatively affect the chances of introducing a product several years later. Although these 
results seem to contradict the existing literature 150, other empirical evidence supports these 
findings. For example, George et al.148 have found that knowledge-attracting and 
knowledge-generative alliances have significant, negative effects on marketed products. 
Moreover, the variable “non-source alliances” includes strategic alliances that are not 
related to new product development. Engaging in a large number of such alliances might 
deteriorate a firm’s focus on new product development, which could explain the negative 
effect on the introduction of new products. In the second set of models, non-source 
alliances are found to positively affect earned revenue from biotechnological product sales. 
This finding again implies that the technology recipient firm (i.e., non-source) in a 
technology alliance earns a larger share of the revenue from sales following a product 
introduction. The fact that technology source and non-source alliances are found to have 
opposite effects validates our premise of a risk-return trade-off for technology alliances.  
 
The results show a similar risk-return trade-off for companies residing within clusters. 
Informal cooperation within a biotech cluster positively affects the likelihood of a product 
introduction, suggesting that it decreases risk in product development, which supports the 
beneficial factors of residing within a cluster. In the trade-off, however, companies 
established within such a cluster seem to earn lower returns from products that make it to 
the market. Undoubtedly, this is correlated with the similar effects of technology source 
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alliances. This correlation is also supported by the negative interaction effect of the cluster 
variable and technology source alliances on returns (appendix b; table a2).  
For the third dimension, there are several arguments explaining the unfortunate effects of 
acquisitions on new product development in the studied sector. As discussed in the existing 
literature, previously dominant technologies in the pharmaceutical industry have become 
obsolete due to the rapid rise of science-driven biotechnologies during the 1980s and 
1990s, thereby reducing the value of pharmaceutical firms’ existing competences 162, 182. 
Therefore, “biotechnology is a dramatic case of competence-destroying innovation” 
204(p.368). Ironically, since the rise of biotechnology, established firms that exist by virtue of 
previously dominant technologies have begun to massively acquire biotechnological 
innovation to counter the pharmaceutical innovation deficit 5, 63. In the regression models 
for returns, “being acquired” has no significant effects on revenues from product sales. 
However, these effects are negative, which may suggest that the negative effects on returns 
of being acquired slightly outweigh their positive effects, but not enough to sort a 
significant negative effect.  
 
3.5.1 Strategic and managerial implications 
This study shows that governance structures play an essential role in interfirm cooperation 
with respect to successful product commercialization. Our empirical findings have several 
implications for both leaders of biotech SMEs and managers at established firms. For 
biotech companies, the chances of a successful product introduction appear to be positively 
affected within a “cluster setting”. Therefore, leaders of biotech companies do best to 
establish themselves in such an environment, but keeping in mind that this decision might 
influence the returns from products that are successfully launched. In addition, engaging in 
technology source alliances with larger (pharmaceutical) firms facilitates access to and 
benefits from the expertise and resources needed for downstream clinical R&D and 
commercialization. Such alliances significantly reduce the risk of failure during 
development, albeit at the expense of expected future revenues from sales. Nevertheless, 
during and after such collaborations, SMEs can optimally benefit from upfront, milestone, 
and royalty payments, depending on the value of their innovation, their IP position, and the 
nature of the deal. 
 
Obviously, at an early stage, biotech SMEs need to focus on upstream R&D activities. At a 
later stage, after one or more successful product introductions, companies can choose one 
of two strategic options. First, they can focus on engaging in technology source alliances, 
which will increase the likelihood of additional product introductions and increase the 
company value for an eventual exit strategy. As a second strategic option, biotech 
companies can focus on developing new products in-house to maximize revenues from 
future product sales and simultaneously engage in “non-source alliances” further 
downstream to maximize revenue from future and existing biotechnological product sales.  
 
There are also implications for larger firms when acquiring and exploiting externally 
sourced innovation. Established firms gain from biotechnological innovations by engaging 
in “non-source alliances,” as opposed to acquiring biotech companies. This conclusion 
corresponds to that of Markides205, who has suggested that established firms should 
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concentrate on their strengths instead of exploiting and attempting to create disruptive 
innovation. In this industry, established pharmaceutical firms are good at downstream 
R&D, marketing and commercialization, and consolidating young markets into large, mass 
markets. Correspondingly, instead of allocating valuable resources to acquiring and 
attempting to grow new, innovative businesses, they should aim to create and sustain a 
network of what Markides205(p. 24) describes as “feeder” companies. Biotechnological 
platforms can then be scaled up once their derived applications are ready for market 
consolidation. The study shows that by clustering feeder companies, as described earlier, 
an additional beneficial effect on new product development can be obtained.  
 
3.5.2 Limitations and further research 
Two limitations of this study point to future research opportunities. First, our large sample 
size made it difficult to deconstruct some variables into additional submeasures. It was 
possible to distinguish between technology source alliances and non-source alliances. 
However, further categorization of the alliances variable might provide additional insights. 
Different types of alliances (e.g., in- and out-licensing, collaborative R&D agreements, 
joint ventures) might have sorted different effects with respect to biotechnological product 
development and product sales. With respect to our results on acquisitions, future research 
could address categorization related to types of acquiring firms and assess which types are 
predominantly responsible for the negative effects of acquisitions. Additionally, future 
studies could account for post-acquisition integration measures to gain insights into 
optimizing integration and exploitation processes (see Puranam et al.152; Ranft and 
Lord153).  
 
Moreover, it is possible that the second DV, revenues from product sales including 10% in 
royalty payments, is not always equal to the financial success of a biotech company. The 
main reason for this is that most biotech companies that indirectly introduce a product 
through alliances or acquisitions have made financial deals with their partners related to 
other forms of cash flow, in addition to royalties (i.e., upfront payments, milestone 
payments) 137, 139, 206. Given the large sample size, it was fairly difficult to retrieve this 
financial data. This limited us to assessing the effects on income from revenue and 
royalties of introduced biotechnological product sales. 
 
Certainly, the significant results of this single study do not provide conclusive evidence, 
and additional research is needed to examine in greater detail the link between biotech 
company success and governance structures in interfirm cooperation. However, the results 
clearly show that from a biotech firm’s perspective, engaging in technology source 
alliances is a superior strategy for successfully commercializing biotechnological product 
innovations than being acquired by a larger (pharmaceutical) firm. 
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Appendices 
Appendix a. Literature overview interfirm cooperation 
Table a1. Literature overview of interfirm cooperation 
  Study Research 
sample/Data 
Design and 
Independent 
variables 
Dependent 
variables 
Findings/Key Insights 
Dimension 
1: 
Clusters 
Deeds et 
al.143; 
(Journal of 
Business 
Venturing) 
Publicly held 
pharmaceutical 
and 
biotechnology 
companies. 
Geographic 
location in 
cluster areas in 
the US; 
Research team 
capabilities; 
Strategic 
Alliances; R&D 
Management 
capabilities 
New product 
development; 
measured by 
both marketed 
products and 
products in 
development. 
"Location has a significant and positive impact on a firm’s new 
product development. Specifically, a firm located in an area 
with a higher concentration of biotechnology firms has a 
significantly higher number of products completed or in trials 
than those located in areas with lower concentrations. However, 
when at the high end of the concentration the negative impact of 
competition for resources appears to have an impact and 
actually decreases the firms ability to develop products.” “Close 
proximity of organisations with similar interests promotes the 
natural exchange of ideas through both formal and informal 
networks established among the organizations” “ Firms which 
are located close to other firms in the same industry will reap 
benefits from knowledge spillovers, specialized suppliers, and 
labor pooling, but the results also indicate that there is a point at 
which competition for resources within a given geographic 
location interferes with a firm’s ability to develop new 
products.” 
 Stuart & 
Sorenson145; 
(Research 
Policy) 
Biotechnology 
firms. 
Geographic 
proximity to 
establised 
biotech firms; 
Sources of 
biotechnology 
expertise; 
Venture 
capitalists 
Location-
specific 
founding rates 
and (financial) 
performance of 
biotechnology 
firms. 
“The form of social capital most valuable in the resource 
mobilisation process is to a large extent a geographically 
localised currency” “ According to our results, the most 
advantageous locations for new biotech firms provide access to 
an extensive technical workforce, but do not present intense 
local competition from nearby biotech firms.” “the competitive 
effect of being located in a densely populated biotechnology 
cluster impacts poorly funded startups most strongly.” “the 
faculties of leading universities in the biotech-related sciences 
establish more new biotechnology firms when only a few 
biotech companies operate in the immediate vicinity of their 
universities.” 
 Phene et al.114 
(Strategic 
Management 
Journal) 
Patent data 
from US 
Biotechnology 
industry 
Technological 
space; 
Geographic 
origin. 
Breakthrough 
innovation, 
measured by 
patent citations 
(binary 
variable) 
“Exploration across geographic or technological neighborhoods 
can be valuable in achieving breakthrough innovations”; 
“technological distance of knowledge does not assure its utility; 
rather, it is the interaction of technological space and 
geographic origin that enables firms to create breakthrough 
innovations. Technologically distant knowledge has a 
significant impact on breakthrough innovation only if it is from 
the same national context.” 
 Folta et al.144 
(Journal of 
Business 
Venturing) 
Private and 
public US 
biotechnology 
firms 
Cluster size; 
Cluster growth 
Firm 
performance 
(five measures): 
Discontinuance; 
IPOs; Private 
equity 
offerings; 
patents; 
strategic 
alliances. 
"Economies of agglomeration benefit firms in their ability to 
innovate through patenting, attract alliance partners, and attract 
private equity partners.” “At the same time, marginal benefits to 
cluster size decline as clusters get large, clearly suggesting that 
diseconomies of agglomeration may play an important role 
when clusters exceed about 65 firms”; “ the marginal benefit to 
being in a cluster is increasing at a decreasing rate" 
 Ahrweiler et 
al.165  
(Journal or 
Product 
Innovation 
Management) 
Knowledge-
intensive 
industries 
Simulation of 
innovation 
networks with 
and without 
university 
agents. 
University-
industry linkages 
Innovation 
diffusion and 
collaborative 
arrangements in 
innovation 
networks. 
“University-industry links improve the 
conditions for innovation diffusion and enhance collaborative 
arrangements in innovation networks.” 
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Dimension 
2: 
Alliances 
George et 
al.148 (Journal 
of High 
Technology 
Management 
Research) 
Biopharmaceutical 
firms 
Alliance portfolio 
characteristics 
(Horizontal/vertical 
alliances and 
generative/attractive 
alliances) 
Innovative 
performance 
(products on 
market), 
financial 
performance 
(revenue), and 
absorptive 
capacity 
The results highlight the differential effect of the portfolio 
characteristics on performance. Vertical alliances rather 
than horizontal alliances increase the probability of 
bringing a product to market. “Horizontal alliances are 
positively related to patents (innovative capability), 
whereas vertical alliances are negatively related to patents. 
Also, vertical alliances are positively related to 
performance, whereas horizontal alliances are not 
significant predictors of company performance.” 
 George et 
al.167 Journal 
of Business 
Venturing) 
Publicly traded 
biotechnology 
companies 
Business-university 
alliances 
R&D 
expenses, 
innovative 
output, 
financial 
output 
Companies with university linkages have lower R&D 
expenses while having higher levels of innovative output. 
However, companies with university linkages do not 
achieve higher financial performance than similar firms 
without such linkages. 
 Rothaermel 
& Deeds 149 
(Strategic 
Management 
Journal) 
Biotechnology 
firms 
Exploration 
alliances; Products 
in development; and 
exploitation 
alliances. 
Products in 
development; 
Exploitation 
alliances ; and 
Products on 
the market 
“We found support for an integrated product development 
path leading from exploration alliances, 
via products in development and exploitation alliances, to 
products on the market.” “As a technology venture grows, 
it tends to withdraw from this product development path to 
discover, develop, and commercialize promising projects 
through vertical integration.” 
 Danzon et 
al.111 (Journal 
of Health 
Economics) 
Pharmaceutical 
and biotechnology 
firms. 
Overall and 
Therapeutic 
experience; 
Diversified 
experience across 
therapeutic areas; 
Scope; Co-
development 
alliance 
Drug 
development 
phase 
completion 
"Products developed in an alliance tend to have a higher 
probability of success, at least for the more complex phase 
2 and phase 3 trials, particularly if the licensee is a large 
firm.” “The evidence on effects of alliances tends to 
confirm the direct evidence from the economies of 
experience measures: experience increases the probability 
of success for late stage trials, whereas it is not necessary 
for the simpler, phase 1 trials. These productivity-
enhancing effects of alliances with large firms dominate 
any lemons or moral hazard effects.” 
 Rothaermel 
& Deeds 150 
(Journal of 
Business 
Venturing) 
Biotechnology 
firms 
Upstream, 
horizontal, and 
downstream 
alliances from the 
perspective of the 
biotech firm. 
New product 
development. 
"The biotech fi rms’ limited capability for alliance 
management is exhausted the fastest with upstream 
alliances, followed by horizontal, and then by downstream 
alliances, in this order.” “Consequently, firms can afford to 
engage in more horizontal alliances compared to upstream 
ones and can manage an even greater number of 
downstream alliances" 
 Stuart et 
al.207 
(Research 
Policy) 
Biotechnology 
firms 
Upstream alliances; 
and affiliated 
scientists’ networks 
Revenue 
generating 
down-stream 
alliances 
“(i) firms with multiple in-licensing agreements are more 
likely to attract revenue-generating alliances with 
downstream partners; however, (ii) the positive 
relationship between in-licenses and downstream alliances 
attenuates as firms mature, and (iii) the diversity and the 
quality of the academic connections of firms’ principals 
influences their chances of successfully acquiring 
commercialization rights to scientific discoveries in 
universities.” “Biotechnology firms with strong academic 
connections (but, not necessarily academic founders) are 
ideally suited to capitalize on the business model of 
brokering university technology.” 
 Sherwood & 
Cavin 146 
(Journal of 
Product 
Innovation 
Management) 
Firms engaged 
in technology 
transfer; 
partnerships with 
universities 
Trust, familiarity 
with partner, 
familiarity with 
technology, alliance 
experience, use of 
formal 
collaboration teams, 
and technology 
experts’ 
communication. 
Technological 
knowledge 
acquisition 
success 
“the results emphasise the importance of three factors to 
knowledge acquisition success: (1) the trust exhibited by 
the knowledge- seeking party in the knowledge source; (2) 
partner familiarity; and (3) the partners’ technology 
experts’ communications.” Both parties should consciously 
strive, through substantive and symbolic actions, to create a 
trusting relationship and partner familiarity is needed to 
build partner trust. In addition, the employment of 
communications channels that offer the knowledge-seeking 
party unobstructed, timely, and complete access to the 
technology of the knowledge source party should be a 
communications objective, and this may be most easily 
accomplished by creating strong communications linkages 
between the parties’ technology experts. 
 Un et al.178 
(Journal of 
Product 
Innovation 
Management) 
Manufacturing 
firms 
R&D collaborations 
with universities, 
suppliers, 
customers, and 
competitors. 
Product 
Innovation 
"R&D collaborations with suppliers have the highest 
positive impact on product innovation, followed by 
collaborations with universities. Surprisingly, R&D 
collaborations with customers do not appear to affect 
product innovation, and collaborations with competitors 
appear to harm 
it.” “These findings indicate that ease of knowledge access, 
rather than breadth of knowledge, appears to drive the 
success of R&D collaborations for product innovation.” 
32_Erim Fernald BW stand.job
 
 55 
 Van Beers & 
Zand 208 
(Journal of 
Product 
Innovation 
Management) 
12,811 innovating 
firms, based on 
data from the 
Dutch Community 
Innovation Survey 
The diversity of 
different kinds of 
partners in R&D 
cooperation 
Innovation 
performance 
"Functional diversity leads to a variety of knowledge 
intake and synergetic effects necessary to develop and 
commercialize novel products. Geographical diversity 
results in successful adaption of existing products to 
different local requirements such as technical standards, 
market regulations, and customer preferences. The 
organizational determinants of both kinds of partner 
diversity are prior experience, patenting, and information 
technology infrastructure.” “The observed effects of 
partner diversity on innovation performance are more 
profound in high-technology and knowledge-intensive 
industries because of higher degrees of product complexity, 
market volatility, and riskiness/uncertainty of innovation 
projects in these sectors.” 
      
 
Dimension 
3: 
Acquisitions 
Ahuja & 
Katila154 
(Strategic 
Management 
Journal) 
Acquiring 
firms in the 
chemicals 
industry 
Technological 
acquisitions, 
acquisitions in 
which 
technology is a 
component of 
the acquired 
firm’s assets, 
and non 
technological 
acquisitions” 
acquisitions that 
do not involve a 
technological 
component. 
Innovation 
performance 
“Within technological acquisitions absolute size of the acquired 
knowledge base enhances innovation performance, while 
relative size of the acquired knowledge base reduces innovation 
output. The relatedness of acquired and acquiring knowledge 
bases has a nonlinear impact on innovation output. 
Nontechnological acquisitions do not have a significant effect 
on subsequent innovation output.within technological 
acquisitions absolute size of the acquired knowledge base 
enhances innovation performance, while relative size of the 
acquired knowledge base reduces innovation output. The 
relatedness of acquired and acquiring knowledge bases has a 
nonlinear impact on innovation output. Nontechnological 
acquisitions do not have a significant effect on subsequent 
innovation output.” “From the acquisition selection standpoint 
this research suggests that a balance on both size and relatedness 
of acquisitions is favored.” 
 Hagedoorn & 
Duysters 156 
(Technology 
Analysis & 
Strategic 
Management) 
Companies in 
the 
international 
computer 
sector. 
Relatedness in 
M&As 
(technological; 
similar size; 
R&D intensity) 
Technological 
performance 
"M&As can contribute to improving the technological 
performance of companies in a high-tech environment. 
However, it has to be stressed that both the organizational and 
the strategic fit of the companies involved in these M&As are 
crucial for the technological success of M&As.” “The successful 
integration of other companies in a familiar environment and the 
search for new opportunities through M&As are both mentioned 
in that context as major mechanisms in a two- fold strategy to 
improve technological performance. The relevance of market 
relatedness of M&As stresses the importance of uncertainty 
reduction by means of integration of companies that are active 
in similar sectors and that have some similarity in terms of 
product- markets” 
 King et al.78  
(Strategic 
Management 
Journal) 
93 studies with 
852 effect 
sizes with a 
combined size 
of 206.910 
observations 
Meta-analyisis 
of Empirical 
studies of 
acquiring firms.  
Financial 
performance 
(e.g., 
abnormal 
returns with 
multiple 
event 
windows, 
return on 
assets (ROA), 
return on 
equity (ROE), 
return on 
sales (ROS)). 
“Acquisitions either have no significant effect or a modest 
negative effect on an acquiring firm’s financial performance in 
the post-announcement period.” “This may lead one to 
conclude, for example, that acquisition is not the best means by 
which to access and profit from valuable resources existing in 
other, external businesses.”Until researchers can provide 
managers better guidance on how value can be created through 
M&A activity, the apparent bias for external growth over 
internal growth likely will continue to result in disappointing 
performance outcomes.” 
 De Man & 
Duysters 76  
(Technovation) 
30 studies on 
alliances and 
15 studies on 
M&A 
Review of 
Empirical 
studies of 
acquiring firms 
and alliance 
partners 
Innovation "Alliances increase the innovativeness of firms. There are some 
conditions that enhance this effect, like similar knowledge 
backgrounds of the partners, a higher level of alliance capability 
and more intense relationships. Alliances involving public 
support or a public partner do not increase innovation, although 
they do lower the cost of innovation.” M&A have a neutral or 
negative effect on innovation; M&A may lead to some scale 
economies thereby lowering the cost of innovation; well 
managed M&As and M&As among related firms outperform 
poorly managed M&As and diversifying M&As, respectively.” 
“Overall conclusion: alliances are outperforming M&As in 
terms of their effect on innovation. Except for the possibilities 
offered by M&As to reap some economies of scale in R&D, 
alliances outperform M&As on almost each conceivable point.” 
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 Cloodt et al.77 
(Research 
Policy) 
Acquiring 
firms in four 
major high-
tech sectors. 
Non-
technological 
M&As; 
Technological 
M&As. 
Post-M&A 
innovative 
performance 
“Non-technological M&As appear to have a negative impact on 
the acquiring firm’s post-M&A innovative performance. With 
respect to technological M&As, a large relative size of the 
acquired knowledge base reduces the innovative performance of 
the acquiring firm. The absolute size of the acquired knowledge 
base only has a positive effect during the first couple of years 
after which the effect turns around and we see a negative effect 
on the innovative performance of the acquiring firm. The 
relatedness between the acquired and acquiring firms’ 
knowledge bases has a curvilinear impact on the acquiring 
firm’s innovative performance. This indicates that companies 
should target M&A ‘partners’ that are neither too unrelated nor 
too similar in terms of their knowledge base.” 
 Danzon et al.74 
(Managerial 
and Decision 
Economics) 
Pharmaceutical 
and biotech 
firms 
Excess capacity 
on merger 
activity and 
merger activity 
on performance 
Mergers; 
Firm 
performance 
“Firms with a low Tobin’s q;  hence with low expected earnings 
growth, are more likely to acquire another firm.” “Large firms 
that merged experienced a similar change in enterprise value, 
sales, employees, and R&D, and had slower growth in operating 
profit, compared with similar firms that did not merge. Thus 
mergers may be a response to trouble, but they are not a 
solution.” “ For small firms mergers appear to be primarily an 
exit strategy for firms that are in financial trouble, as measured 
by low Tobin’s q;  few products and low cash–sales ratio. 
Because most of these small firms do not have marketed 
products, this financial trouble is more likely caused by 
unobserved R&D shocks rather than excess capacity due to 
patent expirations.” 
 Demirbag et 
al.155 
(Multinational 
Business 
Review) 
Pharmaceutical 
firms 
Comparative 
Analysis of Pre-
M&A versus 
Post-M&A 
performance 
Research 
productivity, 
ROI, and 
profit margin 
"Relying on three measures of evaluating M&A performance, it 
has been noted in general that no value creation was realized in 
our sample M&As in terms of research productivity, return on 
investment, and profit margin” 
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Appendix b. Additional analyses; interaction effects 
Table a2. Logit regression models for interaction effects on product introductiona 
Variable Model 5  Model 6  
DV: Biotech product introduction (t to t+5)     
Category big biotech 9.38***  [2.08] 11.04***  [2.19] 
Age .94**  [.313] .856**  [.321] 
Patent activity (t-5 to t) .757***  [.190] .598**  [.196] 
Cluster 1.56*  [.715] 1.65*  [.762] 
Number of alliances (t-5 to t) .618*  [.242]  ---  
Technology source alliances (t-5 to t)                             ---   .518  [.349] 
Non-source alliances (t-5 to t)                             ---  .211  [.350] 
Acquired (t-5 to t) -.369  [.726] -.961  [.776] 
Acquired within cluster (t-5 to t) -.073  [.861] -.572  [.877] 
Cluster * Alliances (t-5 to t) -.013  [.012] ---  
Cluster * Technology source alliances (t-5 to t)                             ---  .043  [.024] 
Cluster * Non-source alliances (t-5 to t)                             ---  -.062*  [.026] 
Acquired * Alliances (t-5 to t) -.036  [.021] ---  
Acquired * Technology source alliances (t-5 to t)                             ---   .148**  [.877] 
Acquired * Non-source alliances (t-5 to t)                             ---   -.112*  [.049] 
Constant -17.66***  [1.73] -17.30***  [1.77] 
Chi2 112.46***  110.38***  
McKelvey & Zavoina's R2 .274  .27  
n = 5697     
a  Year dummies are included in all models. Standard errors in brackets.  
*Statistically significant at the 5% level.  
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
*** Statistically significant at the .1% level.  
 
Table a3. OLS regression models for interaction effects on revenue (without firm dummies)a 
Variable Model 5  Model 6  
DV: Revenue from biotech products     
Category big biotech 2.45**  [.927] 1.45  [.808] 
Age -.360  [.299] -.242  [.243] 
Patent activity (t-5 to t) .515*  [.244] .616**  [.235] 
Cluster -1.07*  [.470] -.599  [.442] 
Number of alliances (t-5 to t) .014  [.255] ---  
Technology source alliances (t-5 to t)  -  -.488  [.395] 
Non-source alliances (t-5 to t) -  .777*  [.323] 
Acquired (t-5 to t) -.374  [.666] -.322  [.669] 
Acquired within cluster (t-5 to t) 1.73*  [.845] 1.91*  [.773] 
Cluster * Alliances (t-5 to t) -.012  [.019] ---  
Cluster * Technology source alliances (t-5 to t)  -  -.079**  [.028] 
Cluster * Non-source alliances (t-5 to t)  -  .018  [.019] 
Acquired * Alliances (t-5 to t) -.045**  [.019] ---  
Acquired * Technology source alliances (t-5 to t)  -  -.123**  [.048] 
Acquired * Non-source alliances (t-5 to t)  -  -.037*  [.016] 
Constant 6.12***  [1.06] 4.99***  [.954] 
R2 .5646  .6450  
n = 675     
a  Year dummies are included in all models. Standard errors in brackets.  
*Statistically significant at the 5% level.  
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
*** Statistically significant at the .1% level.  
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Table a4. OLS regression models for interaction effects on revenue (with firm dummies)a 
Variable Model 7  Model 8  
DV: Revenue from biotech products     
Age -.656  [.368] -.456  [.303] 
Patent activity (t-5 to t) .467  [.280] .547*  [.277] 
Number of alliances (t-5 to t) -.017  [.203] ---  
Technology source alliances (t-5 to t)  ---  -.833**  [.312] 
Non-source alliances (t-5 to t)  ---  .824***  [.251] 
Acquired (t-5 to t) .502  [.502] .550  [.565] 
Acquired*Alliances (t-5 to t) -.042*  [.017] ---  
Acquired *Technology source alliances (t-5 to t)  ---  -.099*  [.047] 
Acquired *Non-source alliances (t-5 to t)  ---  -.033  [.017] 
Constant 5.57***  [1.21] 4.39***  [1.01] 
R2 .7035  .7143  
n = 675     
a  Firm dummies and year dummies are included in all models. Standard errors in brackets  
*Statistically significant at the 5% level.  
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
*** Statistically significant at the .1% level.  
 
Appendix c. Additional analyses; quadratic terms 
Table a5. Logit regression models for product introduction with quadratic termsa 
Variable Model 9  Model 10  
DV: Biotech product introduction (t to t+5)     
Category big biotech 9.30***  [2.12] 9.49***  [2.07] 
Age 1.05**  [.308] .967**  [.330] 
Patent activity (t-5 to t) 1.35  [1.29] 1.66  [1.30] 
Patent activity squared (t-5 to t) -.289  [.628] -.509  [.635] 
Cluster 1.44  [.738] 1.40*  [1.50] 
Number of alliances (t-5 to t) 1.97*  [1.54] ---  
Number of alliances squared (t-5 to t) -.765  [.754] ---  
Technology source alliances (t-5 to t) ---  1.37  [1.50] 
Technology source alliances squared (t-5 to t) ---  -.145  [.738] 
Non-source alliances (t-5 to t) ---  .282  [1.48] 
Non-source alliances squared (t-5 to t) ---  -.385  [.725] 
Acquired (t-5 to t) -.957*  [.446] -.778  [.444] 
Constant -18.32***  [1.67] -17.42***  [1.87] 
Chi2 114.53***  104.87***  
McKelvey & Zavoina's R2 .270  .265  
n = 5697     
a  Year dummies are included in all models. Standard errors in brackets.  
*Statistically significant at the 5% level.  
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
*** Statistically significant at the .1% level.  
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Table a6. OLS regression models (without firm dummies) with quadratic termsa 
Variable Model 9  Model 10 
DV: Revenue from biotech products     
Category big biotech 2.20**  [.858] 1.70* [.717] 
Age -.075  [.280] .089  [.220] 
Patent activity (t-5 to t) -1.05  [1.03] -1.13  [.957] 
Patent activity squared (t-5 to t) .750  [.505] .824  [.471] 
Cluster -.982*  [.496] -.929*  [.447] 
Number of alliances (t-5 to t) -3.34*  [1.35] ---  
Number of alliances squared (t-5 to t) 1.59*  [.754] ---  
Technology source alliances (t-5 to t) ---  -.567  [.885] 
Technology source alliances squared (t-5 to t)  ---  -.142  [.495] 
Non-source alliances (t-5 to t) ---  -3.06*  [1.49] 
Non-source alliances squared (t-5 to t)  ---  1.86*  [.818] 
Acquired (t-5 to t) -.032  [.493] -.778  [.444] 
Constant 5.45***  [.977] 4.66***  [.895] 
R2 .5603  .6063  
n = 675     
a  Year dummies are included in all models. Standard errors in brackets.  
*Statistically significant at the 5% level.  
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
*** Statistically significant at the .1% level.  
 
 
 
Table a7. OLS regression models (with firm dummies) with quadratic termsa 
Variable Model 11  Model 12  
DV: Revenue from biotech products     
Age -.298 [.348] -.073 [.292]  
Patent activity (t-5 to t)  -.957 [.992] -1.09 [.939]  
Patent activity squared (t-5 to t) .676 [.494] .788 [.475]  
Number of alliances (t-5 to t)  -3.68* [1.45] ---  
Number of alliances squared (t-5 to t) 1.79* [.736] ---  
Technology source alliances (t-5 to t) --- -.725 [1.05]  
Technology source alliances squared (t-5 to t)  --- -.054 [.574]  
Non-source alliances (t-5 to t) --- -2.98 [1.55]  
Non-source alliances squared (t-5 to t)  --- 1.85* [.844]  
Acquired (t-5 to t) -.170 [.533] -.235 [.504]  
Constant 4.36*** [1.02] 3.97*** [.897]  
R2 .6939 .7130  
n = 675    
a  Firm dummies and year dummies are included in all models. Standard errors in brackets  
*Statistically significant at the 5% level.  
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
*** Statistically significant at the .1% level.  
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           Chapter  4  
 
THE MODERATING ROLE OF ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY 
AND THE DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS OF ACQUISITIONS 
AND ALLIANCES ON BIG PHARMA FIRMS’ INNOVATION 
PERFORMANCE 
 
 
Abstract 
In the context of increased pharmaceutical innovation deficits and big pharma 
blockbusters’ patent expirations, this study examines the moderating role of firms’ 
absorptive capacity in external innovation activities of big pharma firms. The study 
indicates a rising interest of big pharma in acquisitions of and alliances with biotechnology 
companies. Unfortunately, this increased interest is not reflected in the number of new 
drugs generated by big pharma. We find that acquisitions of biotech companies have 
negatively affected big pharma firms’ innovation performance on average but these 
acquisitions might have a positive effect at higher levels of acquiring firms’ absorptive 
capacity. Moreover, also acquisitions of pharma companies and alliances with biotech 
companies only have a positive effect on innovation performance at sufficiently high levels 
of absorptive capacity. The moderating role of absorptive capacity implicates that a tight 
integration of internal R&D efforts and (unrelated) external knowledge is crucial for 
harnessing complementarity effects. 
 
Fernald, K.D.S., Pennings, H.P.G., van den Bosch, J.F., Commandeur, H.R. and Claassen, E. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The pharmaceutical industry is one of the most research-intensive industries, with average 
new product development (NPD) trajectories of 11.9 years 58, 109. For the past decade the 
industry has been coping with a growing “productivity gap” 12 or “productivity paradox” 4, 
which is generally described as a decrease in new products launched versus an increase in 
research and development (R&D) expenditures 14. These increased expenses appear to be 
related to an increasingly rigid regulatory environment and higher quality demands 209, 210. 
In addition, patent expiry on numerous blockbuster drugs, also referred to as the “patent 
cliff”, and consequent generic competition is currently affecting the industry, eroding 
$Billions in annual sales 96. Although the decrease in pharmaceutical productivity is 
controversial 210, the combination of challenges that are involved has serious ramifications 
for maintaining the industry’s margins and double-digit growth rates of past decades 211. 
These rates are still incorporated into the growth expectations of shareholders and can be 
maintained only with an annual launch of at least two new ‘blockbuster’ drugs 4.  
 
An important strategy that has been used over the past two decades to address thinning 
pipelines involves mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 72, 73. Figure 4.1. shows the 
consolidation of big pharma, with 32 incumbent firms in 1990 merging to 12 firms in 2013.  
 
Together, these firms have generated more than 60% of the combined global 
pharmaceutical sales over the past decade (see figure 4.2). According to Danzon et al.74 and 
Frantz75, M&A appear to be a response to the expected patent expirations and gaps in a 
firm’s product pipeline. However, this consolidation strategy has had little effect, as M&A 
do not appear to create or destroy value 72. Nonetheless, since the 1980s, pharmaceutical 
firms have employed this M&A strategy with respect to biotechnology small- and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) in the hopes of countering innovation deficits 5, 94. 
 
The current innovation challenges have coincided with the considerable rise of new sources 
of innovation for pharmaceutical firms. The biotech ‘revolution’, which began in the 1970s 
17, has significantly affected the radical innovation process within the industry. This rise of 
scientific drug discovery, spurred the origination of highly innovative and specialized 
biotechnology-driven firms 212.  
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Figure 4.1 Big pharma consolidation; M&A that led to the current 12 largest pharmaceutical firms 
(source: SDC Platinum Database (ThomsonReuters))    
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Figure 4.2 Global pharmaceutical sales (in $Billions); Showing the proportion of global sales of big 
pharma firms as illustrated in figure 4.1 compared to global industry sales  
(source: EvaluatePharma; Datastream (ThomsonReuters))  
 
 
 
 
Biotechnology as a new source of external innovation was expected to be the answer to the 
challenges that the pharmaceutical industry is currently confronted with 16. This 
development resulted in a continuous trend in the formation of new pharma-biotech 
collaborations and acquisitions of biotech SMEs 13, 213(figure 4.3 and 4.4). However, the 
coincidence of the incumbent firms’ focus on external sources of innovation, the 
considerable rise in R&D expenditures, and the stagnant pattern of newly developed drugs 
(i.e. productivity paradox), does raise questions regarding the effects of external innovation 
from biotechnology SMEs on incumbent pharmaceutical firms’ innovation performance.  
 
The (bio)pharmaceutical industry is a prime example where technologically unrelated 
innovation sources are used to replenish incumbent firms’ R&D pipelines, making it ideal 
to investigate differential effects of related and unrelated acquisitions and alliances on 
firms’ innovation performance. By establishing a framework based on the innovation 
activities of incumbent pharmaceutical firms, this study uniquely aims to explore effects of 
related and unrelated sources of innovation, accessed through alliances and acquisitions, on 
firms’ innovation performance. Moreover, the aim is to show the moderating role of 
absorptive capacity, measured as internal R&D, in these effects, identifying either 
complementarity or substitutability between big pharma firms’ internal and external R&D 
activities. 
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4.2 Theory and hypotheses 
In the context of open innovation6 and exploration and exploitation157 as it applies to the 
(bio)pharmaceutical industry159, 160, three important innovation activities are internal R&D 
efforts, engaging in alliances, and engaging in M&A. 
 
In the pharmaceutical industry, several types of M&A are prevalent, which include but are 
not limited to: large-scale mergers between pharmaceutical firms (e.g., Glaxo Wellcome 
merging with Smithkline Beecham to form GlaxoSmithkline in 2000 and Sanofi merging 
with Aventis in 2004), large-scale biotech mergers (e.g., Biogen and Idec merging in 2003) 
and acquisitions of biotech SMEs13 on the one hand, and acquisitions of pharmaceutical 
companies on the other hand. It is apparent that pharma companies are related to big 
pharma firms, in terms of knowledge, technologies and NPD, whereas biotech companies 
are unrelated to the incumbent pharma firms. 
 
Incumbent (pharma) firms and biotech companies make alliance and acquisition deals to 
reach their respective goals. Biotech companies want to ensure their short-term survival by 
accessing financial resources, sharing the high risks associated with drug development and 
ultimately gaining market access. In contrast, pharmaceutical firms intend to select product 
candidates with blockbuster potential to fill gaps in their pipeline 162, 214. Although the 
blockbuster model is being increasingly questioned by firms themselves 4, the strong focus 
on the short-term commercial exploitation of high-potential products appears to resonate in 
the strategies of firms. As a result, firms generally target profitable or later clinical stage 
biotech companies. Although early stage companies are less expensive to acquire, they are 
typically more distant from becoming profitable and thus are less appealing 215. The targets 
also tend to be acquired for only one or a few products from their pipeline 189, resulting in a 
frequent write-off of acquired in-process R&D. 
 
4.2.1 External innovation activities and innovation performance 
Alliances generally seem to outperform acquisitions when it comes to effects on a firm’s 
innovation performance 76. Where overall effects of alliances are often positive 111, 177, 179, 
the effects of acquisitions are mostly neutral or negative 76. Effects of acquisitions appear 
to be more negative when acquirers and targets have more diverging knowledge bases or 
are more dissimilar in size 156. So, especially for unrelated acquisitions, where the 
assimilation and application of newly acquired knowledge are likely to be resource 
consuming and can be counter-productive 216, the effects are found to be negative 77, 154, 217, 
218. 
 
Compared to acquisitions, different dynamics play a role in alliances, and hence different 
management capabilities are needed to adequately exploit innovation accessed through 
strategic alliances 219. Alliances are often engaged prior to M&A 71, presenting the 
opportunity of ‘cherry-picking’ at a relatively low cost before committing to all assets of a 
target company 76, 220. However, the extent to which alliances have positive effects on 
innovation performance is highly dependent on various factors, such as the relatedness of 
the knowledge bases of involved firms, the intensity of collaboration, and optimal alliance 
networks 76, 77. Especially relatedness may be an important factor and positive effects of 
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alliances may be greater for related alliances as opposed to unrelated alliances. 
Distinguishing between biotech and pharma alliances, Deeds and Hill 177, however, find no 
significant differences in innovation performance between both types of alliances.  
 
4.2.2 The moderating role of Absorptive Capacity 
A firm’s internal R&D investments is considered to be a proxy for its absorptive capacity 
221-223 and appears to be a contingency variable that critically influences the relationship 
between external R&D strategies and innovation performance 224-226. In particular R&D 
acquisitions are complementary innovation activities at higher levels of internal R&D 
investments, while at lower levels, internal R&D and acquisitions turn out to be 
substitutive strategic options. This might especially be true for related acquisitions as 
literature typically suggests that creating economies of scale and scope require a high level 
of technology- and market-relatedness 76, 227. Accordingly, Zahra and Hayton222 find 
positive significant interaction effects of related acquisitions and absorptive capacity on 
both firms’ ROE (return on equity) and revenue growth. Building upon these arguments, 
we derive the following hypothesis: 
      
H1a: Absorptive capacity has a positive moderating effect on the relationship between 
pharma acquisitions and big pharma firms’ innovation performance. 
 
Pisano187 explained that the rapid internalization of biotechnological R&D through 
acquisitions is likely to be an undesirable model. He argued that acquiring biotech SMEs 
can be particularly dangerous when used to overcome internal deficits. Acquiring 
biotechnology companies is only recommended after sufficient accumulation of in-house 
R&D experience 185, 187, 188. Correspondingly, Miyazaki228 has reported negative effects in 
high-tech industries when firms choose between either high levels of internal R&D (i.e., 
‘making’) or external growth strategies involving M&A (i.e., ‘buying’). 
 
Although, as H1a suggests, complementarity between internal and external R&D often 
depends on relatedness 76, 227, 229, positive, but mostly non-significant, interaction effects of 
internal R&D activity and unrelated knowledge acquisitions have been found as well 222, 
230. In such cases, innovation management requires a tight integration of internal and 
external knowledge to capture the positive effects each innovation activity has on the 
marginal return of the other 229. It seems that increased absorptive capacity (i.e. internal 
R&D) could positively moderate the effects of unrelated acquisitions on firms’ innovation 
performance. As such, the following hypothesis is suggested: 
  
H1b: Absorptive capacity has a positive moderating effect on the relationship between 
biotech acquisitions and big pharma firms’ innovation performance. 
 
A very fundamental difference between alliances and acquisitions lies in the degree of 
ownership between the parties involved. While larger firms can play a dominant role, the 
ownership of external R&D remains with the other firm, resulting in a lack of ownership 
advantages that could be essential to create complementarity between internal and related 
external R&D. The choice between internal R&D and related alliances is influenced by 
whether they are complements or substitutes which, ultimately, rely on whether synergies 
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exist between them231 and the R&D governance mode choice appears to be an important 
contingent variable in this regard 232. Due to a higher degree of separation in terms of 
ownership and governance between internal R&D and external alliances, firms are more 
likely to choose M&A over alliances with increased relatedness 232. In this context, related 
alliances and internal R&D might even be substitutable, so that the marginal benefit of 
pharma alliances could decrease with higher levels of internal R&D investments. While 
Zahra and Hayton222 find a positive moderating role of absorptive capacity on financial 
effects of related alliances, Berchicci233 find a substitution effect between a firm’s internal 
R&D capacity and external R&D through licensing, alliances and technology agreements 
with other firms. Given these mixed findings, we do not expect to find similar effects on 
firm’s innovation performance and formulate the following hypothesis. 
 
H2a: Absorptive capacity has no moderating effect on the positive relationship between 
pharma alliances and big pharma firms’ innovation performance. 
    
The effects of unrelated alliances on firms’ innovation performance, on the other hand, 
could be enhanced by firms’ absorptive capacity. Laursen234 explains that the inherent 
tensions and conflicts between exploratory and exploitative activities may call for 
organizational separation of these activities within firms. Perhaps a higher degree of 
separation in governance between the (more exploratory) activities of biotechnology firms 
and the (exploratory and exploitative) activities of pharmaceutical firms can result in 
increased complementarity effects on innovation when internal pharmaceutical R&D 
interacts with biotech R&D through strategic alliances. Correspondingly, Lavie et al.235 
explain how inter-organizational R&D alliances may involve varying degrees of basic 
research and incremental development in which they recognize intermediate activities that 
combine new knowledge development and the leveraging of prior knowledge. Increased 
internal exploratory R&D might enhance effects of partnerships with unrelated innovation 
on a firm’s innovation performance. This corresponds with positive and significant 
empirical findings from existing literature222, 223, 230, offsetting possible negative effects 
from opportunism in unrelated alliances. Considering this, the following hypothesis is 
suggested: 
  
H2b: Absorptive capacity has a positively moderating effect in the relationship between 
biotech alliances and big pharma firms’ innovation performance. 
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4.3 Methodology 
In this study, we collect data related to all incumbent pharmaceutical firms, together known 
as big pharma. As shown in figure 4.1, these firms are: Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer, Roche, 
GlaxoSmithKline, Novartis, Sanofi-Aventis, AstraZeneca, Abbott, Merck & Co (and 
Schering), Bayer, Eli Lilly, and Bristol-Myers Squibb. We examine the effects of alliances 
and acquisitions that occurred between the period from January 1990 to December 2013.  
 
4.3.1 Measures 
Innovation Performance – Abundant previous studies have used both input measures (e.g., 
R&D expenditures) and output measures (e.g., product introductions) to study innovation 
performance. According to De Man and Duysters76, output measures are expected to 
provide the most accurate measure of innovation performance when estimating the effects 
of M&A. Accordingly, an output measure was used for the analysis in this study.  
 
The Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) xxi distinguishes eight different 
chemical classes of new drug approvals (NDAs), of which the first class concerns new 
molecular entities (NMEs) xxii. This class has been used in the literature as a measure for 
pharmaceutical innovation performance 72, 236-239. In addition, products generated by 
biotechnologies such as recombinant DNA technology are registered as Biologic License 
Applications (BLAs), governed by the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research 
(CBER) xxi. The total number of NMEs and BLAs generated by the big pharma firms and 
their subsidiaries during the studied period, as depicted in figure 4.1, was used as the 
dependent variable in this study. The data was obtained from the online databases of the 
FDA, CDER, and CBER xxi.  
 
NMEs and BLAs generated by firms prior to their merger were included in the analysis. 
NMEs and BLAs generated by subsidiaries that remained active were only included after 
the respective acquisition, and only if the subsidiary also engaged in alliances and 
acquisitions prevalent in our dataset. Subsequently, we excluded NMEs and BLAs with the 
same name, applicant and approval date as a previous one. These occur due to multiple 
registrations according to different dosages or delivery methods. A total number of 318 
NMEs and BLAs were included in the analysis. The focus was on US approvals because 
the USA is the largest market for pharmaceuticals and biotech products and accounts for 
more than 50% of global pharmaceutical sales 240, and any firm that generates new drugs 
would take advantage of this market. 
 
Acquisitions – From ThomsonReuters SDC Platinum M&A databasexxiii, an initial total 
number of 1,205 mergers and acquisitions was gathered. This dataset was analysed per 
entry in order to properly categorize and include or exclude individual acquisitions. As 
                                                            
xxi www.fda.gov 
xxii  The class of NMEs is defined as drugs that contain an active moiety that has never been approved by the FDA 
or marketed in the US. 
xxiii  http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/financial/financial_products/a-z/sdc/; consisting of a partial 
database for M&A and one for Alliances. 
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discussed earlier, this study does not focus on large-scale M&A, as depicted in figure 4.1; 
therefore, these were excluded from the analysis, and all minority stake acquisitions were 
also excluded. Subsequently, it was determined whether acquisitions were directly relevant 
for NPD, possibly leading to either an NME or a BLA. On the basis of this premise, 
acquisitions of (research) services companies and medical devices/diagnostic product 
companies were excluded from the analysis.  
 
The remaining acquisition targets were subsequently categorized either as being 
biotechnology companies or pharmaceutical companies. This categorization was mainly 
based on the respective target company’s lead product(s) in development. Information from 
the deal synopsis as included in the database was used in combination with additional 
searches for company websites and profiles on websites (e.g. Bloomberg’s 
businessweek.com). The criteria used for distinguishing pharma companies from biotech 
companies resemble those described in existing literature 149, 241-243. Targets were 
considered to be pharmaceutical companies if their products (in development) mainly 
concerned small molecule drugs and/or the companies used more traditional drug 
discovery methods for lead generation. For biotech targets, consistent with the works of 
Chiaroni et al.212 and Chiesa and Chiaroni241, we identified different types in our dataset. 
We only included Chiesa and Chiarioni’s241 description of  “core biotech companies”, 
which include “product biotechs”, “drug agent biotechs”, and “platform biotechs”. Targets 
were considered to be biotech companies if their products (in development) concerned 
products of biotechnologies (e.g. recombinant proteins, antibodies) or platform 
biotechnologies (relating to gene therapy or cell therapy, for example). After these 
exclusion steps a total of 568 acquisitions were included in the analysis, of which 290 
acquisitions of pharmaceutical companies (i.e. Pharma Acquisitions) and 278 acquisitions 
of biotechnology companies (i.e. Biotech Acquisitions). 
 
Alliances – With the first inquiry, a total of 2,878 alliances were extracted from 
ThomsonReuters SDC Platinum alliances and joint venture databasexxiii. This dataset was 
again analysed per entry, using similar exclusion criteria as described above. First, the type 
of alliance was considered and ‘alliances for services’, ‘out-licensing’, ‘marketing 
alliances’, ‘out-sourcing’, and ‘manufacturing alliances’ were excluded from the analysis. 
As a consequence, only ‘joint ventures’ (JVs), ‘in-license deals’, ‘funding of external R&D 
projects’, and ‘collaborative R&D agreements’ were included, if these were considered to 
be directly relevant for NPD (i.e. marketing or manufacturing JVs were also excluded). In 
addition, these latter set of alliance types with (research) services and medical 
devices/diagnostic product partners were also excluded from the analysis, as such partners 
were again not considered to be directly relevant for NPD. 
 
The remaining alliances were further categorized based on the alliance partner being either 
a biotechnology partner or a pharmaceutical partner. For this categorization the same 
criteria as described for the acquisition targets, were used. Similarly, this categorization 
was also based on the deal synopsis as provided by the SDC Platinum database or, if 
necessary, on additional online data. After these exclusion steps a total of 1,270 alliances 
were included in the analysis, of which 552 alliances with pharmaceutical companies (i.e. 
Pharma Alliances) and 718 alliances with biotechnology companies (i.e. Biotech 
Alliances). 
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Absorptive Capacity (ACAP) – As stated by Zahra and Hayton222, several measures for 
absorptive capacity have been used in the literature, but the most popular measure is R&D 
spending, as a firm’s internal R&D is the foundation of its absorptive capacity221. Similarly 
to Lin et al.223, we used a relative measure for R&D intensity, which was generated by 
dividing the R&D expenditures by the sales of the respective firm. Both data on firms’ 
R&D expenditures and sales was collected from ThomsonReuters’ Datastreamxxiv and these 
measures were added together for merged firms prior to their merger. The role of 
Absorptive Capacity was assessed by estimating effects of interactions with the 
acquisitions and alliances variables on firms’ innovation performance. For the main affects 
this measure for R&D intensity was included as a control variable in models without firm 
dummies.  
 
Size – Firms’ size was included as a control variable, measured by the number of 
employees. This data was also obtained from Datastreamxxiv. In the analysis a log 
transformation of this variable was generated. 
 
4.3.2 Models and analysis 
For the regression analyses, a panel dataset was used to estimate effects on the dependent 
variable, Innovation Performanceit for firm i in year t. Independent variables were 
generated by creating stock variables for the measures as described above for firm i over 
the period from year t to t-5, hereby creating a time lag of 5 years xxv. This time lag was 
introduced to estimate the lagged effects of our independent variables, considering 
companies’ stage in product development. A longer time lag would lead to a larger 
decrease in the number of observations.  
 
First, the main effects were estimated with a Poisson regression with robust standard error 
(SE) corrections, with and without firm dummies, including Absorptive Capacity i(t - t-5) and 
ln(Size)i(t - t-5) as control variables (results shown in tables 4.2 and 4.3).  
 
Subsequently, the moderating role of absorptive capacity was explored with a Poisson 
regression of the same models including interactions of absorptive capacity with the 
acquisitions and alliances variables, using the same time lags of 5 years (results shown in 
table 4.4). By using dummy variables, we control for time-specific and firm-specific 
effects. The hypotheses were tested using the following model (results shown in table 4.4): 
 
Innovation Performanceit = α + β1 ACAP(t - t-5) +  β2 ln(SIZE)i(t - t-5) +  β3 Pharma 
Acquisitionsi(t - t-5) +β4 Biotech Acquisitionsi(t - t-5) + β5 Pharma Alliancesi(t - t-5)  + β6 
Biotech Alliancesi(t - t-5) + β7 ACAP * Pharma Acquisitionsi(t - t-5) +β8 ACAP * Biotech 
Acquisitionsi(t - t-5) + β9 ACAP *Pharma Alliancesi(t - t-5)  +  β10 ACAP * Biotech Alliancesi(t 
- t-5) + ε 
 
                                                            
xxiv  http://thomsonreuters.com/datastream-professional/ 
xxv  Similar but more non-significant results were found using time lags of 4 and 6 years, (results not shown). 
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4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Acquisitions and alliances 
Over the studied period of 24 years (1990-2013), we do not observe a rise in the total 
number of acquisitions. However, pharmaceutical acquirers seem to have shifted their 
focus, with respect to the type of acquisition targets they acquire. Figure 4.3 shows an 
increase in Biotech Acquisitions and a decline in Pharma Acquisitions, as percentages of 
total acquisitions that were considered to be directly relevant for NPD. This trend supports 
the notion of increased investments in biotech by big pharma firms.  
 
Regarding the total number of alliances, we observe a decline, decreasing from an annual 
average of 220 between 1990 and 1995 to an annual average of 55 between 2008 and 2013. 
Similar to the patterns regarding acquisitions, the results show that over the past 24 years, 
firms have developed an increasing preference for collaborations in which they gain access 
to biotech products and platform technologies (figure 4.4). This result is not surprising, as 
many acquisitions, especially small-scale acquisitions, are preceded by alliances and 
collaborations 71. These trends regarding acquisitions and alliances correspond to the trends 
that have been reported in other studies 13, 213. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Trends in externally acquired knowledge and assets through acquisitions by big pharma 
firms between 1990 and 2013. Showing the acquisitions of ‘Pharma’ targets and ‘Biotech’ targets as 
a percentage of included acquisitions (Source: SDC Platinum Database (ThomsonReuters)) 
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Figure 4.4 Trends in externally acquired knowledge and assets through alliances of big pharma firms 
between 1990 and 2013. Showing access to knowledge/assets in alliances with ‘Pharma’ companies 
and ‘Biotech’ companies as a percentage of all studied alliances (Source: SDC Platinum Database 
(ThomsonReuters)) 
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4.4.2 Innovation performance 
The total number of NMEs and BLAs generated by big pharma was used as the measure 
for innovation performance of these firms. In correspondence with existing literature 16, 17, 
210, these measures show a rather static pattern for both big pharma and the entire industry. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Output in terms of NMEs and BLAs produced by the big pharma versus the industry as a 
whole. These results represent the output NMEs and BLAs from the 12 largest pharma firms and the 
output of the industry as a whole based on all drugs approved by the FDA (Source: CDER (Center 
for Drug Evaluation and Research) and FDA (Food and Drug Administration)) 
 
 
 
 
Based on these numbers big pharma accounts for close to 50% of all NME approvals over 
the studied period of 24 years (1990-2013) xxvi. Considering the vast increases in R&D 
spending, these results are considered representative for the productivity gap as described 
in literature 4, 14, 244, 245. 
 
4.4.3 Main effects 
The descriptive statistics for all variables are provided in table 4.1. We observe an 
expected positive correlation between the control variable, Size, and the dependent 
variable, Innovation Performance. In addition, Size correlates with all acquisitions and 
alliances variables, which is not surprising as larger firms would also be able to engage in 
more acquisitions and alliances. Interestingly, there is no significant correlation between 
                                                            
xxvi As shown in figure 4.2, these big pharma firms accounted for more than 60% of total pharma 
sales over the past decade. 
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Absorptive Capacity (i.e. R&D intensity) and Size or Innovation Performance. And, 
Innovation Performance only correlates with Acquisitions and Pharma Acquisitions, in 
addition to Size, while Absorptive Capacity only correlates with Acquisitions, Biotech 
Acquisitions and Pharma Alliances. 
 
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive statisticsa 
 Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.Innovation performance 1.1 1.22 0 6         
2. Size b 11.33 .558 10.1 12.6 .222*        
3. Absorptive Capacity .139 .058 .052 .422 .084 .072       
4. Acquisitions 2.13 2.07 0 9 .190* .440* .157*      
5. Pharma Acquisitions 1.01 1.34 0 6 .179* .397* -.015 .751*     
6. Biotech Acquisitions  .965 1.21 0 7 .095 .275* .267* .740* .165*    
7. Alliances 4.77 4.61 0 30 .077 .168* -.137 .169* .196* .049   
8. Pharma Alliances  1.92 2.51 0 17 .064 .170* -.181* .133* .230* -.030 .875* 
 9. Biotech Alliances  2.49 2.4 0 15 .077 .154* -.038 .185* .120* .132* .826* .492* 
*Correlation is significant at the 5% level (2-tailed). 
a n= 228 
b Log transformation 
 
 
Table 4.2 displays the main effects without the use of firm dummies. Here, we show that 
the control variable Size is positive and significant in our models. In addition, table 4.2 
shows that Absorptive Capacity (i.e. R&D intensity) has a positive but non-significant 
effect on the innovation performance of big pharma firms, which provides empirical 
support for the innovation paradox that is described in the literature 4. 
 
 
  Table 4.2 Main effects on big pharma firms’ innovation performance (without firm dummies)a 
Variable 
DV: Innovation Performance Model 1     Model 2   
Size (t-5 to t) .353** [.134] 
 
.310* [.138] 
Absorptive Capacity (t-5 to t) .776 [1.05] 
 
.809 [1.09] 
Acquisitions (t-5 to t) .021 [.011] 
 
- 
 Pharma Acquisitions (t-5 to t) - 
  
.021 [.015] 
Biotech Acquisitions (t-5 to t) - 
  
.024 [.020] 
Alliances (t-5 to t) .008* [.004] 
 
- 
 Pharma Alliances (t-5 to t) - 
  
.015 [.012] 
Biotech Alliances (t-5 to t) - 
  
.009 [.012] 
Constant -5.15** [1.76] 
 
-4.73** [1.81] 
Adjusted R2 .12 
  
.12 
 n = 228      
Log pseudolikelihood -414.97     -412.67   
a Year dummies are included, and most are not significant (not shown). 
 * Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
    ** Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
    *** Statistically significant at the .1% level. 
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Table 4.3 Main effects on big pharma firms’ innovation performance (without firm dummies)a 
 
Variable 
DV: Innovation Performance Model 1     Model 2   
Size (t-5 to t) -.594* [.255]  -.694** [.258] Absorptive Capacity (t-5 to t) -3.14 [2.09]  -3.55 [2.17] Acquisitions (t-5 to t) -.051** [.016]  ---  Pharma Acquisitions (t-5 to t) ---   -.039 [.022] Biotech Acquisitions (t-5 to t) ---   -.043* [.019] Alliances (t-5 to t) .011** [.004]  ---  Pharma Alliances (t-5 to t) ---   .029*** [.008] Biotech Alliances (t-5 to t) ---   -.008 [.010] Constant 7.76* [3.35]  8.97** [3.41] Adjusted R2 .23   .24  n = 228      
Log pseudolikelihood -358.78     -358.25   
a Year dummies and firm dummies are included, and most are not significant (not shown). 
* Statistically significant at the 5% level.     
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.     
*** Statistically significant at the .1% level.    
 
 
Table 4.3 displays the main effects estimated with the Poisson regression analysisxxvii for 
the same models, including firm dummies. Overall, acquisitions negatively affect the 
innovation performance of big pharma firms. This effect can be primarily attributed to the 
negative effect of Biotech Acquisitions as opposed to Pharma Acquisitions. These findings 
are consistent with the literature. Pharma Acquisitions also appear to be negative but are 
non-significant, which supports the notion that technologically related acquisitions are 
more beneficial for a firm’s innovation performance than unrelated acquisitions. 
 
In contrast to acquisitions and as expected, main effects of alliances positively affect 
innovation performance, primarily because of the positive and significant effect of Pharma 
Alliances, again illustrating the benefits of relatedness. There appears to be a negative but 
non-significant relationship between Biotech alliances and Innovation performance. 
Nevertheless, alliances with biotech partners outperform acquisitions of these companies 
and may, therefore, be a more preferred strategy, in particular when considering the 
moderating effects of firms’ absorptive capacity. 
 
                                                            
xxvii A negative binomial regression analysis provided near identical results, as the standard deviation and the mean 
of the dependent variable are similar in magnitude (results not shown). 
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4.4.4 Interaction effects 
The moderating role of Absorptive capacity is shown in Table 4.4. Although the interaction 
effect with acquisitions is not significant, it is positive, while the main effect is negative 
and significant. Absorptive capacity seems to predominantly moderate the effects of related 
acquisitions, given that the interaction with Pharma acquisitions is positive and significant, 
which provides empirical evidence for H1a. On the other hand, the interaction with Biotech 
acquisitions is positive but not significant, suggesting that absorptive capacity does play a 
moderating role here, neutralizing the negative main effect of biotech acquisitions. 
However, this effect is not significant, providing insufficient support for H1b.  
 
For alliances, overall, Absorptive capacity seems to negatively moderate their positive 
main effect. However, this seems to be caused by a stronger negative and significant 
interaction effect of Absorptive capacity and Pharma alliances, while the interaction of 
Absorptive capacity and Biotech alliances is positive and significant. These results do not 
support H2a, which anticipated a neutral interaction effect of internal R&D with Pharma 
alliances; but they do support H2b, as the sign of the interaction between internal R&D and 
Biotech alliances is positive and significant. 
 
 
Table 4.4 Interaction effects on big pharma firms’ innovation performancea 
Variable 
DV: Innovation Performance Model 3     Model 4     Expected Sign 
Size (t-5 to t) -.650** [.252] 
 
-.576* [.261] 
  Absorptive Capacity (t-5 to t) -2.34 [3.85] 
 
-8.51* [3.46] 
  Acquisitions (t-5 to t) -.060* [.030] 
 
-    Pharma Acquisitions (t-5 to t) -   
-.089* [.039] 
  Biotech Acquisitions (t-5 to t) -   
-.080** [.030] 
  Alliances (t-5 to t) .026*** [.008] 
 
-    Pharma Alliances (t-5 to t) -   
.110*** [.022] 
  Biotech Alliances (t-5 to t) -  
 
-.052* [.022] 
  ACAP * Acquisitions (t-5 to t) .143 [.170] 
 
-    ACAP * Pharma Acquisitions (t-5 to t) -   
.568** [.220] 
 
H1a (+) 
ACAP * Biotech Acquisitions (t-5 to t) -   
.274 [.173] 
 
H1b (+) 
ACAP * Alliances (t-5 to t) -.152* [.063] 
 
- 
   ACAP * Pharma Alliances (t-5 to t) -   
-.758*** [.177] 
 
H2a (☐) 
ACAP * Biotech Alliances (t-5 to t) -   
.405* [.172] 
 
H2b (+) 
Constant 9,10** [3.20] 
 
8.70** [3.35] 
  Adjusted R2 .28   
.29    n = 228       Log pseudolikelihood -386.64     -381.67      
a Year dummies and firm dummies are included, and most are not significant (not shown). 
  * Statistically significant at the 5% level.  
 
 
   ** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
     *** Statistically significant at the .1% level.  
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4.5 Discussion 
4.5.1 Conclusions 
In this study we show that increases in the number of acquisitions of biotech companies 
have negatively affected big pharma firms’ innovation performance. However, we also 
show that the level of these firms’ absorptive capacity, which is characterized by a relative 
measure for in-house R&D investments, is a contingency variable that critically influences 
the relationship between some external innovation activities and big pharma firms’ 
innovation performance. In particular, acquisitions of both pharma and biotech companies 
are complementary innovation activities at higher levels of absorptive capacityxxviii , 
whereas the general effects of these acquisitions appear to be negative. Noteworthy, 
pharma acquisitions outperform biotech acquisitions in this regard, illustrating the known 
influence of technology- and market-relatedness. In addition, we show that the same 
complementarity exists between biotech alliances and absorptive capacity, while pharma 
alliances’ main effect is positive but these alliances turn out to be substitutive strategic 
options at higher levels of absorptive capacity.  
 
Given the current innovation deficits big pharma is confronted with, this study indicates 
that big pharma firms may have neglected internal R&D efforts because of the promising 
expectations of the biotech revolution. Apparently, firms have relied on biotech companies 
for innovation and may have underestimated the need for an emphasis on internal R&D, 
absorptive capacity, and post-acquisition integration. We show that optimal gain from 
external technologically unrelated innovation, either through acquisitions or alliances, is 
contingent upon these closely related constructs; and when underemphasized, effects of 
engaging with external biotech innovation can be detrimental to a pharmaceutical firm’s 
innovation performance.  
 
Although literature mostly attributes the M&A strategy of incumbent firms to their drying 
pipelines and need for innovation, the negative main effects of biotech acquisitions could 
also be explained by differences in acquisition motives. Schweizer162 indicates that M&A 
strategies certainly differ and that an understanding of the motives behind them is 
important for the successful implementation of different types of acquisitions. Moreover, 
Ahuja and Katila154 acknowledge that technological reasons do not motivate all 
acquisitions. Other motives may include the desire to obtain access to distribution 
channels, to gain entry into new markets, or to obtain financial synergies or market power 
154. Furthermore, Ahuja and Katila154 argue that such acquisitions cannot be expected to 
improve an acquiring firm’s innovation performance. Moreover, R&D replenishment in the 
short-term or other short-term motives, such as the ability to enter new biotechnology 
markets or enhance short-term competitive advantages, could be driving the spur of 
acquisitions of biotechnology companies, which could not reasonably be expected to resort 
real benefits to innovation performance. 
 
                                                            
xxviii  Threshold at ACAP > 0.16 (p < .000) for pharma acquisitions and at ACAP > 0.29 (p < .005) for biotech 
acquisitions. 
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Where general effects of acquisitions on innovation performance are mainly negative, 
effects of alliances are mainly positive. Alliances with either related or unrelated partners 
may be subject to differences in tensions between, for example, vigilance and trust, control 
and autonomy, design and emergence, innovation and replication, and exploration and 
exploitation, referring to dialectical theory 246-248. Such tensions can strengthen an alliance 
and increase its likelihood of success; however, they can also lead to alliance instability 
and consequent negative effects. These tensions could thus influence internal R&D 
processes and, consequently, the interaction effects with internal R&D intensity on a firm’s 
performance. In this regard, technology relatedness seems to be an important factor as 
higher levels of absorptive capacity (i.e. R&D intensity) are complementary with biotech 
alliances but substitutable with pharma alliances.  
 
A related explanation for the negative interaction effect of alliances with pharma 
companies is that a large number of such partners could lead to more interference and 
reconciliation issues regarding strategy and thus internal R&D processes. Governance 
mode choice in interfirm cooperation25, 232 may be important here as well as, in contrast, 
interaction effects of pharma acquisitions and absorptive capacity are positive. Perhaps this 
difference can be attributed to potential ownership advantages of acquirers during 
acquisitions and post-acquisition integration, where the acquirer exerts a more dictating 
role, fitting the acquired assets into its own strategy and R&D focus.  
 
4.5.2 Implications 
For future pharmaceutical productivity and business model innovation 249, it is essential 
that acquired biotechnology companies, once integrated, form a complementary force with 
internal pharmaceutical R&D efforts, even when companies are acquired for reasons other 
than R&D replenishment and NPD. Other researchers have concluded that focusing either 
on accumulating internal R&D but not exploring external opportunities or on continuously 
acquiring but not assimilating new knowledge will negatively affect innovative 
performance 228, 250. A delicate balance must be found between the ‘make’ and ‘buy’ 
strategies 228, and ideally a focus on both is most beneficial as capabilities associated and 
developed by putting effort in the ‘make’ increase absorptive capacity necessary to 
optimally leverage the ‘buy’ 188. In addition to a balance between ‘make’ and ‘buy’, a 
similar balance between ‘make’ and ‘collaborate’ is equally important and may vary for 
different types of partners and targets. Thus, a tight integration of externally acquired 
knowledge and internal R&D efforts is crucial for harnessing potential complementarity 
effects 229. This encompasses an important firm level implication regarding R&D 
management, emphasizing the importance of this integration, especially with respect to 
technologically unrelated companies. For affairs with related companies, firms are best to 
focus on gaining governance control over external R&D through acquisitions as this can 
work complementary to internal R&D efforts. Without such control, this cooperation with 
external related companies will be substitutable with internal R&D efforts. 
 
Fetterhoff and Voelkel251 describe the management of open innovation activities in the 
context of biotechnology by proposing a five stage value chain: 1) ‘seeking’ opportunities, 
2) ‘evaluating’ the market potential of an opportunity, 3) ‘recruiting’ potential partners, 4) 
‘capturing’ value through rapid commercialization, and 5) ‘extending’ the innovation (i.e., 
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working collaboratively to generate additional innovation and develop collaboration 
beyond the life cycle of a given product). From the firm perspective, this five stage process 
represents a process of integrating external exploratory innovation, adequately exploiting 
that innovation, and eventually further ‘extending’ the innovation in an exploratory 
manner. Fetterhoff and Voelkel251 state that each stage offers an opportunity for value 
creation but also presents unique challenges requiring specific capabilities. Examining the 
results of this study, we suggest that large pharmaceutical firms often do not possess such 
specific capabilities. Moreover, pharmaceutical firms might not complete this value chain 
through the final step of ‘extending’ externally acquired innovation. Generating additional 
innovation beyond the life cycle of one or a few products requires exploratory capabilities 
and increases the value of the initially acquired innovation251. 
 
The results in this study do not imply that firms should make fewer investments in 
biotechnologies. On the contrary, we believe that investment in and adequate exploitation 
of biotechnologies holds the future for pharmaceutical productivity, innovation and growth. 
As stated by Dhankhar and Evers211, pharmaceutical firms must identify ways to spend less 
and achieve more. However, we suggest that it is unwise to fully rely on acquiring 
biotechnology innovation alone, while neglecting to continuously invest in internal 
exploratory R&D activities 188, needed for increased absorptive capacity and post-
acquisition integration capabilities. Investing in biotechnology requires a long-term 
perspective that includes future internal exploration and that will not be successful if the 
post-acquisition integration process is predominantly focused on short-term innovation 
boosts and short-term profits. The motives behind acquisitions and alliances are important, 
as they may function as a predictor of the success of an acquisition or alliance and of 
whether such activity will positively affect innovation performance. 
 
4.5.3 Limitations and further research 
Our results should be interpreted with caution in view of the limitations of this study. 
Although the trends that are identified in our study are consistent with global industry 
trends, this study was conducted using data of the largest pharmaceutical firms of the past 
decades, which makes it difficult to generalize these results and conclusions throughout the 
industry, including smaller (bio)pharmaceutical firms. However, the purpose of this study 
was to investigate the processes pertaining to large incumbent pharmaceutical firms. 
Additional data related to smaller firms would have increased the amount of data but could 
have also obscured the effects that are mostly associated to big pharma firms’ conduct of 
business. Furthermore, our dataset is quite substantial, as the big pharma firms account for 
more than 60% of global pharmaceutical sales over the past decade (see figure 4.2) and 
have produced close to 50% of all approved NMEs and BLAs between 1990 and 2013.  
 
Another limitation of this study is the extent to which we defined our categories. Perhaps 
additional categorization would reveal more nuances; for example, different therapeutic 
areas or types of products may be associated with different effects on innovation. In 
addition, in this study we used but one variable that could moderate general effects of 
acquiring innovation, while additional variables could also play an important role herein 
(e.g. measures for alliance or acquisition experience).  
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Noteworthy, this study was limited to analysing a specific industry with a high-risk profile 
that is increasingly dependent on innovation from a still upcoming industry. As such, 
similar effects might be apparent in other industries with similar characteristics. Further 
research could examine such industries in a similar way to assess this. Another avenue of 
further research could be to study innovation performance from the perspective of the 
acquisition target, in this case the biotechnology company (for example see: Fernald et 
al.25), as most related research has focused on the incumbent firm’s perspective. Additional 
further research could include assessing, in detail, the determinants of the absorptive 
capacity of firms, and the necessary capabilities of optimal post-acquisition integration. 
 
Finding a direct relation between innovative input and trends in output remains difficult. 
However, by implementing time lags of up to five years in the models, we have been able 
to measure significant differences in the effects of acquisitions and alliances on innovation. 
As data from before 1990 was not included, this study does not allow for an accurate 
measurement of long-term effects beyond five years. However, we show that acquiring 
biotechnology companies will not solve the innovation deficit in the next five years 
without continuous development of internal R&D. 
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                 Chapter  5  
 
I. VENTURE CAPITALISTS AS GATEKEEPERS FOR 
BIOTECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Venture capitalists (VCs) aim at trade sales as a preferred exit-strategy for biotechnology 
companies they invest in. Therefore, VCs pay close attention to the wishes of larger 
(bio)pharmaceutical acquirers. In this study we explore VCs’ behavior and strategies by 
analysing the technology fields and therapeutic areas in which they are invested most and 
which yield the highest relative returns by means of trade sales. The data show that VCs 
are by far most invested in oncology and this is also an area in which relatively high 
returns are realized. Regarding other areas, VCs could balance their average investment 
valuations more in correspondence with what acquirers are willing to pay. In addition, VCs 
have predictive insight in the types of technologies that do well and they seem to employ a 
strategy focused on both short-term and long-term success. They are investing most in 
small molecule drugs and protein/peptide therapeutics, which both yield high returns, 
followed by DNA/RNA technologies which underlie the possibilities of personalized 
medicine. We conclude that VCs act as technological gatekeepers because they are 
predicting long-term cure and care macro-trends. 
 
 
Fernald, K.D.S., Hoeben, R.P.N. and Claassen. E.  
Journal of Commercial Biotechnology (2015) 21(3): 32-41; doi: 10.5912/jcb704 
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5.1 Introduction 
Venture Capital (VC) is the primary source of funding for biotechnology ventures, with 
annual VC financing of biotechnology quadrupling in ten years from $2 billion in 1999 to 
$8 billion in 2008 252, 253. Since this 2008 high, annual VC financing has been relatively 
stable at $5.5 billion.  
 
From an investor’s perspective biotechnology start-ups are considered to be high-risk 
investments 64. On the flipside, VC firms can reap returns of five to ten times their initial 
investment when portfolio companies are successful, as measured by an initial public 
offering (IPO) or a trade sale (i.e. acquisition) 254. In light of recent merger and acquisition 
(M&A) trends in the (bio)pharmaceutical industry related to innovation deficits and the 
productivity paradox25, 161, most biotechnology companies are currently built with a trade 
sale in mind as a preferred exit 255. Not surprisingly, venture capitalists (VCs) pay close 
attention to the wants and needs of larger (bio)pharmaceutical firms 255. However, the taste 
of big pharma can change over time - even within the average three to five years between 
investment and exit. For this reason, when it comes to investment decisions and valuations, 
VCs rely on their own intuition and market intelligence, in addition to the declared wants 
and needs of big pharma. 
 
In a sense VCs are the drivers for technological change within a given industry, and the 
biotechnology industry in particular. They act as “technological gatekeepers, accelerating 
the process of technological change” 27. By their investment decision-making, VCs set the 
tone for the entire life sciences market, essentially generating the supply of innovation to 
big pharma and the market in general. Considering multiple factors influencing investment 
decisions, it is imperative for both investors and bio-entrepreneurs to gain insight in global 
biotechnology investment strategies. Not only for deciding whether or not to get involved 
in new life sciences opportunities, but also to use this information in negotiating company 
valuations, business planning and raising capital. 
 
Therefore, this study aims to distil global investment strategies of VCs by analysing the 
distribution and extent of investments with respect to therapeutic areas and technology 
fields. Furthermore, these areas and fields are analysed in terms of exit potential and 
relative returns on investment (ROI), which are based on trade sale multiples. 
 
The aim is to explore the therapeutic areas and technology fields in which VCs are invested 
most and whether that corresponds to where they realize the highest relative returns. 
Therefore, a total of 2,639 life sciences companies receiving VC backing between 1999 
and 2013 are analysed to identify the most popular areas and technology fields for 
investment and acquisition. In addition, the average investment amounts and average trade 
sale transaction values are analysed by technology field and therapeutic area of the lead 
product(s) to gain insights in investments and show what acquirers are willing to pay for 
different types of companies. Finally, the average trade sale multiples are calculated in 
order to evaluate relative success rates of VC investments per technology field and 
therapeutic area. From the results an overall investment strategy is interpreted that is useful 
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to investors and entrepreneurs in considering their engagement in new life sciences 
opportunities.  
5.2 Methodology 
An initial dataset was developed, containing early stage investments in life sciences 
ventures between 1999 and 2013 based on data extracted from ThomsonReuters’ SDC 
Platinum VentureXpert database (official database of the National Venture Capital 
Association; NVCA). A total of 2,639 dataset entries were analysed individually to 
determine the companies’ main technology field and therapeutic area focus. Subsequently, 
medical technology/devices (medtech) companies and service-oriented companies were 
excluded from the dataset, resulting in a total of 1,217 small molecule and biotechnology 
ventures that received their first investment round between 1999 and 2013. Of those 212 
companies were acquired later on and for these, additional data on transaction details have 
been gathered from the ThomsonReuters’ SDC Platinum VentureXpert M&A database and 
news reports, to calculate the average trade sale values and multiples. 
 
5.2.1 Biotechnology fields  
Based on 21 exploratory interviews with VCs and literature 256, 257, a classification of 
technology fields is used. The categorization of individual companies is based on in-
database and online company descriptions as well as companies’ lead products in 
development. In addition, the Cooperative Patent Classification (CPC) codes were 
analysed, if available and as provided by Espacenet (worldwide.espacenet.com), of 
respective companies’ patents to verify our categorization.  First medical technology 
(devices), small molecule drugs, and biotechnology are separated. Medical technology 
companies are excluded from further analysis and Biotechnology is further categorized in 
biotechnology fields (DNA/RNA; Proteins/peptides; Cell/tissue engineering; Gene/RNA 
vectors; Targeting/delivery; Bioinformatics; Nanobiotechnology; and 
Glycobiotechnology), depending on the technology used for the respective company’s lead 
product(s) (table 5.1). Note that some companies may focus on combinations of 
technologies, so the illustrated data will add up to more than 100% of actual funding. 
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Table 5.1 Overview of Biotechnology fields 
 
Biotechnology Field Biotechnology Subfield 
DNA/RNA Technologies  
 Genomics/pharmacogenomics 
 Gene probes/DNA markers 
 Genetic engineering 
 DNA/RNA sequencing/ synthesis/ amplification 
 RNAi/siRNA (inhibiting gene function) 
 Gene expression profiling/Antisense technology 
Proteins/peptides and other large molecules 
 Engineering of proteins and peptides/ recombinant proteins 
 Proteomics 
 (Monoclonal) Antibodies  
 Subunit/VLP vaccines 
 Protein isolation and purification 
 Peptide/protein sequencing/ synthesis 
 Signalling Analysis (of cytokines, chemokines, transcription factors, cell cycle proteins, 
and neurotransmitters) 
Cell and tissue engineering technologies 
 Cell therapy (including Immunotherapy) 
 Tissue engineering (including tissue scaffolds and biomedical engineering) 
 Cellular fusion 
 Embryo manipulation 
Gene and RNA vector technologies 
 Gene therapy 
 DNA vaccines 
 Viral vectors 
Drug targeting/delivery technologies 
 Proteins 
 Liposomes 
 Micelles/dendrimers 
 Inorganic/biodegradable 
 Nanostructures 
Bioinformatics (ICT applications in life sciences) 
 Construction of databases on genomes 
 Modelling complex biological processes (including systems biology) 
Nanobiotechnology  
Glycobiotechnology   
Based on 21 exploratory interviews with venture capitalists and literature. 256, 257 
 
5.2.2 Therapeutic areas 
Based on the WHO ICD-10, literature 255, and declared investment interests in 21 
exploratory interviews with VCs, a full range of therapeutic areas is used for analysis. 
Again the classification of backed companies was based on their lead product(s) in 
development. Ultimately the 15 most invested areas are included in the analysis. Note that 
some companies may focus on combinations of technologies, so the illustrated data will 
add up to more than 100% of actual funding. 
 
5.2.3 Limitations 
While our analysis aimed to be a systematic, bias-free, review of life sciences VC 
investments and average trade sale multiples, several limitations apply. First, our dataset is 
in essence a data sample as we are unable to ensure that the collection of relevant data is 
100% complete. While we are confident that the large majority of early stage life sciences 
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investments is included in our dataset, we cannot claim a 100% coverage of all deals, as the 
search criteria might have excluded deals that should have been included or the 
ThomsonReuters SDC Platinum VentureXpert database, which is based on self-reported 
data, might not include all existing deals. Second, the categorization process was 
conducted using several indicators to assess technology fields and therapeutic areas, 
namely lead products and programs, company websites and profiles, and CPC codes. 
Although two researchers conducted this process separately, some cases are still open to 
interpretation and for others limited information was available. Nevertheless, we are 
confident that most VC backed companies were categorized correctly. Third, of 
approximately 37% of trade sales, transaction values were not disclosed. Therefore, the 
average trade sale valuations as used for the analysis are also based on a sample of trade 
sales and we do not claim to cover 100% of all existing data. Fourth, the dataset included 
global data, and differences between geographic regions were not analysed. Such 
differences may provide additional insights and could be an avenue of further research. 
Finally, this study does not aim at uncovering absolute returns for VCs in biotechnology as 
we focus on trade sales as successful exits and do not include losses or other gains VCs 
have made with their investments. Further research may attempt to reveal general results of 
VC investments in biotechnology. However, this study aims at comparing general VC 
investments in technology fields and therapeutic areas with realized trade sale multiples in 
those fields and areas. 
 
5.3 Results 
The majority of backed companies concerned medtech companies (965) followed by 
biotechnology companies (813) and small molecule drug companies (456). VC financing, 
however, is almost equally distributed over these three fields of technology, with 
biotechnology taking the upper hand (36%). Thus, small molecule drug companies receive 
the highest average investment per company ($48.6 million), followed by biotechnology 
companies ($32 million) and medtech companies ($25.7 million). The total amount of $26 
billion invested in biotechnology is distributed among several biotechnology fields as 
specified in table 5.1. 
 
5.3.1 Technology fields 
As shown in figure 5.1, almost half (43%) of VC investments in biotechnology has been 
invested in companies focusing on proteins/peptides, which include products and 
technologies such as recombinant proteins, monoclonal antibodies, recombinant subunit 
and virus like particle (VLP) vaccines, peptide therapeutics, engineered enzymes, and 
proteomics. Subsequently, 29% has been invested in DNA/RNA technologies mainly 
involving genomics and pharmacogenomics; gene probes and DNA markers; sequencing, 
synthesis and amplification of DNA/RNA, RNAi and siRNA gene regulation therapeutics; 
and gene profiling and antisense technology. Following these two subfields, which are 
undoubtedly most popular, 9% of VC financing of biotechnology companies involved 
cell/tissue engineering technologies, which include (stem) cell therapy (immunotherapy); 
tissue engineering; cellular fusion and embryo manipulation. Thereafter, 5% concerned 
gene/RNA vector technologies, involving gene therapy; vector vaccines and DNA 
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vaccines. Another 5% has been invested in drug targeting and delivery (encapsulation) 
technologies using proteins; liposomes; micelles/dendrimers; inorganic, biodegradable 
structures; and nanostructures. As such there is overlap with nanobiotechnology, in which 
4% of VC biotechnology funds has been invested. The remaining 5% was invested in 
bioinformatics (4%), involving IT as a basis for new diagnostics and therapeutics; and 
glycobiotechnology (1%), which involves the synthesis of glycolipids and glycoproteins. 
Moreover, 21% of backed biotechnology companies focused on molecular diagnostics 
technologies, mostly within the subfield of DNA/RNA. In total $ 4,6 billion has been 
invested in biotechnology related diagnostics companies (figure 5.1). 
 
 
Figure 5.1 VC investments ($M) per technology field and per biotechnology subfield (a); and VC 
investments ($M) per technology field and date of first round  
Note: Hypothetical future investments are included, as a subset of companies backed since 2009-
2013 will most likely receive later stage financing in the near future. For illustration purposes, an 
estimated 15% is added. This percentage is based on average later stage funding of companies 
initially backed in previous periods (Source: ThomsonReuters’ SDC Platinum VentureXpert 
Database, company websites, worldwide.espacenet.com) 
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Figure 5.2 VC investments ($M) per therapeutic area and technology field (a); and VC investments 
($M) per therapeutic area and date of first round (b)  
Note: Hypothetical future investments are included, as a subset of companies backed since 2009-
2013 will most likely receive later stage financing in the near future. For illustration purposes, an 
estimated 15% is added. This percentage is based on average later stage funding of companies 
initially backed in previous periods (Source: ThomsonReuters’ SDC Platinum VentureXpert 
Database, company websites) 
 
 
5.3.2 Therapeutic areas 
Figure 5.2 shows that 29% ($13.8 billion) of all small molecule and biotechnology 
investments have been in companies that focused on oncology, making it by far the most 
invested therapeutic area (figure 5.2). The following five most invested areas are infectious 
diseases ($6.7 billion), platform technologies, defined as ‘no specific area’ ($6 billion), 
cardiovascular diseases ($6 billion), central nervous system (CNS) indications ($5.8 
billion), and endocrine and metabolic diseases ($5.8 billion). 
Not surprisingly, small molecule drugs are mostly invested in when targeted on a specific 
disease area and not often when developed as platforms (figure 5.2a). They are mostly 
focused on CNS, pain, oncology, endocrine and metabolic diseases, and cardiovascular 
diseases. However, it seems that different biotechnology subfields are used for a wide 
variety of therapeutic areas (figure 5.2a). Proteins/peptides are developed mostly for 
treating oncology, infectious diseases, inflammation, auto-immune diseases, and endocrine 
and metabolic diseases, while DNA/RNA includes many discovery and diagnostics 
technologies, which seem to be mainly developed for oncology, platforms, and for 
congenital diseases. Furthermore, cell therapy and cell/tissue engineering is used most for 
oncology and endocrine and metabolic diseases, while gene therapy and vectors are mainly 
focused on oncology, infectious diseases, cardiovascular diseases, and auto-immune 
diseases. This data seem quite accurate considering advances such as immune cell 
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modifications (cell therapy/immunotherapy) to treat cancer and the use of vector- and DNA 
vaccines for infectious diseases  258-260. 
 
5.3.3 Trade sales 
As IPOs and more so trade sales are the most important denominators for success from an 
investor’s perspective the dataset includes which companies went public and which ones 
have been acquired. Of the 1,217 small molecule and biotechnology companies backed 
between 1999 and 2013, 212 have been acquired and 132 went public. Of those that were 
acquired, subsequent data was collected on the transaction values, if disclosed, and the 
clinical development phase of the respective company’s lead product. This data was 
collected from ThomsonReuters’ SDC Platinum M&A database (thomsonreuters.com/sdc-
platinum), clinicaltrials.gov, company websites and additional webscraping of business 
websites (e.g. businessweek.com). Average trade sale transaction values are plotted per 
development phase for different therapeutic areas and technology fields (figure 5.3). 
 
The average trade sale valuations of companies in different development phases vary 
amongst therapeutic areas and technology fields, suggesting different risk profiles. 
Strikingly, trade sale valuations of oncology focused companies increase substantially with 
each development phase, whereas those of cardiovascular diseases or CNS show different 
patterns. In figure 5.3b, the complexity of newer technology fields (e.g. cell therapy and 
gene therapy) is represented by relatively low trade sale valuations of such companies up 
until phase III clinical trials. Yet, when phase III is reached, the value of such companies 
increases substantially, illustrated by the acquisition of Biovex by Amgen in 2011. Small 
molecule drugs, however, as a more classical technology field, show a more predictable 
and stable path as average trade sale valuations of small molecule drug companies increase 
more gradually with each development phase. The same holds true for proteins/peptides. 
 
Figure 5.3 Average trade sale prices ($M) per therapeutic area (a) and per technology field (b), for 
each phase in clinical development (Source: ThomsonReuters’ SDC Platinum VentureXpert and 
M&A Databases, company websites, clinicaltrials.gov) 
 
 
49_Erim Fernald BW stand.job
 
 89 
 
5.3.4 Deal values and multiples 
Arguably, there are various ways to evaluate the success of individual investments and of 
investments over categories. In order to review patterns between where VCs invest the 
most and where they earn the most, the average trade sale values and the average total 
amounts invested in companies are evaluated per therapeutic area (figure 5.4a) and 
technology field (figure 5.4b). In addition, for the VC backed companies in our dataset that 
have been acquired, the trade sale multiple was calculated for each individual acquisition to 
determine the average trade sale multiples, again per therapeutic area (figure 5.4c) and 
technology field (figure 5.4d). 
 
As shown in figure 5.4a, average trade sale transaction values are highest for auto-immune 
diseases ($430 million) and oncology ($424 million), followed by infectious diseases ($371 
million). Interestingly, this top three of therapeutic areas for acquirers is different from the 
top three areas based on average VC investment values. Per company VCs have invested 
most, on average, in (chronic) inflammation ($62 million), endocrine and metabolic 
diseases ($58 million), and cardiovascular diseases ($58 million). Auto-immune diseases 
comes fourth for VCs with an average total investment amount per company of $55 
million, while it seems to be the first area for acquirers. Moreover, average trade sale 
transaction values for different therapeutic areas seem to have a much wider range (from 
$125 million to $430 million) than the average total VC investments per therapeutic area 
($40 million for CNS to $62 million for inflammation). 
 
The average multiples, however, are highest for auto-immune diseases (8.7), endocrine and 
metabolic diseases (7.4), oncology (6.9), and infectious diseases (6.5). Of these the first 
two are also in the top four of areas that receive the highest average investments from VCs. 
The second highest multiple has been realized in endocrine and metabolic diseases, while 
the difference between average VC investment and average trade sale value for this area is 
not very large ($58 million versus $211 million). This suggests that the successful exits 
have come from relatively lower investments in this area. For all other areas, the average 
trade sale multiples are quite consistent with the average trade sale values, confirming little 
differentiation of average VC investments with regards to therapeutic areas. 
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Figure 5.4 Average trade sale price ($M) and average total investment amount ($M) per therapeutic 
area (a) and per technology field (b); and average trade sale multiples per therapeutic area (c) and per 
technology field (d)  
* Too few or no trade sales to calculate appropriate average (N/A).  
** Trade sale multiple = (Trade sale value)/(Total amount invested in acquired company).  
(Source: ThomsonReuters’ SDC Platinum VentureXpert and M&A Databases) 
 
 
 
For the technology fields, an overall difference in average VC investments is shown 
between biotechnology ($32 million) and small molecule drugs ($49 million). The 
biotechnology subfields subsequently range between $26 million for cell/tissue engineering 
to $36 million for gene/RNA vectors, with $32 million for DNA/RNA and $34 million for 
proteins/peptides in between. This suggests that VCs undoubtedly expect most from the 
technology field of small molecule drugs, especially when also considering the total 
amount invested in this field (30% of all funds; figure 5.1). Although high expectations for 
this field are justified by the corresponding average trade sale value ($320 million) and 
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multiple (5.5), similar trade sale multiples have been realized for the biotechnology 
subfields proteins/peptides ($ 282 million; 5.6) and gene/RNA vectors ($339 million; 5.0). 
The average trade sale values for the subfields DNA/RNA and cell/tissue engineering are 
much lower ($143 million and $87 million respectively). However, the average multiples 
for these fields are relatively close (3.6 and 3.8), suggesting that the successful trade sales 
resulted from relatively lower investments in these fields. This is especially true for the 
DNA/RNA subfield, considering the average VC investments in this field ($32 million), 
which is the same as the average for the entire biotechnology field. Moreover, the total 
amount invested in DNA/RNA technologies is high (29% of all biotechnology 
investments) relative to what big pharma is willing to pay for these technologies. This 
suggests a notable interest of VCs in the DNA/RNA technology subfield. 
 
The average multiples in the technology fields as shown in figure 5.4d show less variation 
(4 - 6) than those in the therapeutic areas (3 - 9; figure 5.4c). VCs, thus, seem to be better at 
anticipating returns within technology fields and adjusting their investment allocation 
accordingly, than doing the same for the various therapeutic areas. 
 
5.4 Conclusions 
We conclude that VCs act as technological gatekeepers because they are predicting long-
term cure and care macro-trends. They have formidable predictive insight in the types of 
technologies that do well. However, in terms of therapeutic areas, VCs can balance their 
average investment valuations more in correspondence with what big pharma is willing to 
pay. We set out to distil global investment strategies of VCs by analysing the distribution 
and extent of investments with respect to technology fields and therapeutic areas. It seems 
that VCs employ a strategy focused on both short-term and long-term success. On the one 
hand they play it safe, minimizing risk by investing most in small molecules and proteins. 
On the other hand, they are investing heavily in DNA/RNA technologies, which as a field 
seem to be underperforming (figure 5.4b, d). As VCs and bio-entrepreneurs build for big 
pharma, the blockbuster business model directly affects new venture financing by VCs for 
the short term. However, VCs are also rebelliously investing for long-term cure and care 
macro-trends, as they invest in biotechnologies that underlie the possibilities of 
personalized medicine. 
 
For therapeutic areas, a discrepancy between variation in average VC investment amounts 
and variation of average trade sale transaction values is illustrated by an imbalance in 
average multiples (3 – 9). Acquirers seem to attach greater importance to differentiating 
between therapeutic areas than VCs do, resulting in unnecessary overinvestment in one 
area versus potential underinvestment in another. As VCs are essentially building for big 
pharma, they, their investors and bio-entrepreneurs would benefit from a portfolio balanced 
more in correspondence with what pharma is willing to pay. Doing this can in turn lead to 
more predictability and consistency of average multiples over the therapeutic areas. 
However, success ratios between therapeutic areas may be more susceptible to rapid 
changes than technology fields, making prediction difficult. Many VCs might therefore be 
investing quite opportunistically with less distinction per therapeutic area. 
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With regards to technology fields, there seems to be a macro investment strategy that 
appears to focus both on short-term and long-term success. For the short-term, VCs are 
investing heavily in small molecule drug companies with a relatively higher average 
investment valuation. In addition, within biotechnology they are investing most in the 
proteins/peptides subfield (43% of all biotechnology investments), while keeping their 
average investments relatively low. This conservative risk-averse strategy corresponds with 
pharma’s blockbuster business model as small molecules and proteins/peptides are the only 
type of products that can become blockbusters (in the form of new molecular entities and 
biologicals) 14. This strategy has resulted in average multiples of around 5.5 for both these 
technology fields. However, VCs have invested less in the gene/RNA vectors field, while 
there have been some tremendous recent successes in this field. 
 
In addition to the conservative investment strategy tailored to pharma’s business model, 
VCs have also invested a large proportion (29%) of biotechnology funds in the DNA/RNA 
technology field. The DNA/RNA field includes the technologies required for realizing the 
potential of personalized medicine, which has been claimed to be the future of medicine, 
promising to significantly increase the quality of healthcare 261-263. Here, we find evidence 
that despite the low average multiple and average trade sale valuation for this field, VCs 
are embracing their role as technological gatekeepers. They are investing in this field and 
thereby the future, while a proven business model for personalized medicine that could be 
equally lucrative as the blockbuster model is still lacking now. 
 
For other investors and VCs with less experience investing in life sciences, a similar 
investment strategy is recommended. Moreover, we believe it to be wise to evaluate the 
therapeutic areas new ventures are focusing on, with respect to both an appropriate match 
with technology types and relative ROI rates. It is however noteworthy that VCs evaluate 
companies on a case-by-case basis and employ strict criteria for their investments (e.g. 
competition, regulations, reimbursement, management team, financials) irrespective of 
therapeutic areas or technology fields. Notwithstanding, oncology, infectious diseases and 
auto-immune diseases seem to be the most interesting therapeutic areas to invest in, 
considering investment amounts, average trade sale valuations and average multiples. 
In the current investment climate, bio-entrepreneurs can increase chances of being funded 
by combining a focus on radical innovation within technology fields with blockbuster 
potential with a focus on therapeutic areas where investors can realize relatively high 
multiples. When developing technologies underlying personalized medicine and 
diagnostics, where the blockbuster model is not applicable, it is imperative that 
entrepreneurs focus on business models for generating income during (early) development 
stages, ensuring survival whilst cure and care macro-trends continue towards a 
personalized and patient-centered approach. 
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II. BIOTECH TRADE SALE RETURNS ON VENTURE 
CAPITAL – 2010-2014 
 
 
Fernald, K.D.S. and Claassen. E.  
Nature Biotechnology (2015), accepted 
 
Over the past decades venture capitalists (VCs) have invested heavily in early-stage 
biotechnology companies252. Acquisitions (i.e. trade sales) of these companies have 
become the preferred exit-strategy for VCs 255, as big pharma has been  increasingly 
acquiring innovative biotech companies 25. Here, we present an analysis of trade sale 
returns based on investment and acquisition data of VC-backed biotech and pharmaceutical 
companies over the past five years. Companies acquired between 2010 and 2014 are 
categorized by their lead product(s) in development; categories are based on exploratory 
interviews with VCs and literature 255, 257. 
 
The field of biotechnology contains companies that focus on: DNA/RNA technologies, 
including molecular diagnostics and nucleotide therapeutics; protein/peptide therapeutics; 
cell and tissue engineering therapies; gene/RNA vector technologies/therapies; delivery 
technologies; bioinformatics; nanobiotechnologies; and glycobiotechnologies. Diagnostics 
refers to the subset of companies that develop molecular diagnostics or biomarkers; and 
vaccines encompass companies that develop recombinant protein vaccines/sub-unit 
vaccines, virus-like particle (VLP) vaccines, vector vaccines or DNA vaccines. Finally, 
companies that develop small molecule drugs are separated from biotechnology 
companies. 
 
As shown in figure 5.5, trade sales of small molecule drug companies have benefited VCs 
most over the past five years. Big pharma firms remain most interested in small molecules, 
resulting in higher average trade sale values (p < .001) and multiples (p < .05) of these 
companies compared to biotechnology companies. Furthermore, although not significant, 
the difference between trade sale values of biotechnological diagnostic and vaccine 
companies illustrates a difference in valuation of DNA/RNA technologies (average of 
$83M) versus biotechnological products such as protein therapeutics (average of $195M) 
or cell- & gene therapies (average of $276M). VCs, however, seem to be aware of this 
difference and invest accordingly, resulting in comparable multiples (figure 5.5).  
Interestingly, in terms of total investment amounts, VCs have invested more in 
biotechnology ($3,945M) than in small molecules ($2,117M). Furthermore, from figure 5.5 
it seems that VC investment amounts land in a specific range, which is most likely due to a 
maximum VCs can afford to invest in ventures before undermining the multiple on their 
return. Moreover, the average investment amounts suggest that VCs valuate diagnostic 
companies ($11M) lower than small molecule - ($20M; p < .05), biotechnology - ($18M; p 
< .05), or vaccine companies ($21M; N.S.). The lower average investment amount for 
diagnostic companies is probably due to shorter development timelines before a profit can 
be realised. Diagnostic ventures need less money to achieve results faster, however, the 
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returns are smaller as well, resulting in similar, and sometimes even marginally better, 
multiples. 
 
Figure 5.5 Trade sale returns of VC-backed biotech and pharmaceutical companies acquired between 
2010-2014, categorized by lead product(s) in development  
* p < 0.05;  ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Note: The medians of trade sale values and multiples are included as data labels. Investment data is 
based on a total of 324 early stage biotechnology companies that received their first investment round 
between 2010-2014. Trade sale data is based on a total of 115 VC-backed companies that were 
acquired between 2010-2014, and only contains those of which the values have been disclosed 
(71%). Outliers of transactions above $1 billion or with multiples above 100x have been excluded 
from the analysis. The average trade sale multiple is calculated as the average trade sale value 
divided by the average total known amount invested in each acquired company (Source: 
ThomsonReuters’ SDC Platinum VentureXpert Database (National Venture Capital Association 
(NVCA) Database) 
 
 
 
 
 
In figure 5.6, several outliers are revealed, as the data is presented for each year, separately. 
Overall, small molecule drug companies outperform biotechnology companies in each 
year. However, in 2012, the average trade sale value of small molecule drug companies is 
relatively low, also resulting in a below average multiple. This may give the impression 
that there is more variation in small molecule company trade sale values over the years, 
however, it is likely due to fewer larger deals occurring in that year. For the field of 
vaccines it seems like there is even more variation over the years, but this is likely due to 
the overall lower amount of trade sales in vaccines. The multiple for biotechnology 
companies is high in 2012 due to the acquisition of Epitomics Inc. Furthermore, there are 
two outliers of trade sale multiples in 2012 and 2011 that influence the overall average for 
small molecule drug companies. These were realized in the acquisitions of Boston 
Biomedical Inc. and Graceway Pharmaceuticals LLC, respectively. Above average 
multiples were also realized in the acquisitions of: a vector-based vaccine company, 
Okairos AG in 2013; a cellular and molecular diagnostics company, Diagnostic Hybrids 
Inc. in 2010; and a small molecule drug company AkaRx Inc. in 2010. This last acquisition 
also explains the outlier of blood disorders in figure 5.7, which can be attributed to chance 
because there are but two acquisitions in this area. Similarly, the Okairos AG acquisition in 
2013 (figure 5.6) was the only one in the field of vaccines that year. 
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Figure 5.6 As for figure 5.5 but includes separate analyses per year. 
 
 
 
 
 
The analysis indicates that VCs have benefited most in the area of oncology, followed by 
infectious -, auto-immune - and central nervous system diseases. Furthermore, the analysis 
shows that big pharma’s predominant blockbuster paradigm guides their acquisition 
preference and therewith their innovation demand. Surprisingly, VCs predict the 
corresponding innovation supply and act as visionary technological gatekeepers27, building 
for big pharma 255. 
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Figure 5.7 As for figure 5.5 but includes analysis for therapeutic areas 
 
 
 
 
As a bioentrepreneur it is important to adjust both short-term and long-term strategies to 
VC investment preferences, which are largely determined by big pharma acquisition 
preferences26. VCs are in many cases foreseeing technological developments and investing 
accordingly. Generally speaking, bioentrepreneurs should present to VCs with a history of 
exits at similar or higher multiples as shown here. Furthermore, this data is relevant for 
governmental subsidy and grant providers and fund-to-fund managers of larger healthcare 
funds that invest in life sciences private equity. 
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              Chapter  6  
 
A QUANTITATIVE PRIORITIZATION AND BARRIER ANALYSIS 
OF BIOTECHNOLOGY FIELDS AND THERAPEUTIC AREAS; A 
VENTURE CAPITAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
Abstract 
Early stage research and development in the biotechnology industry requires significant 
risk capital investments, which are mostly provided by venture capitalists that invest for 
high returns. As biotechnology ventures highly depend on this capital during early stages, 
insights into investment priorities of venture capitalists is valuable for entrepreneurs. In 
this study, a systematic prioritization analysis has been conducted to determine venture 
capitalists’ investment priorities in terms of biotechnologies and therapeutic areas, as well 
as associated investment barriers. 21 qualitative interviews were conducted and 81 
quantitative questionnaires were completed by venture capitalists. We show that venture 
capitalists seem to be considering cell- & gene therapy technologies as future disrupters in 
terms of innovation and economic development. Our analysis further reveals several niches 
of technology - therapeutic area combinations with high venture capital attractiveness, 
namely: protein technologies, cell therapy & gene therapy technologies for oncology, 
cardiovascular and central nervous system diseases. It also reveals high-prioritized 
investment barriers specific to these technologies and therapeutic areas, which mainly 
concern the complexity of the science underlying the respective technology or pathology, 
efficacy issues in trials, regulations, competition, and finance. Overcoming high-prioritized 
barriers for specific niches of technology-therapeutic area combinations could significantly 
increase venture capital attractiveness. 
 
Fernald, K.D.S., Janssen, N.M. and Claassen, E. 
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6.1 Introduction 
In high-tech industries young innovative ventures have become a major source for the 
development of new radical technologies and more generally for economic growth and 
competitiveness 82. For the pharmaceutical industry, biotechnology ventures have even 
become the predominant source of innovation as large incumbents have increasingly turned 
to alliances with- and acquisitions of biotechnology companies to replenish R&D pipelines 
and counter innovation deficits 5, 14, 15, 25, 94, 214. In contrast to established firms, young 
innovative ventures are mainly concerned with early stage research and development 
(R&D) and are often not in a position to generate revenue. This negative cash-flow 
position makes it far more difficult for smaller ventures to obtain external financing, and 
these ventures therefore rely mostly on risk capital investments. 
 
While there have been trends of biotech start-ups adapting towards additional funding 
opportunities264, early (clinical-)stage biotechnology companies have historically been 
driven by substantial risk capital from venture capitalists (VCs)252, 254. This capital is used 
merely to fund the early clinical stages, after which an exit for the respective VC becomes 
apparent. This is mainly due to the relatively lengthy and expensive R&D trajectories 
within this industry, with an average total duration of 11.9 years58 and new product 
development costs of $0.8-$1.3 billion 25, 59, 94. As such, the final phases of clinical R&D 
are most often funded by large incumbent (bio)pharmaceutical firms through alliances and 
acquisitions. These incumbents will typically get involved after successful phase II clinical 
trials, as they are far more risk-averse 15. Thus, venture capital is the prime source of 
funding for biotechnology ventures during the start-up and growth phase of the technology 
transfer gap 265. 
 
Moreover, high technology and research-driven ventures have mostly been the focus of 
VCs that prefer pre-seed, seed and early stage investments. In fact, most VC firms are 
involved with technology investments85, 86, and of those, most VC funding goes to 
research-driven university spin-off companies87, while ventures that have spun out from 
corporate institutions perform below average in terms of VC exit performance 266. Thus, 
VC plays a crucial role in the development of new firms in new markets 80, 81; and fostering 
the creation of VC industries is even considered to be a necessary preliminary step to 
support the generation of innovative high-growth ventures and thus to stimulate innovation, 
economic growth and regional competitiveness 82. 
 
There have been substantial VC investments in biotechnology and VC funding of 
biotechnology firms has continuously increased until 2008 and has remained at the $5.5 
billion per year level onward 26, 253, However, an overview of investment priorities in terms 
of technologies or disease areas is lacking in literature and in the market. For a large part 
VCs are drivers of technological innovation and of the formation of high technology 
innovation clusters 27, which is true for biotechnology in particular 267, 268. VCs, as 
technological gatekeepers, accelerate the process of technological change 27 and in essence 
determine the supply of innovation for larger firms in the industry26, 28. This is illustrated 
by the fact that trade sales or acquisitions of biotechnology firms have become the most 
preferred exit-strategies for VCs 255, 269.  
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Therefore, an overview of early stage VC investment strategies and priorities in terms of 
technologies and therapeutic areas can be valuable in shedding light on where to expect 
most future innovation and economic development. Moreover, insights in issues that may 
keep VCs from investing in certain technologies or diseases areas may be equally 
important. Such insights can be the basis of a competitive advantage in business planning, 
fundraising and attracting investors for new biotechnology ventures. Thus, there is an 
obvious need to systematically assess biotechnology and disease priorities for investors and 
what keeps them from investing in them. Consequently, the aim of this study is to evaluate 
investment priorities of VCs in terms of therapeutic areas and technology fields as well as 
associated investment barriers by means of qualitative interviews and quantitative 
questionnaires. VCs were interviewed about therapeutic areas and technologies and related 
potential investment barriers, and were asked to rank these in a questionnaire. This study 
provides novel insights into the perspective of VCs on investing in biotechnologies and 
therapeutic areas. 
 
6.1.1 Background 
Investment priorities – Research prioritization is an effective way of identifying research 
opportunities within a specific context that are needed most 270. As such, a similar process 
of prioritization can be used to identify investment opportunities from the perspective of 
investors within a specific industry context. Several prioritization processes have been 
conducted and described in literature, particularly in the context of health 270-275. As 
Weenen et al.270 explain there is no absolute standard or best practice for conducting 
prioritization research as the context of the research may vary. Therefore, in this study the 
method as described in literature has been adapted to rank investment priorities and 
associated investment barriers from a VC perspective. The aim of this process is to develop 
a relative ranking list of technology fields and therapeutic areas and not to define an 
absolute cut-off point beyond which therapeutic areas or technology fields are considered 
to contain only less interesting investment opportunities. This exercise rather produces a 
generalized representation of which areas and fields might contain the most interesting 
investments opportunities looking forward, providing the opportunity to look for niches in 
the market. 
 
Investment barriers – The analysis of innovation barriers along the value chain of new 
product development does not only provide insight in the innovation process but is also a 
first step in accounting for these barriers and overcoming them 276, 277. In this study we are 
looking at the early stages in the value chain of biotechnological product development, in 
which technology based ventures are receiving seed or start-up funding from VCs. The 
innovation barriers that we are looking for and are attempting to prioritize are in fact 
barriers for VCs to invest in specific technologies or therapeutic areas. In this context, we 
therefore refer to them as investment barriers. From a more theoretical perspective we can 
also refer to them as relative exogenous barriers, as they selectively affect companies 
within this specific sector but are exogenous to any portfolio company in question 276-278.  
 
As clarified in literature, barriers can be endogenous or exogenous to a respective firm and, 
in addition, can be relative or general. General barriers affect all types of companies, while 
relative barriers are only apparent in certain industry sectors or only apply to certain types 
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of companies. Furthermore, endogenous barriers can directly be attributed to the respective 
firm (e.g. lack of capabilities or resources), whereas exogenous barriers are caused by 
factors external to the firm in question (e.g. governmental barriers, financial barriers) 277, 
278. 
 
6.2 Methodology 
The methodology in this study is based on previously developed methods of 
prioritization270, 271, 277, 279 and adapted to evaluate VC investment priorities in terms of 
technologies and therapeutic areas. In addition investment barriers related to specific 
technologies and therapeutic areas were identified and ranked as well. The multi staged 
process started with the identification of the most interesting therapeutic areas, 
technologies and investment barriers through exploratory interviews. Subsequently, 
complete collections of technology fields and therapeutic areas were developed by 
combining qualitative data from the interviews with literature 26, 255-257. Thereafter, these 
collections of therapeutic areas, technology fields and related investment barriers were 
systematically prioritized by means of an online questionnaire. In addition, the study 
includes evaluation of VCs’ opinions regarding investments in orphan diseases and 
product- versus platform-based ventures as well as the importance of the interests of 
potential pharmaceutical acquirers in making investment decisions. This could provide 
insights in the extent to which VCs are influenced in their investment decision-making 
with regards to technologies and therapeutic areas. 
 
6.2.1 Research subjects 
A search query in ThomsonReuters SDC Platinum VentureXpert databasexxix resulted in a 
total of 272 venture capital firms. The search criteria for this dataset were focused on the 
firm’s preferred industry for investment (limited to: Biotechnology, Life Sciences, Medical 
Products/Diagnostics/Therapeutics/Health, and Pharmaceuticals), and the preferred 
investment stage (limited to: Seed, Start-up, Early Stage, and Balanced). From this dataset, 
one hundred executive members of the included firms were selected to participate in the 
semi-structured interviews. This was a random selection, taking position and experience of 
the participants into account. 
 
6.2.2 Exploratory interviews 
The selected participants were initially contacted by e-mail, informed of the nature of the 
study and invited to participate. A semi-structured format was used, by taking participants 
through a standardized set of questionsxxx. Therapeutic areas that were mentioned, were 
further specified by asking for indications during the interviews. Similarly, technologies 
were specified by asking for explanations. By means of theme coding, the technologies 
were categorized using an overview of biotechnology fields adapted from the literature 26, 
256, 257. In addition, investment barriers specifically related to technologies and therapeutic 
areas as discussed in the interviews were identified. Saturation curves of therapeutic areas, 
                                                            
xxix  SDC Platinum VentureXpert Database by ThomsonReuters Financial www.venturexpert.com 
xxx  Interview questions available upon request 
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technology (sub)fields and investment barriers ensured a most complete set of answers, 
thereby increasing content validity of the questionnaire. Saturation of therapeutic areas, 
technology fields and investment barriers for both, as mentioned by the VCs was reached 
after 16 interviews (figure 6.1). In total 21 interviews were conducted. 
  
 
Figure 6.1 Saturation curves of the identification of therapeutic areas, technology fields and 
investment barriers, during interviews with 21 life sciences venture capitalists 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.3 Questionnaire design and analysis 
The aim of the questionnaire was to prioritize the main technology fields and therapeutic 
areas for VC investment, along with prioritizing the main barriers related to these, as 
identified during the interviews. Using the original dataset of VC firms, extracted from 
SDC platinumxxix and additional webscraping of firms’ websites, 614 individuals were 
successfully approached, 91 questionnaire responses were realized and data from 81 
respondents was included in the analysis, as some failed to complete the questionnaire or 
provided insufficient data (13% response rate). The anonymous online questionnaire was 
created and distributed through the online web survey program SurveyMonkey. VCs that 
did not respond to the initial survey received a follow up phone call or e-mail 1.5 weeks 
later to increase response rates. 
 
The questionnaire contained mainly closed questions, with some allowing for qualitative 
answers to be added. Several demographic questions (e.g. age, title, position, country, 
experience) were followed by a few general questions regarding investment preference. 
The rest of the questionnaire was dedicated to systematically ranking therapeutic areas and 
associated investment barriers as well as technologies and associated investment barriers. 
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Prioritization – Both technology fields and therapeutic areas were prioritized by means of 
the questionnaire, in which VCs were asked to prioritize the three most important, ranging 
from 1 to 3 (1 being the highest priority, representing a weight of 3). The prioritization 
process was based on prioritization methodologies as described in existing literature270, 271, 
276, 277, 279, 280, and adapted to fit the scope of this research. Each score was multiplied by the 
respective weight (3, 2, or 1). The sum of these weighted scores reflects the total weighted 
score of the respective technology field or therapeutic area. A relative measure for the 
weighted ranking was used for comparison, by dividing the score by the highest ranked 
area or field. As such, the following equation was used to rank technology fields and 
therapeutic areas as well as related investment barriers 276, 277: 
 
 
 !" = ((!!! ∗ 3) + (!!! ∗ !2) + !!!!) ∗ 100((!!! ∗ 3) + (!!! ∗ !2) + !!!!)HR  
 
 
Where WR is the Weighted Rank of the respective field, area or barrier, n is the number of 
times this area, field or barrier was chosen, r1/2/3 is the respective rank that was chosen, 
and HR is the Highest Ranked area, field or barrier. 
 
Regarding the technology fields, participants were also asked to prioritize technology 
subfields for any technology field that they included in their top three. In addition, 
participants were asked to rank the investment barriers specifically for each therapeutic 
area and each technology field that they included in their top three, effectively prioritizing 
barriers six separate times (for three therapeutic areas and for three technology fields). As 
such, the barriers are ranked for each technology field and therapeutic area separately 
(tables 6.1 and 6.2). 
 
6.3 Results 
With the questionnaire a response rate of 13% was reached, with a total of 91 respondents. 
As some participants failed to complete the questionnaire or provided insufficient data, 
responses from 81 participants were used for the analysis. In terms of further descriptive 
data, 58% of respondents was a partner at their firm, and 74% fulfilled an executive or 
management position; the average experience in life sciences venture capital was 12.5 
years; 59% of respondents lived and worked in Europe, 38% in North America, and 3% in 
the Asia/pacific region; and 35% was 55 years of age or older, 48% was between 40 and 54 
years of age, and the remaining 17% was younger than 40 years of age. 
 
6.3.1 Therapeutic areas 
While 56% of respondents declared themselves to invest opportunistically, 80% deemed 
the respective therapeutic area to be (very) important when considering investments in 
early stage ventures. In terms of ranking, respondents were asked to prioritize their top 
three therapeutic areas from an investor perspective. As shown in figure 6.2, oncology as a 
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therapeutic area received the highest investment priority by far, which is consistent with 
our previous research 26. Cardiovascular, central nervous system, and infectious diseases 
are the following investment priorities for VCs, followed by companies that develop 
platforms applicable to multiple therapeutic areas. In addition, the majority (62%) of VCs 
declared to have an interest in investing in orphan diseases. Respondents were also asked 
whether opportunities in orphan diseases would increase or decrease in the future, and 52% 
of VCs is expecting an increase in orphan disease opportunities, while 17% expects a 
decrease. 
 
Figure 6.2 Therapeutic area ranking according to weighted scores divided in three priority groups: 
Low: 0-33; Medium: 34-66; High: 67-100 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3.2 Technology fields 
Similar to therapeutic areas, technology fields were considered to be (very) important 
factors in investment decisions, as indicated by 75% of the respondents. Although one of 
the respondents made clear that “there are no a priori considerations in terms of technology 
fields”. Another respondent mentioned that “the importance of areas and fields really is 
based on market demands” and that “there has to be a significant unmet need in the area or 
field”. 
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Notwithstanding, the results show a clear distribution of VCs’ investment preference when 
it comes to technology types and fields. Figure 6.3a shows the VCs’ investment 
preferences for pharmaceuticals, medical technology, or biotechnology, which is quite 
evenly distributed and consistent with previous analyses 26. Respondents were also asked to 
declare their preference for portfolio companies in terms of products versus platforms, and 
the results show that product-based ventures are most popular amongst VCs (figure 6.3b). 
Moreover, in the interviews, respondents indicated that moving one product forward is 
often an important validation for the technology platform from which it is derived. For this 
reason many VCs focus either only or partially on products first, causing the percentage of 
VCs investing in platform-based ventures alone to be relatively small. 
 
Figure 6.3 VC investment preferences in terms of technology types (a) and product-based vs. 
platform-based ventures (b)  
 
 
 
 
Subsequently, respondents were asked to prioritize their top three technology fields within 
the field of biotechnology and were then asked to prioritize specific technology subfields 
for each field included in their top three. The results of this prioritization are shown in 
figure 6.4 according to their weighted ranking score into three priority groups. Consistent 
with previous research, proteins/peptides as a field is considered to be of highest 
investment priority, in which (monoclonal) antibodies and recombinant proteins are 
leading. This is not surprising, considering the fact that all biological products, as approved 
by the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER) of the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), are derived from this technology field. 
 
The second priority group contains the fields ‘cell and tissue engineering technologies’ led 
by cell therapy (immunotherapy), and ‘gene and RNA vector technologies’ led by gene 
therapy. Correspondingly, gene therapy and cell therapy were also mentioned most often 
during the interviews as being the most groundbreaking technologies VCs are investing in.  
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Figure 6.4 Technology ranking according to weighted scores divided in three priority groups:  
Low: 0-33; Medium: 34-66; High: 67-100 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3.3 Investment barriers 
The barriers are ranked in relation to both the top three therapeutic areas and the top three 
technology fields. Respondents were asked to rank the barriers as identified in the 
interviews for each therapeutic area and technology field that they included in their top 
three, separately. Table 6.1 shows the results for the therapeutic areas and table 6.2 shows 
the results for the technology fields.  
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Table 6.1 Relative ranking of associated investment barriers for the top 3 therapeutic areas 
 
Therapeutic area WR Associated barrier ranking WR 
Oncology 
(n=48) 
100 Efficacy issues in trials 100 
Intricate pathology 86.4 
Competition 54.2 
Cardiovascular 
(n=21) 
42.4 Regulatory barriers 100 
Competition 68.2 
Finance barriers 54.5 
Central Nervous 
System 
(n=19) 
28.0 Intricate pathology 100 
Efficacy issues in trials 84.6 
Finance barriers 50 
n represents the number of respondents that included the area in their top three 
 
 
Table 6.2 Relative ranking of associated investment barriers for the top 3 biotechnology fields 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the therapeutic areas it seems that most barriers are related to efficacy issues in trials, 
the complexity of the illness itself, regulations, competition and finance issues. However, 
the analysis shows an important difference between the three highest prioritized therapeutic 
areas. Namely that for oncology and CNS diseases, efficacy issues in trials and the 
pathology itself form the strongest investment barriers, while regulations seem to form a 
crucial barrier for cardiovascular diseases. As made clear by one of the respondents, 
regulatory issues represent a weighty barrier for VCs, causing them to “under invest in for 
example cardiovascular diseases and over invest in other areas such as oncology”. In 
addition, competition seems to be an important issue as well for companies focusing on 
oncology. 
 
Biotechnology field WR Associated barrier ranking WR 
Proteins/peptides 
and large molecules 
(n=32) 
100 Competition 100 
Complicated technology 90 
Finance barriers 86.7 
Cell and tissue 
engineering 
(n=24) 
70.4 Complicated technology 100 
Validation issues 95.8 
Efficacy issues of the technology in trials 62.5 
Gene and RNA 
vectors 
(n=22) 
65.4 Complicated technology 100 
Validation issues 56.7 
Regulatory barriers 50 
n represents the number of respondents that included the field in their top three 
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Similarly, investment barriers for the second and third highest prioritized technology fields, 
which mainly revolve around cell therapy and gene therapy, concern the complexity of 
these technologies and validation issues for underlying technology platforms. As specified 
during interviews “validation of technology platforms is shown by taking one product 
forward”. Thus, it seems that there are many instances in which it is difficult to further 
develop a product candidate from gene therapy and cell therapy platforms. However, exits 
(e.g. trade sales) have also been mentioned as validation indicators for technology 
platforms, suggesting that this may also be more difficult to realise for these 
groundbreaking technologies. Furthermore, showing the efficacy of cell therapy products 
in trials seems to be difficult as well, while regulations are a larger concern for gene 
therapies in particular. 
 
In figure 6.5 we have included a general ranking of barriers over therapeutic areas and 
technology fields into a matrix, according to three priority groups (Low, Medium, High). 
Although this figure must be interpreted with caution because respondents were asked to 
rank the barriers per area and field, it does provide a general overview of the most common 
issues that keep VCs from investing in therapeutic areas or technology fields. It seems that 
overall; the most common investment barriers are associated with the complexity of the 
science underlying the technology or the pathology in question. In addition, efficacy issues 
in trials, regulatory issues, competition and finance barriers seem to represent significant 
obstacles as well. Overall, for biotechnology fields, validation of the respective technology 
is also an important issue from an investment perspective. 
 
 
Table 6.3 Relative ranking of associated investment barriers for therapeutic areas and technology 
fields 
Therapeutic areas   Technology fields  
Barrier WR  Barrier WR 
Efficacy issues in trials 100  Complicated technology 100 
Intricate pathology 87  Validation issues 62.7 
Regulatory barriers 77.6  Regulatory barriers 53.3 
Competition 70.2  Efficacy issues of technology in trials 50 
Finance barriers 69.6  Competition 49.3 
Difficulty to carry out clinical trials 56.5  Finance barriers 43.3 
Issues obtaining reimbursement 37.3  Return on investment/business model 33.3 
Prices of therapy/product 32.9  Manufacturing issues 32.7 
Changing strategies of acquirers 26.1  Prices of therapy/product 32 
Small patient groups 19.9  Time consuming R&D 31.3 
Risk/Safety 19.3  Difficulty to carry out clinical trials 26 
Time consuming R&D 18.6  Wrong timing (too early or too late) 14 
Wrong timing (too early or too late) 14.9  Risk/Safety 11.3 
Barriers to collaborate (with academia or 
industry) 
9.3  Issues obtaining reimbursement 10.7 
Lack of preclinical support (validation) 3.7  Changing strategies of acquirers 8.7 
Ethical barriers 1.9  Ethical barriers 4.7 
   Barriers to collaborate (with academia or 
industry) 
2.7 
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Figure 6.5 Matrix of investment barriers for therapeutic areas and technology fields divided in 
priority groups: Low: 0-33; Medium: 34-66; High: 67-100 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3.4 Importance of big pharma’s interests 
Other noteworthy findings mainly relate to the interests of (bio)pharmaceutical acquirers 
for VC investment decisions. Due to the fact that in most cases “pharma ultimately pays for 
the exits”, as stated by respondents, their interests might be of great importance for VC 
investment decisions. However, as noted by one of the respondents this very much 
concerns the future interests of acquirers as “pharma strategy is subject to frequent change” 
and is mostly “dependent on changes in management and strategic direction, which are 
more profit-centred than focused on positively impacting health and well-being”. It was 
also noted that “pharma rather is a follower than a leader when it comes to the next wave of 
game changing technologies”. This corresponds with the idea that VCs fulfil a critical role 
as technological gatekeepers 26-28 and suggests that their intuition in terms of where the 
highest returns may be realised in the future could also be a strong influencing factor in 
making investment decisions. Thus, participants were asked which of the two they believed 
is more important for them when investing in early stage biotechnology ventures. 
Interestingly, the majority of respondents (84%) declared either that pharma's interest is 
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more important than VCs’ intuition (42%) or that their intuition and pharma's interest are 
equally important (42%) when investing in biotechnology ventures. Thus, the results show 
that for many VCs, the interest of potential future acquirers is quite important for current 
investment decisions.  
 
A final noteworthy finding is that there are some VCs that try to avoid acquisitions as an 
exit because it “destroys value”, as one respondent claimed that “companies should 
therefore not be built to sell to Pharma”. Although many VCs do focus on acquisitions as 
preferred exit-strategies, there is literature that confirms the notion that acquisitions, in this 
field particularly, destroy value, including our previous research 15, 25. 
!
6.4 Conclusions and discussion 
This study shows that VCs seem to be considering cell- & gene therapy technologies as 
future disrupters in terms of innovation and economic development, and might be jumping 
the S-curve of technological development from protein therapeutics to cell therapy & gene 
therapy technologies. Our analysis further reveals several niches of technology - 
therapeutic area combinations with high VC attractiveness, namely: protein technologies, 
cell therapy & gene therapy technologies for oncology, cardiovascular and central nervous 
system diseases. It also reveals high-prioritized investment barriers specific to these 
technologies and therapeutic areas, which mainly concern the complexity of the science 
underlying the respective technology or pathology, efficacy issues in trials, regulations, 
competition, and finance. 
 
In addition to the opportunity to aim for niches with high VC attractiveness, the study 
provides opportunities for entrepreneurs to create competitive advantages by finding ways 
to overcome these technology and therapeutic area specific investment barriers. Solving 
high-prioritized barriers for specific niches of technology-therapeutic area combinations 
could significantly increase VC attractiveness of new ventures.  
 
6.4.1 Therapeutic areas 
VCs prioritize oncology as the highest therapeutic area by far. The relatively large gap in 
prioritization between oncology and other therapeutic areas is fully in line with the amount 
of VC money invested in oncology, which is at least twice the average total amounts 
invested in other high-prioritized therapeutic areas26. Substantial amounts of investments in 
oncology drug development over previous years 26, 281 may have been influenced by the 
fact that the antibody market is heavily focused on oncology (among others)282. In addition, 
there are noteworthy differences between clinical R&D of oncology therapies, compared to 
other areas, which might contribute to the attractiveness of oncology for investors and 
entrepreneurs. For example, oncology therapies, with the exception of antibodies, are not 
usually tested on healthy subjects, effectively skipping phase I trials and testing for safety 
in phase II trials. Moreover, oncology therapies are always evaluated in addition to 
standard care and there is no use of placebos in oncology trials. 
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With regards to VC funding, oncology and the other four highest ranked therapeutic areas 
(cardiovascular diseases, central nervous system diseases, infectious diseases, and 
platforms) are identical to the top five therapeutic areas that have received the most VC 
funding over the past 15 years 26. Although the order differs slightly, the total amounts 
invested in the four areas following oncology are very similar. The notable similarity 
between VCs’ expressed interest and actual money invested, shows that VCs put their 
money where their mouth is when it comes to therapeutic focus.  
 
6.4.2 Technology fields 
As technological gatekeepers, VCs focus most on antibodies & protein technologies; cell 
therapy & cell/tissue engineering technologies; and gene therapy & vector technologies. 
The focus on protein technologies is evident, considering a track record of biologics that fit 
pharma’s blockbuster business model (e.g. Genentech’s Rituxan ®, Centocor’s 
Remicade®). The focus on antibodies within this field is mainly due to the fact that 
antibodies and recombinant proteins dominate the biologics market 14, 282. Moreover, this 
investment priority is fully consistent with previous research as proteins are also the most 
funded technology field over the past 15 years (43%) 26. Therefore we can conclude that 
VCs’ high prioritization and investments suggests that they still expect sufficient future 
economic development within this field. The second highest prioritized field, mainly 
revolves around promising advances in the cell therapy subfield, which, apart from 
Dendreon’s Provenge®, involves technologies that are currently still in clinical research 
stages. Similarly, the third highest prioritized field has recently generated UniQure’s 
Glybera® as the first approved gene therapy 38, 39. 
 
Considering the limits of technological development and a potentially imminent innovation 
cliff for protein related technologies 14, VCs’ second and third priorities might indicate that 
they are counting on these technology fields for disruptive innovation and that they are 
jumping the technology S-curve of proteins to cell- & gene therapy technologies. The 
concept of ‘jumping the S-curve’ relates to slowly abandoning one technology or market as 
it reaches its saturation phase while adopting a disruptive technology or market during its 
emerging or growth phase 14, 128, 283(p.123-128). Gene therapy, for example, has been suggested 
to be a future disrupter of the protein therapeutics market 284. In this context, our study 
suggests that VCs seem to be considering cell- & gene therapy technologies as future 
disrupters in terms of innovation and economic development. 
 
In contrast to therapeutic area priorities, there is a noteworthy discrepancy between 
prioritization and VC funding of technology fields. The allocation of DNA/RNA 
technologies at the bottom of the medium priority group is surprising, since it is the runner 
up field in terms of VC funding (29%). Moreover these DNA/RNA technologies form the 
basis of personalized medicine opportunities, which is a major trend in healthcare 26, 261, 262, 
285. The discrepancy between declared priority and relative amount of funding might be due 
to the relatively moderate to low returns that have been realized for this technology field 26. 
Correspondingly, in our previous research we concluded that VCs invest in these 
DNA/RNA technologies for long-term cure and care macro-trends. However, from this 
study we can also conclude that although VCs invest heavily in DNA/RNA technologies, it 
does not have a high investment priority relative to proteins and, more importantly, to 
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technologies such as cell therapy and gene therapy. It may also be the case that there are 
simply less viable opportunities available in cell- & gene therapies, while VCs do perceive 
these to be higher investment priorities. This may explain the relatively lesser amounts 
invested in cell- & gene therapy technologies, in relation to their prioritization. 
 
  
6.4.3 Niches and investment barriers 
Insights from this study provide the opportunity to identify niches with high VC 
attractiveness and further increase this attractiveness by solving barriers that VCs associate 
with those niches. Generally, the highest prioritized investment barriers are associated to 
the complexity of the science underlying the respective technology or pathology, efficacy 
issues in trials, regulations, competition, and finance. However, the study mainly focused 
on the differences in prioritized barriers for different technology fields and therapeutic 
areas. Thus, for specific combinations of applying technologies within certain therapeutic 
areas, entrepreneurs have the opportunity to adjust their organizational strategy and 
activities in such a way so as to overcome related investment barriers or at least include 
them as risk parameters in their business planning. Hereby, entrepreneurs may transform 
barriers into opportunities and develop unique competitive advantages. For example, if one 
is developing a gene therapy for oncology, one may gain a competitive advantage by 
including solutions for regulatory issues that are specific for gene therapy technologies in 
their business planning; as well as any validation issues by demonstrating a sound proof of 
concept of the technology and the ability to move a specific product forward into clinical 
trials. They may also, for example, benefit from studying efficacy issues that occurred in 
other oncology trials that involved similar technologies. In contrast, addressing other issues 
may be more important in gaining a competitive edge when a venture is developing a new 
therapeutic protein for a cardiovascular disease. In this case, focussing on and planning for 
potential regulatory issues specific for cardiovascular diseases as well as milestone 
planning for financing of R&D will probably be more beneficial in convincing VCs to 
invest. 
 
A noteworthy issue is the importance of the interests of potential future 
(bio)pharmaceutical acquirers from a VC perspective. This measure was included in the 
questionnaire to gain insight into the extent to which VCs are influenced in their 
investment decisions with regards to technologies and therapeutic areas. The results show 
that pharma’s interests are considered to be either equally important or more important 
than VCs own intuition and thus are often quite leading. Therefore, pharma’s interests may 
easily influence niches with VC attractiveness as identified in this study. Because pharma’s 
interests are subject to frequent change, as stated by one respondent, it is imperative that 
entrepreneurs not only focus on these niches but also account for pharma’s future interests. 
Vice versa, as technological gatekeepers, VCs in essence control the supply of innovation 
and therefore pharma’s future interests may also depend on the investment decisions VCs 
make now. Especially when it comes to new waves of game changing technologies and 
radical innovation, pharma may rather be a follower than a leader, as claimed by one of the 
respondents. 
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6.4.4 Considerations and future research 
There are several considerations that have to be taken into account when interpreting the 
results from this study. For the prioritization we used cut-off points to categorize fields, 
areas and barriers into priority groups (Low, Medium, High). Although this approach was 
adopted from literature 270, 279, it resulted in the allocation of a high number of therapeutic 
areas and investment barriers in the low priority groups. Thus, in future analyses in this 
context, cut-off points may be re-evaluated. In addition, the analysis required a total 
number of 49 questions in the questionnaire, which may have been considered as too many 
by potential participants. Nevertheless, we do not suspect that this might have led to 
sampling bias since we observed an appropriate distribution of demographic characteristics 
amongst respondents (e.g. age, geographic location). Therefore, the group of respondents 
was considered to be representative for life sciences VCs. 
Future research may focus on investigating the technology S-curves of cell- & gene 
therapy technologies to identify current phases in technological and economic development 
of these technologies. This could also provide insights in whether VCs could indeed be 
jumping the S-curve of protein technologies. Evaluating these technologies a decade from 
now and comparison with VCs’ current investment priorities as found in this study could 
subsequently provide insight into the predictive abilities of VCs in terms of innovation and 
economic development of technologies. In addition, the method of prioritization analysis 
used in this study may be applied to a wide range of interests across different disciplines 
and markets. Additional future research could aim at uncovering more in-depth knowledge 
about the underlying causes and opportunities associated to the investment barriers. This 
may be realized by conducting case studies of ventures with a specific technological focus. 
Another potential avenue of further research may entail a similar analysis targeting R&D-, 
alliances- or acquisition managers or directors at incumbent (bio)pharmaceutical firms as 
research subjects. A comparison of a prioritization of therapeutic areas, technology fields 
and associated barriers from that perspective could shed light on similarities and 
discrepancies between the VC perspective and acquirer perspective (see Giniatullina et 
al.255). 
 
This study provides the first systematic prioritization of therapeutic areas, technology fields 
and investment barriers from a VC perspective. It provides unique quantitative findings 
that contribute to the knowledge about new ventures and investments in the biotechnology 
sector. Because VCs are considered to be technological gatekeepers, their perspective on 
investment priorities and barriers provides unique opportunities for entrepreneurs to create 
competitive advantages and look for niches with high VC attractiveness. 
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                 Chapter  7  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
This chapter commences with a summary of the main conclusions of each study presented 
in this dissertation, and discusses how these contribute to existing literature. Subsequently, 
central challenges of the pharmaceutical industry are discussed in relation to the waves of 
biotechnological innovation, concluding that biotechnology has been underutilized by 
established firms due to their dominant logic and blockbuster paradigm. Hereafter, 
management implications are discussed and a trajectory of organizational innovation is 
suggested involving gradual changes and transition towards a prevention-based paradigm. 
This is followed by recommendations for a new organizational form that may better sustain 
and drive future waves of biotechnological innovation. This form is mainly based on 
differentiation regarding organization and governance of exploration and exploitation. 
Separation of these constructs based on required capabilities and the link between them 
through long-term alliances beyond single product development are both crucial to achieve 
sustainability. Finally, several avenues for further research are suggested, focusing on 
future development of exploratory innovation networks, the role of venture capitalists, 
long-term exploitation alliances and organizational transition, institutional factors that 
could accelerate adoption of new innovation, and the potential reconstruction of the value 
chain based on a prevention-based paradigm. 
61_Erim Fernald BW stand.job
 
 114 
7.1 Summarizing conclusions and contributions 
The studies in this dissertation reveal several important and contributing findings with 
regards to interfirm cooperation between biotechnology companies and established 
pharmaceutical firms. Furthermore, they reveal findings regarding investments, trade sale 
multiples and investment priorities and investment barriers, exploring a venture capital 
perspective. Here, the main conclusions from the individual chapters are summarized and 
their contributions to existing literature are discussed. 
 
7.1.1 Technological development and interfirm cooperation effects 
First, chapter 2 thoroughly examines biotechnological development and adds a dimension 
to the innovation deficit problem of the (bio)pharmaceutical industry 4, 12, 63, 94, 96 by 
showing that the first wave of biotechnology has reached a stage of technological 
saturation. As explained in chapter 1, from its inception, biotechnology was expected to 
revolutionize pharmaceutical R&D; however, literature states that it has not met these 
expectations 1, 5, 16, 18. Moreover, rDNA and mAb technologies, as the first wave, are the 
only ones that produced products, except for Provenge® and Glybera®. However, rDNA 
and mAb products have accounted for a mere 5% of total pharma sales14 and will be in 
competition with biosimilars after patent expiry 286. Given these insights, and considering 
chapter 2 predicts imminent maturation and saturation of productivity, this first wave will 
surely not revolutionize pharmaceutical R&D. Therefore, later waves of biotechnological 
innovation will have to play a significant role in realizing the potential of biotechnology 
and meeting expectations. In addition to these insights being relevant for stakeholders, this 
chapter confirms that patent and patent citation analyses are an efficient method of 
technological forecasting, adding to innovation literature by building on existing research 
using similar methodologies 23, 283. 
 
In chapter 3, we take a more in-depth look at the innovation system from a company-level 
perspective. Merging patent data with additional company specific variables (e.g. location, 
partnerships, deals) of its applicants resulted in a unique dataset providing the ability to 
study interfirm cooperation in relation to company success. In particular, the effects of 
three dimensions of interfirm cooperation – clusters, alliances, and acquisitions – on 
product introduction probability are examined. To the best of our knowledge, chapter 3 
presents the first study where this is done from the perspective of the technology supplier. 
It adds to existing empirical evidence, showing that cluster settings positively affect the 
likelihood that individual companies’ will introduce new products and thereby stimulate 
innovation and economic growth 114, 144, 145, 165. In addition, this chapter contributes to 
literature on strategic alliances76, 146, 178, 208, regarding biotechnology149, 150, 207, as it uniquely 
shows that these alliances involve a risk-return trade-off in biotechnological product 
development: on the one hand, engaging in alliances, as technology suppliers, decreases 
risk by increasing the likelihood of future product introductions; but, on the other hand, 
biotechnology suppliers earn lower returns after product introductions when these products 
are developed through alliances, as opposed to independently. Finally, this chapter provides 
empirical evidence regarding the destructive impact of being acquired on technology 
suppliers’ productivity. It shows that acquisitions negatively affect the likelihood of 
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introducing biotechnological products, although they do not affect revenues gained from 
these products. This chapter therefore contributes to M&A literature in general76, and 
relating to biotechnology in particular 74, 155. 
 
In contrast, the perspective of established pharmaceutical firms and the dynamics of 
interfirm cooperation in relation to their innovation performance have been thoroughly 
examined in chapter 4. The study presented in this chapter shows that these incumbents, as 
literature suggests75, 111, have been increasingly acquiring biotechnological companies to 
replenish R&D pipelines and counter their innovation deficits. However, these increases in 
the number of acquisitions of biotech companies have negatively affected firms’ 
innovation performance. These findings contribute to existing M&A literature, in which 
there lacks consensus regarding the effects of M&A 76. However, chapter 4 also 
demonstrates that these negative main effects are moderated by firms’ absorptive capacity 
as measured by internal R&D efforts, concluding that acquisitions of both pharma and 
biotech companies are complementary innovation activities at higher levels of absorptive 
capacity. Noteworthy, pharma acquisitions outperform biotech acquisitions in this regard, 
illustrating the known influence of technology- and market-relatedness156, 218, 227. These 
findings add to the existing body of knowledge concerning absorptive capacity in M&A 
literature148, 188, 221-224, 229, as they uniquely show the differential effects of acquiring 
technology related and unrelated target companies. For alliances with biotech companies as 
a subsequent dimension of interfirm cooperation, the same complementarity exists at high 
levels of absorptive capacity. However, the study demonstrates that alliances with other, 
often smaller, pharmaceutical companies are substitutive strategic options at higher levels 
of absorptive capacity, while the main effect of pharma alliances is positive. Again, these 
differential effects increase our understanding of technology relatedness and absorptive 
capacity with regards to alliances. Moreover, chapter 4, as well as chapter 3, provide 
insights regarding the need for integration of internal exploratory and exploitative 
capabilities with external innovation to reach complementarity and thereby increase value 
224, 225. These insights are particularly relevant to open innovation literature 6, 7, 251, 287, 
exploration exploitation literature 149, 157-160, 188, 235 and literature that specifically focuses on 
ambidexterity in organizations 159, 288-291.  
 
7.1.2 A venture capital perspective 
Where chapters 3 and 4 examine the dynamics relating to organization of R&D and 
biotechnological product development from a firm-level perspective, distinguishing 
between technology suppliers (chapter 3) and technology recipients (chapter 4); chapters 5 
and 6 build on the technological development analysis (chapter 2), as they focus on 
identifying ground-breaking biotechnologies that are relevant for the future, from the 
perspective of VCs. The first part of chapter 5 evaluates VC investments in biotech 
companies and returns on these investments through trade sales (i.e. acquisitions). 
Investments in these portfolio companies, categorized by technology field and therapeutic 
area focus, based on their lead product(s), reveal VC preferences. The second part of 
chapter 5 includes an analysis of trade sales between 2010-2014, showing that VCs have 
benefitted most in the area of oncology. Other beneficial therapeutic areas are infectious -, 
auto-immune -, and central nervous system diseases. As for technologies, small molecule 
drug companies outperform biotech companies as both trade sale values and multiples are 
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higher on average. As technological gatekeepers 27, VCs select the supply of future 
biotechnological innovation to meet the acquisition demand of established firms; and their 
preference may, therefore, have predictive value in light of development waves of 
biotechnological innovation. As such, this dissertation suggests the analysis of VC 
investments as a useful methodology to examine technological development in a given 
technology sector. Normally, forecasting and analyses of emerging technologies are 
conducted using patent data (chapter 2) 14, 23, 98, 99, 121, 283, 292, but a combination with VC 
investment data can shed light on which type of technologies are being picked up by the 
market. In this case, chapter 5-I shows that VCs focus on both short-term and long-term 
success: on the one hand they play it safe, minimizing risk by investing most in small 
molecules and proteins; on the other hand, they are investing heavily in DNA/RNA 
technologies, which underlie the possibilities of personalized medicine. In conclusion, 
chapter 5 shows that big pharma’s predominant blockbuster paradigm guides their 
acquisition preference and therewith their innovation demand; and that VCs predict the 
corresponding supply of innovation, acting as visionary technological gatekeepers, 
building for big pharma. Moreover, chapter 5 shows that as technology gatekeepers VCs 
provide the foundation for new waves of biotechnological innovation. They are investing 
in technologies for current and future cure and care macro-trends while some of these 
technologies have not (yet) realized good returns through trade sales. 
 
Correspondingly, chapter 6 adds depth to the perspective of VCs by providing a thorough 
qualitative and quantitative prioritization analysis of technology fields and therapeutic 
areas, including associated investment barriers. The application of prioritization analysis in 
this field and to this particular group of research subjects contributes to- and validates this 
existing methodology as implemented by several researchers 270-275. This chapter shows 
that venture capitalists are considering cell- & gene therapy technologies as future 
disrupters in terms of innovation and economic development, suggesting that they might be 
jumping the S-curve of technological development from recombinant proteins to cell- & 
gene therapy technologies. It further reveals several niches of technology - therapeutic area 
combinations with high venture capital attractiveness, mainly concerning protein 
technologies and cell therapy & gene therapy technologies for oncology, cardiovascular 
and central nervous system diseases. Furthermore, the chapter also reveals high-prioritized 
investment barriers specific to these technologies and therapeutic areas, which mainly 
concern the complexity of the science underlying the respective technology or pathology, 
efficacy issues in trials, regulations, competition, and finance. The chapter suggests that 
venture capital attractiveness can be increased by overcoming high-prioritized barriers for 
specific niches of technology and therapeutic area combinations. 
 
The studies presented in chapters 5 and 6 contribute to a better understanding of the role of 
VCs in the current ‘science-business model’. They show that, with their unique 
competences, VCs have found a delicate balance between money, time and risk, fulfilling a 
crucial role in the biopharmaceutical value chain. While small biotech companies seek risk 
in early stage R&D, and established firms are risk-averse by investing and engaging in late 
stage R&D, VCs fill the gap of risk versus required capital, and connect supply and 
demand as risk-neutral investors. By investing in the right technologies and therapeutic 
areas, they foresee technology developments and big pharma’s future innovation demand, 
while at the same time creating a technology push as visionary gatekeepers. 
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7.2 The blockbuster paradigm and biotechnological innovation 
7.2.1 Pharmaceutical R&D and the first biotechnologies 
Traditional pharmaceutical R&D is historically based on chemistry and has spun-off from 
chemical companies that produced dye-stuffs and plastics 1, 293. Simultaneously, 
pharmacists who invented preparations and started to manufacture and sell them, were the 
founders of several companies that became today’s established pharmaceutical firms 293. 
Since 1935, sales of pharmaceuticals started growing to the benefit of these firms. The 
industry really took off after WWII, with an enormous increase in productivity 293, 
illustrated by a peak of NME approvals in the late 1940s 294. However, from 1950 to the 
present, the number of NME approvals has remained constant 72, 294, with the exception of a 
large peak of approvals in 1996 14.  
 
During this period the blockbuster business model evolved with Tagamet becoming the 
first blockbuster drug in 1986 295. This model worked exceptionally well for chemical 
products and provided feasible and necessary R&D investments to produce next waves of 
blockbuster drugs 210. Unfortunately, this paradigm created a virtual ‘trap’ as each new 
drug has to be more successful than the last to cover the increasing R&D investments, 
essentially driving R&D expenditures to record levels 14, 210. In addition, since 1962, 
regulations for the testing of new drugs have gradually become stricter, resulting in a 
greater delay between discovery and marketing as well as increased costs. Moreover, from 
the 1980s, price pressures, increased competition of both first-in-class and generic drugs, 
market fragmentation, enormous rises in R&D expenditures, imminent patent expirations 
of existing blockbusters, and innovation deficits, presented themselves as challenging 
factors that affected profits and growth as productivity remained constant 5, 72, 94, 210, 296. 
 
As discussed in chapter 4, industry consolidation increased with M&A as an attempt to 
cope with these challenges. Although M&A may seem beneficial as they often create 
economies of scale 74, 75, 162, the M&A strategy creates another virtual ‘trap’ where a firm 
needs to continue merging and acquiring to sustain innovation pipelines. Moreover, as we 
and others have shown, M&A often destroy value with regards to innovation and this 
strategy was rather a response to challenges than an adequate solution 25, 74. Moreover, 
technology-relatedness and absorptive capacity play crucial roles in the relationship 
between M&A and innovation performance (chapter 4). 
 
In this context, literature and studies presented in this dissertation suggest that the open 
innovation model has not been successful for pharma and biotechnology 1, 297. The first 
biotechnologies have only generated products that fit the dominant logic298, 299 of 
established firms’ blockbuster model. Although some have become blockbuster biologics 
33, it can be argued that the potential of these biotechnologies is restrained when subdued to 
the blockbuster business model. 
 
Although this first wave will not revolutionize pharmaceutical R&D (chapter 2), early 
stage VCs are currently still prioritizing proteins and small molecule drugs highest (chapter 
6). The main reason for this is that they still represent the technology fields with the 
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highest trade-sale returns (chapter 5). From this, it can be concluded that pharma’s 
dominant logic and blockbuster model currently still dominate the industry. This remains a 
major issue, because it is fairly certain that the future biotechnological developments are 
not headed towards more products with blockbuster potential. In contrast, cure and care 
macro-trends are headed towards better diagnostics and highly complex targeted therapies 
and treatments that care for patients’ individual unmet needs (i.e. personalized medicine). 
 
7.2.2 Future biotechnological innovation and the current science-business model 
As revealed in the study presented in chapter 6, cell- & gene therapies are prioritized 
second and third highest and perceived as the next groundbreaking technologies by VCs. 
These technologies will become increasingly relevant as firms seek opportunities for cures 
beyond palliative treatment regimens 300. However, there are several hurdles, both technical 
and organizational, that have to be addressed. Most of these are revealed in chapter 6 as 
VC investment barriers mainly include validation issues and efficacy issues in clinical 
development, regulatory issues, product prices, and manufacturing issues. Due to the high 
degree of complexity, meeting clinical end-points is an often-encountered challenge for 
these technologies. Furthermore, regulatory hurdles increase with the complexity of a 
technology, in particular with regards to classification of end products 301. Finally, costs of 
production and delivery of cell- & gene therapies are significantly higher than standard 
therapeutics 300, 302, illustrated by Glybera®’s price tag of €1.1 million. Given these 
hurdles, the second wave of innovation involves a considerably different risk profile, and 
because its productivity curve is only just emerging, it is difficult to predict blockbuster 
potential of these therapies. Notwithstanding, VCs appear to be jumping the S-curve from 
proteins to gene- & cell therapy technologies (chapter 6). 
 
Simultaneously, VCs are heavily investing in technologies that underlie personalized 
medicine, in line with cure and care macro-trends, although they have not made great 
returns from these investments in terms of trade sales (see chapter 5). There is no question 
that targeted therapies based on molecular diagnostics and personalized medicine can save 
more lives, increase quality of life, and can save a great deal of money 303. Such outcomes 
are directly in line with the purpose of biotechnological innovation and will undoubtedly 
be realized by the third wave of innovation. These technologies provide the opportunity to 
customize treatment for patients, maximizing effectiveness whilst minimizing side effects. 
 
However, the implementation of these technologies in global healthcare is inexcusably far 
behind the scientific possibilities due to several major hurdles that have to be overcome. 
Noteworthy, some of these hurdles are associated to interests of stakeholders other than the 
three perspectives evaluated in this dissertation (e.g. governments, insurance companies, 
healthcare providers). Most importantly, the possibilities of the third wave are in conflict 
with the obsolete blockbuster model of established pharmaceutical firms. From an 
economic perspective, this model focuses on as large and homogenous patient groups as 
possible, discouraging the development of diagnostics that identify subsets of patient 
groups that may be unreceptive to a given treatment 303. Interestingly, this economic 
interest according to the blockbuster model is in direct conflict with the economic interest 
of health insurers in terms of cost-effectiveness. The larger the subset of patients for which 
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a companion-diagnostic may prevent the use of more expensive treatment, the more cost-
effective this diagnostic product will be for health insurers 261, 285.  
 
While health insurers may benefit enormously from the potential cost-effectiveness of 
companion-diagnostics and personalized medicine, the current reimbursement system 
disincentivises companies to develop these tests and physicians to use them. Companies 
have to go through great lengths to obtain reimbursement for innovative diagnostic 
products; and physicians are primarily rewarded for the procedures they execute, benefiting 
more from practicing trial-and-error medicine 303. Finally, current regulations are also 
aimed at one-size-fits-all products as they require companies to conduct increasingly large 
and costly phase II and III clinical trials with considerably broad patient groups 261, 285, 303. 
 
Thus, in the current environment, value slippage would occur for several stakeholders, 
providing little incentives for value creation in the long-term 304. While the creation of 
value for patients due to personalized medicine technologies is clear, the value capturing 
for all involved stakeholders remains unclear and has yet to be organised properly. Several 
initial strategies that may lead to a situation in which all stakeholders may benefit from the 
third wave of innovation are mentioned as management implications in section 7.3. 
 
7.2.3 Underutilized innovation 
As introduced in chapter 1, an integrated ‘science-business model’ has evolved, which has 
allowed each of the stakeholders, studied in this dissertation, to capitalize on the first wave 
of biotechnological innovation. However, as discussed above and illustrated by the 
findings in this dissertation, the current organizational form turns out to be unsustainable to 
foster future innovation. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 show that VCs keep prioritizing and investing most in small molecule 
drugs and proteins, which fit the blockbuster model. This shows that, in essence, the entire 
innovation system is guided by established firms’ dominant logic298, 299. Arguably, that 
influence has now become the main obstacle for the future of biotechnological innovation. 
The blockbuster paradigm, on which the value chain is based, cannot sustain future 
biotechnological innovation because the challenges cannot be solved with the same 
thinking that created them. 
 
Moreover, as incumbent pharmaceutical firms lack innovation but have accumulated 
excess cash74, they have increasingly acquired biotechnology companies during the past 
decades (see chapter 4). This acquired biotechnological innovation is integrated into the 
dominant pharma logic before it has a chance to develop independently. Therefore, from a 
technology development standpoint, new impulses of biotechnological innovation are 
continuously nipped in the bud as they are acquired prematurely. 
 
In this context, it can be argued that the focus on blockbusters co-created the current result 
of biotechnology, which is disappointing due to unrealized expectations and potential 
(chapter 2)2, 3, 5, 16-18, 94. Therefore, a major conclusion from this dissertation is that 
biotechnology has been underutilized for the past decades because of big pharma firms’ 
dominant logic and blockbuster paradigm 303. It is not that biotechnology itself was not 
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enough to counter pharmaceutical innovation deficits, but it rather was the way in which 
established firms utilized biotechnology that has caused failure in realizing its potential. 
The combination of firms’ short-term goals and focus on one-size-fits-all products has had 
a profound effect on science-based business and its current organizational form. If 
subjected to different organizational forms, business models, or even an adapted value 
chain, biotechnological innovation can still drastically improve the quality of medicine and 
global healthcare. 
7.3 Management implications: towards organizational innovation 
In general, the dominant industrial logic of a firm constitutes its business model 299, 305. As 
Teece305 explains, “business models must morph over time as changing markets, 
technologies and legal structures dictate and/or allow”; and sometimes this results in 
significant changes or even abandoning an existing business model entirely. In many cases 
this, therefore, also means that firms have to change their dominant logic in order to 
survive or thrive. For clarification purposes, Teece305 explains that new organizational 
forms are important as a component of a business model. However, organizational forms 
are not business models. Here, several managerial implications are discussed, relating to 
the necessary organizational and institutional changes. The development of a new business 
model for this industry lies beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Pisano2 states that throughout economic history, technological innovation and 
organizational innovation are interdependent and new organizational forms are invented to 
cater to specific economic issues and needs 2, 306. Moreover, Teece305 states that the creation 
of organizational forms are as – if not more – important to society and to the business 
enterprise, than technological innovation. He also argues that good business model design 
and implementation, combined with strategic analysis, are necessary for technological 
innovation to succeed commercially 305. Therefore, the potential of biotechnological 
innovation can only be realized through complementary organizational, institutional and 
managerial innovation 2, 306. Moreover, the fundamental issue(s) of the current 
organizational form, as described in the previous section, can only be overcome by such 
innovation based on different logic. This represents an evolutionary process, involving 
gradual improvement as well as leaps of- or abrupt improvement (i.e. nongradual 
evolution; saltation).   
 
Arguably, gradual organizational improvements have to be implemented to enhance 
innovation performance within the current paradigm. Subsequently, a new organizational 
form has to evolve from a different paradigm as the blockbuster model has been proven to 
be unsustainable. This is a continuous process that includes an organizational transition 
phase, in which economic circumstances must be improved to gradually sustain future 
technological waves. 
 
7.3.1 Gradual improvement 
Starting with the current organizational form, the studies presented in chapters 3 and 4 
mostly focus on improving it. According to Pisano18 there are a number of key elements 
that ought to shape a more suitable industry anatomy for biotechnological innovation, two 
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of which directly relate to the findings presented in these chapters. These two elements are 
critical in improving biotechnological innovation performance within the current 
organizational form. 
 
Firstly, improved vertical integration is suggested, and chapters 3 and 4 make considerable 
contributions to this notion within the context of the biopharmaceutical value chain. 
Because of their positioning in this chain, pharmaceutical firms have the potential to be 
exceptional integrators. However, radical changes in their dominant logic and conduct of 
business are required, before firms can realize this integration potential. It is argued that, 
internal processes will have to be restructured to adequately sustain externally acquired 
technological innovation 3, 18. In this context, complementarity between internally derived 
innovation and externally acquired innovation through integration might significantly 
improve established firms’ innovation performance (chapter 4).  
 
Secondly, fewer and longer-term alliances are suggested. Chapters 3 and 4 consistently 
show that alliances outperform acquisitions when it comes to biotechnological innovation. 
For alliances, it is similarly important that they complement internal R&D, especially when 
the technological capabilities of both firms are less related (chapter 4). Arguably, a way of 
achieving this is to indeed focus on longer-term alliances that go beyond the scope of 
developing a single new compound or biologic 18. Instead future alliances may focus on 
specific technologies, technology fields, therapeutic areas, or combinations thereof 
(chapters 5 and 6). This, however, requires a shift in approach from focusing on large 
numbers to longer-term commitments, and might lead to more productive investments and 
thus sustaining more technological innovation. 
 
Innovation performance can be enhanced by focusing on one common denominator for 
these two elements, which is ‘extending’ innovation in an exploratory way 251. The scope 
in both vertical integration and strategic alliances has to extend beyond the development of 
a single product, hereby generating additional innovation and collaboration. This may 
stimulate technological innovation, albeit for initial steps within the current organizational 
form.  
 
In addition, literature has provided several practical improvements that can be applied to 
the current R&D process. These may relate to: 1) reducing R&D costs by, for example, 
aggressive outsourcing, prioritizing activities that reduce risk of failure, or risk-sharing 
through collaborations 307-309; 2) Reducing development times through ‘novel parallel-
development techniques’ and selecting the right programs to accelerate 308; 3) Shifting 
attrition of compounds to earlier R&D phases by improving decision-making in project 
suspension through better identification of promising compounds 308, 310, 311.  
 
7.3.2 Organizational and institutional transition 
In order to eventually sustain future biotechnological innovation, a number of previously 
described hurdles have to be overcome. Initial steps in organizational and institutional 
innovation can be taken during an organizational transition phase to gradually pave the 
way to sustainability. First, for cell- & gene therapy technologies, there is little doubt that 
the issues relating to complexity and validation will be overcome through technological 
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innovation. However, the managerial and organizational processes that have to be 
improved form a significant issue. With high production and delivery costs, these 
technologies will require novel manufacturing and operations processes that are not easily 
developed 312. Therefore, in the near future, considerable organizational and managerial 
innovation is necessary to capture and deliver the value of this second wave of 
biotechnologies. 
 
Regarding the third wave, accelerating the adoption and implementation of personalized 
medicine in global healthcare would save more lives, increase quality of life and save 
money303. Conflicting economic interests, however, are a major issue inhibiting this 
adoption. Initial steps towards aligning interests of pharmaceutical firms and health 
insurers may involve a renewed focus on patient outcomes and increased clinical value 
combined with innovative risk-sharing models for drug and diagnostic coverage, where 
reimbursement becomes contingent upon patient outcomes 285. Initially, visionary 
companies and insurers may seek to form such agreements, for new promising diagnostic-
therapeutic combinations to demonstrate both clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. 
If this could lead to more companion-diagnostics being reimbursed, it would stimulate 
companies to develop them and physicians to use them.  
 
In addition, it would be better if physicians were rewarded for accurate early diagnosis and 
prevention rather than the execution of medical procedures and treatments. There lies a 
large role for insurers and regulatory authorities to coordinate decisions and align the 
reimbursement process with the approval process 261, 285, 303. A corresponding reform that 
might catalyse the adoption of personalized medicine would be stricter regulatory 
requirements for safety and efficacy so that companies would need companion diagnostics 
to comply – this may vary per therapeutic area. Simultaneously, the authorities would have 
to decide not to require the collection of clinical data on marker-negative patients, which 
would lower development costs. New drugs and biologics would then only be approved for 
marker-positive patients, enforcing physicians to use companion diagnostics before treating 
patients with state-of-the-art therapies.  
 
Finally, established pharmaceutical firms may have to suffer more losses in terms of sales 
and profits in the short-term, as they slowly but increasingly adopt companion-diagnostics 
in clinical development, during this organizational transition phase. In the intermediate- 
and long-term, however, it will lead to a sustainable model for future technological 
innovation with increased sales and, more importantly, significant cost-reduction of clinical 
development303. Given the trends, as described throughout this dissertation, organizational 
transition is necessary for established firms to successfully partake in the potential future of 
prevention- and personalization- based medicine and healthcare.  
 
7.3.3 Managing uncertainty of biotechnological innovation 
As stated before, cure and care macro-trends are headed towards a paradigm focused on 
preventing disease instead of curing it 55, 261, 285, 303. Moreover, individualization, 
customization and self-management in healthcare have become apparent trends 303, 313. 
From a perspective of technology forecasting, this trend can be perceived when observing 
the technologies underlying the three waves of innovation, as described in this dissertation. 
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The first wave of biotechnological innovation has been utilized within the classic paradigm 
of curing large homogenous groups of patients from an industrial way of producing 
medicine (i.e. blockbuster model). In contrast, the third wave is generating better ways of 
early detection and diagnosis combined with personalization and customized treatment and 
a different paradigm is required to utilize this innovation. Moreover, such a paradigm 
requires different management tools, organizational principles and strategic approaches. 
While these are well developed within the classic paradigm, they have to be adapted or 
replaced to adequately sustain biotechnological innovation within a prevention-based 
paradigm. 
 
In the context of organizational innovation, it is thus important to take incremental steps 
towards a prevention- and personalization- based model, and to, simultaneously, keep 
exploiting cures and medicine for homogenous patient groups. This will require 
management with dual strategies, distinguishing between the management of today’s 
business and planning for the future 314. It will further be necessary to experiment with 
combining different business models to develop ambidexterity and balance to adapt the 
scope of the firm. 
 
Different technologies, as mentioned in chapter 1, are associated with different levels of 
uncertainty, as depicted in figure 7.1 21. There have been various ways of conceptualizing 
uncertainty, and because it can be a major issue in blocking or delaying decision-making, it 
has been a thoroughly described concept in literature on decision-making 315-320. Courtney 
et al.21, 22 describe four different levels of uncertainty, with various management tools and 
strategic approaches adequate for each level. As different technologies are associated with 
different uncertainty levels, they also require different management tools and strategic 
approaches for optimal utilization. 
The first biotechnologies are, presumably, associated with level one and level two 
uncertainty, mainly because the type of products and their success have been demonstrated 
(see chapter 1 and 2). Moreover, the managerial tools and organizational principles of 
exploiting these technologies have been relatively well developed and implemented, as 
these products fit the existing pharmaceutical blockbuster model. Technologies of the 
second wave of innovation may be associated with more uncertainty (level two and three), 
as its products are still mostly in development and it remains difficult to predict their 
commercial success. Lastly, the third wave is mostly associated with level three and four 
uncertainty.  
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Figure 7.1 The four levels of uncertainty; a framework to determine the level of uncertainty 
surrounding strategic decisions (adopted from Courtney21) 
 
 
 
 
 
Noteworthy, level four situations are not static and usually migrate to one of the other 
levels over time. In case of dealing with this level of uncertainty, it is important for 
managers to focus on several pre-defined indicators and follow the market evolution to 
adapt their strategy21, 22. In addition, the fourth level of uncertainty is naturally associated 
with more possibility, for example in terms of industry divergence and convergence as 
industry boundaries may become blurred. This is, for example, already illustrated by the 
increasing importance of information technology (IT) as a complimentary technology in 
the third wave of innovation (e.g. bioinformatics, big data)321, 322. 
Thus, current management tools, organizational principles and strategic approaches 
associated with the blockbuster model may have to be adapted or replaced to deal with 
higher uncertainty and fit a prevention- and personalization- based model. In essence, the 
transition can be viewed as changing the model from ‘mass production’ (i.e. blockbuster 
drugs) to a ‘mass customization’ model (i.e. personalized medicine) 323, which usually 
requires significant change in internal processes. Although such significant change may be 
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expected, it is assumed that the current value chain, which is also based on the blockbuster 
model, will remain roughly the same. However, this does not necessarily have to be the 
case. A complete transformation in industrial logic and organization of science-based 
business, may also require an altered or replaced value chain framework designed from a 
prevention- and personalization- based paradigm. 
Moreover, it is questionable whether the currently dominating incumbents will have the 
capacity to design and implement an alternative value chain based on a different logic. 
Like many traditional business models305, the blockbuster model follows a mainstream, but 
obsolete, approach, where there is no need to worry about the value proposition for the 
customer. This is because new products are only approved after they have proven to be 
more safe and efficacious than the standard of care; and this in itself is the value 
proposition for patients. However, with the third wave of innovation, there is an additional 
value proposition as the treatment can be personalized based on a patient’s specific needs. 
This provides opportunities for companies, and potentially even for new groups of 
commercial stakeholders aside from biotech companies and established firms. Existing 
research has argued that at times of radical technological change, new entrants often 
displace industry incumbents because their capabilities are rendered obsolete by such 
radical change, or because investing in the respective radical change may harm existing 
products and programs 324-327. Ansari and Krop328 discuss factors that influence 
displacement or survival of incumbents in the face of radical technological innovation.  
Notwithstanding, it lies beyond the scope of this dissertation to assess which new entrants 
may seize a role in a prevention-based paradigm, or what an alternative value chain, based 
on a new paradigm, may look like. Therefore, the following section discusses 
recommendations, based on a transformation of science-based business within the context 
of the current value chain. 
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7.4 Recommendations: transforming science-based business 
For a large part this dissertation deals with the predictability of future biotechnological 
innovation and in this section an attempt is made to recommend ideas for a new sustainable 
organizational form. Such a leap of improvement would only result from stakeholders 
abandoning the obsolete blockbuster paradigm and moving towards a diagnostic and 
prevention centred paradigm. 
 
In terms of institutionalized innovation, regulatory-authorities would have to fully accept 
clinical research focused on subsets of patient groups based on biomarker and diagnostic 
programs, provided that these become mandatory companion-diagnostics in patient 
treatment. This will reduce R&D expenditures while enforcing the use of markers and 
companion-diagnostics before treatment. Furthermore, a functional healthcare system 
would need health insurers to reimburse value adding diagnostic-therapeutic combinations 
and reward physicians according to their ability to accurately diagnose and prevent disease, 
as opposed to rewarding them for carrying out treatment procedures 303. 
 
Parallel to this, organizational innovation within the industry would have several 
implications. First, it can be assumed that the consolidation trend, as shown in chapter 4, 
will gradually continue, resulting in the remainder of a few large pharmaceutical 
multinationals. The continuation of this trend is, for example, illustrated by the recently 
alleged desire of Pfizer to acquire GSK, after abandoning its bid for AstraZeneca in 2014 
xxxi.  
 
During the transition phase of shifting towards adopting diagnostics, some firms may 
successfully transform while others may fail. The transformation of firms that do survive 
would cause them to shrink in size due to initial declines in short-term profits and 
revenues. However, it would lead to increased sales and profits in the intermediate- and 
long-term303. Given the average duration of R&D trajectories58, this may be estimated at 10 
to 20 years from now. In this scenario firms have entirely abandoned the blockbuster 
model and have integrated the third wave of biotechnological innovation. However, out of 
necessity, they would have to concentrate most on their strengths 205 in late stage clinical 
development, manufacturing, operations, registration, marketing and distribution (see 
chapter 4). The result would be a polycentric model, in which several large firms would 
supply the market with novel diagnostics, therapeutics and therapies. 
 
From here, internal R&D of these firms would be smaller and more exploratory to remain 
at the forefront of science and innovation. Rather than large R&D departments, firms 
would own independently operating business units329 organized in a network, in which 
some units focus on specific technologies and others on specific therapeutic unmet needs. 
Through cooperation and exploratory alliances, multiple technological applications may be 
validated and developed for various indications. Furthermore, these networks would also 
include small entrepreneurial biotech companies that operate in a similar way, and be 
situated within various innovation clusters worldwide. Previous empirical evidence 
                                                            
xxxi  nytimes.com; bloomberg.com 
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suggests that the locus of biotechnological innovation is found in networks of learning, 
rather than in individual firms330. Correspondingly, at this level, many exploratory alliances 
between biotech companies and independently operating business units would fuel the 
open innovation engine, and commercialization would only take place through long-term 
exploitative partnerships with commercialization departments, based on licensing and 
revenue sharing models. Instead of allocating valuable resources at acquiring and 
attempting to grow new businesses, established firms would co-create and sustain networks 
of entrepreneurial companies and independently operating business units, which may be 
(partially) self-owned. Acquisition would only take place at this level of exploration, 
provided that ownership would enhance complementarity between external companies and 
internal business units229. Thus, within the ownership of an established firm, exploration 
would have to become self-sustaining through partnerships with their own 
commercialization departments. Such an organizational form corresponds to the approach 
of differentiation, emphasizing the importance of separating smaller, decentralized, and 
more flexible organizational units that pursue exploration from larger, centralized ones that 
pursue exploitation 290, 331, 332. As such, true ambidexterity will be embraced and 
biotechnology platforms can be scaled-up once their derived applications are ready for 
market consolidation. 
 
This scenario implicates that biotechnology companies would represent a discovery 
industry solely focused on discovering new treatments and innovation, subsequently 
seeking exploratory alliances with business units owned by established firms. 
Biotechnology companies would be an essential part of such a new innovation system and 
through organic- or inorganic growth they may develop a similar organization of 
independently operating business units, partnering with one of the large established firms 
for late stage R&D and commercialization. This would be a long-term dedicated alliance 
through which multiple innovative products may reach the market. Following this growth-
path and after several successful product introductions, these biotechnology companies 
may eventually go public. In contrast to the current model, in which biotechnology 
companies go public while their products are still in clinical development 18. Moreover, 
larger scale acquisitions may also occur at this level, but would merely represent a change 
in ownership of an organization of independently operating business units. As such, it 
would be quite different from the current M&A model of established firms. 
 
Finally, this new organizational form would provide a slightly different role for VCs and 
would increase the difference between VCs that prefer early stage investments and those 
that prefer mezzanine stage (i.e. growth- or late stage) investments. The former would 
invest in earlier stages of R&D, in which portfolio companies are aspiring partnerships 
with business units of established firms. Such VCs would focus on early stage acquisitions 
or trade sales to established firms or mezzanine stage VCs as appropriate exit-strategies. 
Noteworthy, these early stage VCs, would have to diversify more to account for the risk 
associated with earlier R&D stages. Furthermore, VCs that prefer mezzanine stage 
investments would primarily focus on biotechnology companies that either have a product 
in late stage R&D or have products on the market with established partners. Their portfolio 
companies would want to grow by developing their own organization of independently 
operating business units. An exit-strategy for such VCs would either be an IPO or large-
scale acquisition by an established firm. 
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Arguably, the key of a new organizational form as described in this section is that 
exploration and discovery is organized and governed apart and differently from 
exploitation and commercialization. Differentiation of exploration units and exploitation 
departments, based on the required capabilities, is crucial to achieve sustainability 290. 
Success would subsequently depend on the long-term exploitation alliances between the 
exploratory (open) innovation networks and exploitative commercialization departments. 
Although, such a new form is still based on the currently existing value chain, it may foster 
the realization of the potential of biotechnological innovation and thereby significantly 
improve global medicine and health.  
 
Figure 7.2 Simplistic overview of a hypothetical transformed organizational form for science-based 
business 
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7.5 Suggestions for further research 
 
Considering the described transformation of science-based business organization as a form 
to sustain and drive future biotechnological innovation, several avenues for further research 
are suggested. First, network analysis of exploratory alliances among biotech firms, 
particularly in an innovation cluster setting, could shed further light on how these can be 
structured333, 334; and whether a potential organization of independently operating business 
units, focusing on specific technologies or therapeutic unmet needs, has merit. 
Furthermore, firm-level alliance network-analysis may provide insight in how changes in 
network strategy can redirect an exploitation strategy towards an exploration strategy (see 
Dittrich et al.335). This could be valuable during organizational transition, if firms would 
start to adopt the earlier described explorative innovation network-approach. 
 
Further network analysis regarding VC syndication in this context may provide additional 
insights 336, 337, particularly with regards to the role of VCs or VC syndicates in specific 
biotechnology innovation networks338. Moreover, considering VCs’ crucial position in the 
current value chain, and assuming the continuation of the macrotrend towards 
individualized and prevention-based healthcare, the question arises whether and how the 
position of VCs would change and how they could adapt their unique competences to 
capture value in a new paradigm. More specifically, would they still be able to fulfil their 
role as gatekeepers building for big pharma? The answers to these questions highly depend 
on the effects the new paradigm may have on the anatomy, organization and value chain of 
science-based business. Additional further research regarding VC may focus on when and 
where biotechnology companies can best raise money for specific technologies and 
therapeutic areas, and whether correlations can be identified between different types of VC 
syndicates and different types of companies’ ability to get funded. Furthermore, from a VC 
perspective it would be valuable to identify related independent variables and study their 
effect on VC success in terms of successful (trade sale) exits for this specific industry, 
building on existing research 339, 340.  
 
Another angle for further research would be to aim at advancing insights and 
understanding of capabilities and processes for accurate integration of innovation through 
long-term exploitation alliances. Such capabilities and processes may slightly differ 
depending on the technologies in question, and may therefore be optimized as such. An 
additional, but perhaps more pressing issue would be the short-term returns for 
shareholders of established firms as these are likely to decline during an organizational 
transition phase, as described earlier. Further research could explore ways in which pharma 
firms can best approach this transition phase from a strategic and organizational 
perspective, anticipating inertia or relapses into their dominant logic298, 299.  
 
Additional further research could focus on elements that are external to the stakeholders 
studied in this dissertation, but could accelerate the adoption of personalized medicine in 
clinical development and healthcare in general. For example, Davis et al.285 suggest how 
newly established government agencies that assess both clinical- and cost-effectiveness of 
novel diagnostics may catalyse this adoption. Moreover, regulatory authorities can play a 
critical role in establishing and enforcing policies that could incentivise companies to 
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incorporate diagnostics into clinical development and novel treatment regimens. During the 
past decade, initial guidelines for co-development of diagnostics and drugs have already 
been introduced303 and further research may study their effects and barriers of 
implementation. Research regarding institutional elements that can play a catalysing role in 
the adoption of biotechnological innovation will be most relevant. 
 
Finally, the most challenging avenue of research is in the area of further organizational 
innovation towards a prevention-based paradigm, mainly because it remains very difficult 
to predict what the effects will be and what successful organizational innovation in this 
context will look like. Further research may focus on rethinking the current value chain, 
approached from a personalization – and prevention-based perspective, as opposed to the 
current industrial cure-based paradigm. This may result in the attempt to design a new 
value chain framework and to study the implications of an alternate value chain for this 
industry. It may also explore the possibilities for entirely new groups of commercial 
stakeholders and their potential role in such a new value chain.  
There remains much uncertainty in giving substance to the organizational and institutional 
innovation needed to sustain and foster the next waves of biotechnological innovation in 
medicine. But, given the insights gained from the studies presented in this dissertation, the 
necessity for organizational innovation has become evident. 
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Samenvatting 
 
Het uiteindelijke doel van biotechnologische innovatie is het verbeteren van medicijnen en 
daarmee de gezondheid van mensen. Hier wordt fundamentele wetenschap gebruikt om 
nieuwe innovatieve diagnostische en therapeutische producten te ontwikkelen en daarmee 
de levens van patiënten wereldwijd aanzienlijk te verbeteren. Tegelijkertijd, is het doel 
voor drie verschillende groepen ondernemingen om winstgevendheid te genereren vanuit 
biotechnologische innovatie. Deze drie groepen zijn: ondernemende biotechnologie-
bedrijven, investeerders en farmaceutische bedrijven. 
 
In dit proefschrift worden samenwerkingen tussen bedrijven alsmede durfkapitaal 
investeringen geëvalueerd binnen de context van biotechnologische innovatie en op 
wetenschap gebaseerde bedrijfsvoering. Na de opkomst van biotechnologische innovatie 
zijn er een aantal veelbelovende golven van technologische ontwikkeling ontstaan maar tot 
nu toe, zijn de hoge verwachtingen van biotechnologie nog niet gerealiseerd. De 
onderzoeken in dit proefschrift hebben als doel om meer inzicht te krijgen in hoe meer 
biotechnologische innovatie de markt kan bereiken en welke biotechnologieën de 
productiviteit en de gezondheidszorg drastisch zullen veranderen. Gerelateerde processen 
worden onderzocht vanuit verschillende commerciële perspectieven (namelijk: 
biotechnologiebedrijven, grote farmaceutische bedrijven en investeerders). Hoofdstukken 
twee tot en met zes bieden diepgaande analyses van: Technologische ontwikkeling van 
initiële biotechnologische innovatie; De dynamiek van samenwerkingen tussen bedrijven 
en hoe biotechnologie bedrijven hun kansen op succesvolle product introducties kunnen 
vergroten; Hoe grote farmaceutische bedrijven deze dynamiek van samenwerking kunnen 
adapteren om hun productiviteit en innovatie prestatie te verhogen; En welke nieuwe 
velden van biotechnologische innovatie de toekomst van het ‘science-business model’ gaan 
vormgeven, vanuit een investeerders perspectief. 
 
De eerste onderzoeken van dit proefschrift tonen aan dat allianties tussen farmaceutische 
bedrijven en biotechnologiebedrijven van positieve invloed zijn op innovatie. Anderzijds 
hebben overnames van biotechnologiebedrijven door farmaceutische bedrijven een 
negatieve invloed op innovatie. Verder blijkt er in het geval van allianties sprake te zijn 
van een risico-rendement trade-off in nieuwe productontwikkeling, voor 
biotechnologiebedrijven als technologie-aanbieders in deze allianties. Daarnaast blijkt uit 
de onderzoeken dat allianties met- en overnames van biotechnologiebedrijven 
complementaire innovatie activiteiten zijn bij een hoger niveau van absorptiecapaciteit.  
Betreft durfkapitaal, blijkt uit de laatste onderzoeken van het proefschrift dat investeerders 
een cruciale rol vervullen in de biofarmaceutische waardeketen. Door te investeren in de 
juiste technologieën en therapeutische gebieden, anticiperen deze investeerders op de 
toekomstige vraag naar innovatie van farmaceutische bedrijven. Tegelijkertijd creëren 
durfkapitaal investeerders een technologie-push als visionaire poortwachters van innovatie. 
Tot slot wordt in dit proefschrift geconcludeerd dat de dominante logica en het 
‘blockbuster’ paradigma van grote farmaceutische bedrijven de oorzaken zijn geweest van 
de onderbenutting van biotechnologische innovatie. Verder wordt een transformatie 
voorgesteld richting een nieuwe organisatorische vorm voor duurzame, op wetenschap 
gebaseerde, bedrijfsvoering en effectieve exploitatie van biotechnologische innovatie.  
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Summary 
 
Improving medicine and health is the ultimate purpose of biotechnological innovation, 
where basic science is used to develop new innovative diagnostics and therapeutics to 
significantly improve the lives of patients worldwide. Concurrently, for three stakeholder 
groups the primary goal is to generate profitable business from biotechnological 
innovation. These stakeholders are ‘entrepreneurial’ biotech companies, venture capitalists 
and established pharmaceutical firms. 
 
This dissertation evaluates interfirm cooperation and venture capital investments in the 
context of biotechnological innovation and science-based business. After the rise of 
biotechnological innovation, several promising waves of technological development have 
emerged but as of yet, the high expectations of biotechnology have not been realized. The 
studies in this dissertation aim to better understand how more biotechnological innovation 
can reach the market and which biotechnologies will revolutionize R&D productivity and 
global healthcare. Related processes are evaluated from different business perspectives (i.e. 
entrepreneurial biotech companies, established pharmaceutical firms and venture 
capitalists). The five research chapters offer thorough analyses of: Technological 
development of initial biotechnological innovation; The dynamics of interfirm cooperation 
and how biotech companies can increase chances of eventual product introduction; How 
pharmaceutical firms can adapt these interfirm cooperation dynamics to increase R&D 
productivity and innovation performance; And which new fields of biotechnological 
innovation may shape the future of the ‘science-business model’ from a venture capital 
perspective. 
 
The first studies show that alliances between established pharmaceutical firms and biotech 
companies outperform acquisitions of biotech companies by such firms, as these 
acquisition negatively affect innovation performance. Furthermore, alliances involve a 
risk-return trade-off in new product development, for biotech companies as technology 
suppliers. Moreover, for big pharma, alliances with- and acquisitions of biotech companies 
are both complementary innovation activities at higher levels of firms’ absorptive capacity. 
Regarding venture capital, the final studies show that venture capitalists fulfil a crucial role 
in the biopharmaceutical value chain. By investing in the right technologies and therapeutic 
areas, venture capitalists build for big pharma as they foresee big pharma’s future 
innovation demand. Simultaneously, venture capitalists create a technology push as 
visionary technological gatekeepers. Finally, the dissertation concludes that big pharma’s 
dominant logic and blockbuster paradigm have been the root cause of underutilized 
biotechnological innovation. It further proposes transformation towards a new 
organizational form for sustainable science-based business and effective exploitation of 
biotechnological innovation. 
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INTERFIRM COOPERATION EFFECTS AND A VENTURE CAPITAL PERSPECTIVE
Improving medicine and health is the ultimate purpose of biotechnological innovation,
where basic science is used to develop new innovative diagnostics and therapeutics to
significantly improve the lives of patients worldwide. Concurrently, for three stakeholder
groups, the primary goal is to generate profitable business from biotechnological innova -
tion. These stakeholders are ‘entrepreneurial’ biotech companies, venture capitalists and
established pharmaceutical firms.
This dissertation evaluates interfirm cooperation and venture capital investments, aiming
to better understand how more biotechnological innovation can reach the market and
which biotechnologies will revolutionize R&D productivity and global healthcare. The first
studies show that alliances between established pharmaceutical firms and biotech compa -
nies outperform acquisitions of biotech companies by such firms, as these acquisi tion negati -
vely affect innovation performance. Furthermore, alliances involve a risk-return trade-off in
new product development, for biotech companies as technology suppliers. Moreover, for
big pharma, alliances with- and acquisitions of biotech companies are both complementary
innovation activities at higher levels of firms’ absorptive capacity.
Regarding venture capital, the final studies show that venture capitalists fulfil a crucial
role in the biopharmaceutical value chain. By investing in the right technologies and
therapeutic areas, venture capitalists build for big pharma as they foresee big pharma’s
future innovation demand. Simultaneously, venture capitalists create a technology push as
visionary technological gatekeepers. 
Finally, the dissertation concludes that big pharma’s dominant logic and blockbuster
paradigm have been the root cause of underutilized biotechnological innovation. It further
proposes transformation towards a new organizational form for sustainable science-based
business and effective exploitation of biotechnological innovation.
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